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WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal of International Relations

Volume X, Number 1 October 1957

Price $6.00 per year

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PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

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The editors invite the submission of articles bearing upon problems of international relations. Editorial communications and manuscripts should be addressed to WORLD POLITICS, Woodrow Wilson Hall, Princeton, N.J.

Subscriptions: WORLD POLITICS, Woodrow Wilson Hall, Princeton, N.J.
Advertising: Advertising Department, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.

WORLD POLITICS is indexed by the *International Index to Periodicals*, and abstracts of its articles appear in *International Political Science Abstracts*.

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WORLD POLITICS. Published quarterly by Princeton University Press. October 1957. Vol. X, No. 1. Entered as Second Class matter in the Post Office at Princeton, New Jersey, under the Act of March 3, 1879. Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press. Subscriptions $6.00 per year (two years $10.00); single copies $2.00. Foreign postage 25 cents additional per year.

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WORLD POLITICS

VOL. X • OCTOBER 1957 • NO. 1

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THE CONTRIBUTORS

BRUCE F. JOHNSTON, Associate Professor at the Food Research Institute, Stanford University, served as chief of the Food Branch, Price and Distribution Division of the Economic and Scientific Section of SCAP in Tokyo, and later as an agricultural economist with the U.S. Mission to NATO and European Regional Organizations in Paris. He is co-author of *Japanese Food Management in World War II* (1953).

QUINCY WRIGHT, Professor Emeritus of International Law at the University of Chicago, is currently Visiting Professor of International Law at the School of International Studies, University of Delhi, India. The most recent of his many books is *The Study of International Relations* (1955).

KLAUS KNORR is Professor of Economics and Associate Director of the Center of International Studies at Princeton University. He recently published *The War Potential of Nations* (1956) and contributed to *Military Policy and National Security*, edited by William W. Kaufmann (1956).

GORDON WRIGHT, Professor of History at Stanford University, is the author of *The Reshaping of French Democracy* (1948) and a contributor to *Modern France: The Problems of the Third and Fourth Republics*, edited by E. M. Earle (1951).

CHARLES WOLF, JR., a member of the Economics Division of The RAND Corporation, was associated with U.S. Foreign Assistance Programs from 1950 through 1953. He is the author of *The Indonesian Story* (1948) and co-author, with Sidney C. Sufrin, of *Capital Formation and Foreign Investment in Underdeveloped Areas* (1955).

FRED A. SONDERMANN is Assistant Professor of Political Science at The Colorado College. During the past academic year he was a Ford International Relations Fellow at Stanford University, studying the relationship between the behavioral sciences and international relations.

BERNARD BRODIE is a Senior Staff Member of The RAND Corporation. He is the author of *A Guide to Naval Strategy* (3rd ed., 1954) and co-author of *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order* (1946).

TALCOTT PARSONS is Professor of Sociology at Harvard University and has been a Marshall Lecturer in Economics at Cambridge University. He is co-author, with Neil J. Smelser, *of Economy and Society: A Study in the Integration of Economic and Social Theory* (1956).

HERBERT H. HYMAN, Professor of Sociology and Associate Director of the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University, will be Visiting Professor of Research Methods in Sociology at the University of Ankara, Turkey, during the current academic year. Among his publications are *Survey Design and Analysis* (1955) and *Political Socialization*, which will appear in 1958.

SAMUEL H. BEER is Professor of Government and General Education and Chairman of the Department of Government at Harvard University. The author of *Treasury Control: The Coordination of Financial and Economic Policy in Britain* (1956) and a contributor to *Modern Political Parties*, edited by Sigmund Neumann (1955), he is at work on a book dealing with British parties and pressure groups.

ROBERT S. MERRILL is Research Assistant at the Research Center for Economic Development and Cultural Change of the University of Chicago and Associate Editor of its journal, *Economic Development and Cultural Change*. He is engaged in an analysis of theories dealing with the role of social and cultural factors in economic growth.

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FARM SURPLUSES AND FOREIGN POLICY*

By BRUCE F. JOHNSTON

GOVERNMENT stocks of surplus agricultural commodities, which reached a record level of over nine billion dollars in February 1956,[1] have moved to the center of the stage in recent agricultural legislation and discussions of the farm problem. Reasons for this prominence are numerous. Most obvious perhaps is simply the reaction against the apparent waste of resources in building up huge stocks for which no clear use is in sight. Merely to maintain stocks of this magnitude is a costly undertaking and has necessitated an uneconomic expansion of storage facilities. Little wonder, then, that more and more attention is being devoted to finding means for disposing of this vast mass of agricultural products acquired by the United States government as a prop to farm prices.

Since it is obvious that rapid liquidation of these enormous stocks on our home market would result in catastrophic price declines, there appears to be virtually no likelihood that Congress would agree to any measure which would appreciably relax the tight restrictions governing domestic sales of Commodity Credit Corporation stocks. For this reason, the means of disposal favored by Congress and the Department of Agriculture is sale or other disposition in foreign countries, a method which has alarmed competing export countries and raises the possibility of serious foreign repercussions if measures to dispose of our surpluses abroad are pursued too aggressively.

Our agricultural surpluses are therefore a headache, not only to ourselves but also to other producing countries. On the other hand, past experience has demonstrated that they can be regarded also as a potential asset and, as such, they challenge us to find constructive means for their use.

This article will examine some of the problems and opportunities which confront us because of the existence of these unprecedented stocks of surplus agricultural commodities. After a brief review of certain long-recognized conflicts between our farm programs and foreign

* Helen C. Farnsworth, Roger Gray, and E. Louise Peffer, all of the Food Research Institute, Stanford University, have assisted me with valuable suggestions and criticism.

[1] Total of stocks pledged against outstanding loans and purchase agreements and Commodity Credit Corporation stocks in inventory.

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trade policies, attention will be given to the foreign repercussions of more recent measures for disposing of our surpluses abroad on special terms. A final section will suggest ways in which our stocks might be used for constructive purposes.

I. Agriculture and U.S. Tariff and Trade Policy

Conflict between our agricultural program and United States foreign economic policy is not a new problem.[2] American agriculture has traditionally been a center of opposition to high tariff policies, since import duties on manufactures meant higher prices for farmers as consumers and reduced the ability of foreign countries to finance imports of our agricultural exports. But during the past two decades, as our general trade and tariff policy has moved in the liberal direction charted by the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, agriculture has emerged as a champion of export subsidies and import restrictions. This has been a by-product of our price-support legislation, a necessary consequence of the particular techniques that were adopted to achieve our farm income and price goals.[3]

Whenever we undertake to support the price of one of our export products, the United States support program tends to encourage foreign producers to expand output and exports at our expense because of the "umbrella effect" of our supported prices. In short, our exports are "priced out of the market" as exporters in other countries undercut American prices determined by the domestic support level—that is, unless and until our government bridges the gap with an export subsidy.

A problem also arises with regard to imports, especially in the case of commodities such as cheese and butter. For such products, high support prices in the United States make this country a very attractive market for foreign exporters, which prompts us to impose import quotas or other restrictions to prevent imports from interfering with

[2] See D. Gale Johnson, "Reconciling Agricultural and Foreign Trade Policies," *Journal of Political Economy*, LV (December 1947), pp. 567-71; *idem, Trade and Agriculture: A Study of Inconsistent Policies*, New York, 1950; and *Report to the President and the Congress*, submitted in 1954 by the Commission on Foreign Economic Policy ("Randall Commission"), pp. 28-34.

[3] The President's Commission on Foreign Economic Policy asserted that "Ways of achieving desirable farm policy goals can be found without resort to the kind of inflexible price supports or fixed prices which hold the prices of our farm products above the level of world prices"; but the Commission considered the task of offering suggestions to that end as beyond its terms of reference. *Op.cit.*, p. 32. The book by D. Gale Johnson cited above devotes several chapters to this problem of trying to "show how the inconsistencies can be resolved without sacrificing the achievement of the important goals in either policy area." *Op.cit.*, p. v.

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the operation of our domestic price-support program—or, more precisely, from reaping some of the benefits of a price-support program financed by the American taxpayer and consumer.

We have become so familiar with the various restrictions imposed as a by-product of our price-support programs that we tend to take them pretty much for granted and give little thought to the unfavorable effects which they have on some of our foreign economic policies.[4] Throughout the period since World War II, an objective of American foreign policy has been to promote freer trade among nations as one means of increasing the economic strength of the free world. A priority goal has been to secure the elimination of import quotas and other quantitative restrictions which are considered especially undesirable forms of trade restriction, since they tend to be arbitrary, are subject to frequent revision, provide a degree of protection which is difficult to evaluate but likely to be very high, and incidentally create windfall profits for those who do obtain import licenses. Our efforts have, however, been severely handicapped by the fact that we have consistently insisted on our right to apply quantitative restrictions to agricultural products; and other countries have not lacked the imagination to find justifications for the exceptions which were convenient from their point of view.

II. Foreign Surplus Disposal Measures

Special measures to dispose of United States surplus agricultural products abroad are also an old story. But with the addition of new techniques and greatly expanded use of old ones, foreign surplus disposal has emerged as a mountainous problem posing new and far more serious difficulties. Pressure for these recent changes has, of course, been generated by the tremendous build-up in the stocks held by the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). Stocks in inventory and stocks pledged against outstanding loans and purchase agreements increased almost fivefold between February 1952 and February 1956, from less than two billion dollars to 9.1 billion dollars. Most of the build-up occurred between 1952 and 1954, when annual increases of 70 and 100 per cent were registered. Owing to the combined effect of vigorous efforts at surplus disposal, acreage limitations, drought in extensive

[4] Foreign outcries against our import restrictions reached a peak in 1952 when the Netherlands and Denmark reacted against embargoes on cheese imports imposed in accordance with the "Andresen amendment" to the Defense Production Act of 1951. It came almost as a liberal gesture when this amendment was allowed to lapse in 1953 and we replaced the outright embargoes with import quotas under the provisions of Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.

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areas, and lowering of support levels, the additions to stocks were much less in the next two years—18 per cent between 1954 and 1955, and 20 per cent during the twelve-month period ending in February 1956. And in February 1957 the total investment in surplus agricultural commodities—some 8.5 billion dollars—represented a reduction of 7 per cent from the peak level of February 1956.[5]

Hopes have been expressed that the Soil Bank will make a large contribution toward the elimination of these stocks over the next four or five years. It appears, however, that most agricultural economists are skeptical whether the Soil Bank will actually reduce output significantly. American farmers have shown a remarkable ability to maintain output, despite acreage reductions, by securing higher yields per acre, by concentrating production on the best land, and by optimum timing of planting and other operations, heavier applications of fertilizer, and more generous use of irrigation water.

In addition to the Soil Bank program, the Agricultural Act of 1956 contains a number of other provisions aimed at a reduction in our stocks of surplus agricultural commodities. Indeed, Title II of the Act carries the unequivocal label "Surplus Disposal" and its first section declares: "The Commodity Credit Corporation shall as rapidly as possible consistent with its existing authority, the operation of the price support program, and orderly liquidation, dispose of all stocks of agricultural commodities held by it."

One of the provisions is simply a matter of authorizing larger appropriations—half a billion dollars annually—for subsidizing agricultural exports. Legislative authority for export subsidies dates all the way back to 1935, but subsidization on the present scale is a fairly recent development. Limited programs were carried out to subsidize exports of such items as dried fruit, often with the rationale that these subsidies were equalizing foreign exchange licensing or other discriminatory action against United States exports. The only large-scale program prior to World War II was carried out by the Department of Agriculture in 1938/39, when export subsidies were paid on nearly a hundred million bushels of wheat. Secretary of Agriculture Wallace tried to justify this, however, as an emergency measure: "Export subsidies," he declared, "are a type of economic warfare which, if used on a large

[5] Current data on the CCC investment in agricultural commodities are given in Commodity Credit Corporation, *Report of Financial Operations and Conditions*, monthly. A convenient summary of monthly data for the period July 1947-March 1957 is contained in U.S. Department of Agriculture, Commodity Stabilization Service and Commodity Credit Corporation, *Price Support Program. Charts and Tables. Selected Activities through quarter ending March 31, 1957.*

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scale and for a long time, eventually and almost inevitably harms the nation which uses the subsidy more than it harms anyone else. Nevertheless, in certain emergencies, there may be exceptional and compelling circumstances justifying the use of export subsidies for limited and temporary purposes."[6]

Export subsidies on a large scale became established policy under the first International Wheat Agreement (1949-1953) when the government paid subsidies to compensate exporters for the difference between the IWA maximum price and the prevailing United States prices, which were then above the maximum. At present, equivalent subsidies also apply to exports outside the wheat agreement, and the subsidy rates are intended to make our exports competitive, not merely to bring the export price down to the IWA maximum.

Insistent demands for an export subsidy program for cotton were resisted until January 1956, but at that time the Commodity Credit Corporation initiated a program to dispose of a million bales at competitive prices. The Agricultural Act of 1956 directs the Commodity Credit Corporation to continue and expand this program to reduce its inventory by making cotton available for export at whatever prices may be necessary to "re-establish and maintain the fair historical share of the world market for United States cotton."[7] Although the cotton program does not operate through subsidies to commercial exporters, the effect of a program under which the Commodity Credit Corporation absorbs whatever loss is necessary to resell its stocks at competitive prices is essentially the same. Many would argue, however, that the recently launched cotton program has an additional disadvantage in the impetus which it gives to state trading and bilateralism, trends which have usually been regarded as contrary to United States policy and interests.

Another recent development has been the adoption of entirely new programs to move our surplus agricultural products abroad through sales on special terms. The first major step in this direction was Section

[6] Quoted by V. P. Timoshenko in "Wheat Subsidization and Exports: The Experience of 1938-39," *Wheat Studies of the Food Research Institute* (Stanford University), XVII, (October 1940), p. 45n.

[7] It is scarcely necessary to point out that it is impossible to define a "fair historical share" in any satisfactory manner. The most "normal" feature of international trade in agricultural products is the manner in which exports and imports of individual countries fluctuate from year to year, reflecting changes in domestic crops and foreign exchange positions. In the case of cotton, U.S. authorities can, however, point to a rather steady decline in our share of world cotton exports as our price-support program has encouraged expanded production abroad and placed this country in the role of a "residual supplier."

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550 of the Mutual Security Act of 1953, which stipulated that up to $250 million of our economic aid was to be made available in the form of surplus agricultural commodities. Similar provisions were included in the Mutual Security Act of 1954 and its 1955, 1956, and 1957 amendments.

The second big step was Public Law 480, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954. Initially, Title I of this Act authorized special sales of $700 million in surplus agricultural commodities over the three-year period ending June 30, 1957. But the authorization for these special sales against local currencies was raised to $1.5 billion in July 1955 and to $3 billion in July 1956. The Act specifies various ways in which the local currency received in payment for exports under Public Law 480 may be used—e.g., to help develop new markets for United States agricultural products, to purchase materials for our strategic stockpile, to pay United States obligations abroad, and to promote economic development in the purchasing country. Title II authorizes grants of $300 million in surplus commodities over a three-year period to meet famine and other urgent relief requirements in foreign countries; and Title III enlarges the provisions for surplus disposal through barter agreements and authorizes the CCC to donate surplus food to private relief organizations for distribution overseas, the "Share Our Surplus" program.[8]

Foreign reaction against these programs for disposing of our surplus stocks by special export sales was prompt; and the outcries have continued in a rising crescendo in recent months. Such criticism was not unexpected. Section 550, the first of the legislative provisions authorizing special disposal schemes, included rather carefully defined safeguards to allay foreign fears. Exports under Section 550 were to be "additional" to normal trade, and precautions were to be taken "to safeguard against the substitution or displacement of usual marketings of the United States or friendly countries" and also "to assure to the maximum extent practicable that sales prices of such commodities are consistent with world prices of like commodities of similar quality." Public Law 480, enacted a year later, directed the administration to "take reasonable precautions to safeguard usual marketings of the United States and to assure that sales under the Act will not unduly disrupt world prices of agricultural commodities." The conditions had

[8] For a more complete summary of legislation authorizing the various types of special export programs, see *Prospects of Foreign Disposal of Domestic Agricultural Surpluses*, A Staff Study, directed by the Interagency Committee on Agricultural Surplus Disposal, May 1956, pp. 40-49.

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obviously been relaxed to allow a more vigorous and, some would say, more realistic disposal program: the reference to effects on exports of friendly countries had been deleted and the concern with prices was merely intended to avoid disrupting world prices *unduly*.

These special sales against local currency, a substantial part of which is invariably turned over to the government of the importing country as a grant or long-term loan under favorable terms, have often been branded as "unfair competition" and a form of "dumping." Protectionist elements in Europe have pointed to these measures as an additional reason for maintaining or increasing barriers against imports of American agricultural products, the claim being that they cannot open their markets to such unfair competition. Much more important, however, are the effects on third countries exporting the same or competing products. The view has often been expressed by representatives of agricultural exporting countries that they are willing to compete with this country on an economic basis, but that they cannot compete with the power of the United States Treasury to subsidize our exports.

Australian reaction to a recent agreement between the United States and India for sales of agricultural products under Public Law 480 provides an example of foreign protests against these measures. The agreement with India, announced in August 1956, was the largest that had ever been negotiated under Public Law 480 and the first to call for deliveries over a three-year period. Of total sales of $360 million (including an estimated $54 million for ocean transportation), $200 million was to finance exports of some 130 million bushels of wheat. Payments for imports under this agreement were to be made in rupees, 20 per cent of which would be used to defray expenses of the United States government in India, 15 per cent to be made available as a grant, and the balance to be loaned to India for a forty-year term at low interest rates.

The chairman of the Australian Wheat Board, Sir John Teasdale, charged that "the United States is using the powers granted by Congress Public Law 480 to dump primary products in other countries. The terms of sales, financial considerations and ethics of fair trade are being made subservient to the desperate desire to shift the responsibility for the caretaking and storing of products onto countries other than [the] U.S.A."[9] He expressed particular concern over reports that, in addition to the 130 million bushels of wheat being sold for local currency which was to be used to establish reserve stocks, the United

[9] *The Farmer's Weekly* (Perth), October 11, 1956.

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States would have a prior right to supply 5.5 million bushels in each year of the agreement against total commercial imports expected to average approximately 20 million bushels. (A Memorandum of Understanding published with the Indian agreement does contain such a stipulation.) Australia alone exported about 23 million bushels to India in 1954 and in 1955, he took pains to point out, not to mention the locational factor, which makes India "a natural market for Australian wheat. . . ."[10] Similar charges were leveled by Australia's Minister for Trade, John McEwen, in discussing the Indian agreement in the Federal Parliament. He declared that Australia's export prospects for wheat would be destroyed or distorted by this special sale and took the occasion to charge that Australia had been denied "the right to sell Australian butter, cheese and other products in the U.S.," a right which had been assured in return for tariff concessions on United States goods "under a signed contractual agreement."[11] In a speech to the National Catholic Rural Movement in the spring of 1956, Mr. T. V. Strong, director of Australia's Bureau of Agricultural Economics, declared: "The dumping policy of the United States had been the most demoralising in the history of international trade."[12]

Numerous similar complaints have been registered against the special sales programs since the adoption of the initial Section 550 program in 1953; on the whole, however, the unfavorable repercussions to date seem to have been less serious than had been anticipated. Other countries may have refrained from retaliation, not because provocation was lacking but because the economic power of the United States is so great relative to that of its trading partners that retaliation is not rewarding. Furthermore, the United States administration has, at least until recently, paid a good deal of attention to consultation and to safeguards to minimize adverse effects on third countries. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has exercised some constructive leadership on this problem and has given countries a chance to criticize features of disposal arrangements which threatened their interests. It has recommended to member countries certain "principles" to govern surplus disposal, including safeguards to ensure that excess stocks are disposed of "in an orderly manner so as to avoid any undue pressure resulting in sharp falls of prices on world markets"; and consideration of "the extent to which commodities supplied on concessional terms

[10] *Ibid.*

[11] *The Mercury* (Hobart), October 5, 1956, and *The Land* (Sydney), October 11, 1956.

[12] Quoting the press summary in the *Canberra Times*, April 25, 1956.

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are likely to be absorbed by additional consumption (i.e., consumption which would not have taken place in the absence of the transaction on special terms)."[13] In addition, countries have been urged to judge each action on the basis of weighing the benefits of an agreement to a receiving and supplying country against possible harm to competing exporting countries.

All Public Law 480 agreements have embodied a statement of intention along these lines: "The two Governments agree that they will take reasonable precautions to assure that sales or purchases of surplus agricultural commodities pursuant to this Agreement will not unduly disrupt world prices of agricultural commodities, displace the usual marketings of the United States in these commodities or materially impair relations among the countries of the free world."[14] But such an "undertaking is, of course, very general and is subject to a wide range of interpretation," as a staff study prepared for the Interagency Committee on Agricultural Surplus Disposal points out.[15] Moreover, there is a danger that collateral agreements or understandings arrived at outside the basic agreement to prevent displacement of "usual marketings of the United States" will give us a privileged position at the expense of competing exporters who will feel the full impact of any reduction in normal imports resulting from the special sales under Public Law 480. Thus the Brazilian government, following a pattern which is common in these surplus disposal agreements, has agreed to furnish us information on "provisions for the maintenance of usual [U.S.] marketings." According to Canadian reports, the provisions to that end have had the effect of giving the United States a guaranteed share of Brazil's normal imports. It has already been noted that stipulations of this character in connection with the agreement with India have given rise to special concern in Australia.

There seems reason to believe that since the spring or summer of 1956, the Congress and the U.S. Department of Agriculture have elected to give an overriding priority to the job of finding foreign outlets for our surplus stocks and have, accordingly, become relatively indifferent to the foreign repercussions of such actions. In October 1956, a leading journal of the world grain trade observed that "Recent criticism by Canadian and Australian spokesmen of American export policy, so

[13] FAO, *Disposal of Agricultural Surpluses* (Commodity Policy Studies, No. 5), June 1954, p. 41.

[14] Quoted from "Agreement and Exchange of Notes Between the United States of America and Brazil, Signed at Rio de Janeiro, November 16, 1955," Department of State Publication 6200, p. 14.

[15] *Prospects of Foreign Disposal of Domestic Agricultural Surpluses, op.cit.*, p. 59.

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far as it affects wheat, has been expressed in stronger terms than we have seen at any time since the war."[16]

There is no question but that the surplus disposal programs have been operating at an accelerated tempo and that exports have been very large and have more than offset current additions to the CCC stockpile. During the twelve-month period ending May 31, 1957, stocks in inventory and under loan were reduced from $8.5 billion to something over $7.6 billion. Secretary of Agriculture Benson announced in October 1956 that agreements for special sales under Title I of Public Law 480 had reached a total of $2.2 billion and that nearly half of this total represented agreements signed between March and late October 1956. The accelerated tempo of activity is shown still more clearly by the reports on quantities exported. During the twelve-month period ending in June 1956, exports of agricultural commodities under Title I of Public Law 480 amounted to 3.6 million metric tons. During the six-month period July-December 1956, shipments were nearly 3.1 million tons, and for the ten-month period ending in April 1957 these Title I shipments exceeded 6.1 million tons. The program to sell CCC stocks of cotton at competitive prices in order to regain our "fair share" of world trade has also been pushed vigorously; and United States cotton exports, which accounted for as little as 18 per cent of total world trade in 1955, are expected to increase to about 45 per cent of the world total during 1956/57.[17]

The existence of a generally buoyant world market for agricultural imports has, however, had a moderating influence on foreign criticism. Poor breadgrain crops in Europe as a result of the severe winter of 1955/56 and other factors have strengthened demand for agricultural imports. Moreover, our special export programs have no doubt stimulated an expansion of imports—though only in part for increased consumption, since there has been some rebuilding of pipeline and other stocks under the attractive conditions of purchase which have prevailed.

[16] *George Broomhall's Corn Trade News*, weekly and American edition, October 17, 1956.

[17] USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service, "Title I, Public Law 480 Commitments Pass Two Billion Dollar Mark," FSD-240-56, October 23, 1956; and USDA press releases 2258-56, dated August 1, 1956, and 1545-57, dated May 16, 1957; USDA, Agricultural Marketing Service, *The Cotton Situation*, February and April 1957. Wheat exports under Title I of Public Law 480 rose from 2.5 million metric tons in the 1955/56 crop year to nearly 4.0 million tons in the first ten months of 1956/57; rice shipments rose from 120,000 tons in 1955/56 to close to 750,000 tons; and Title I exports of cotton rose to 1.3 million bales in the first ten months of 1956/57 from 468,000 bales in 1955/56. This is but a fraction of total cotton exports; mainly as a result of the sales of CCC stocks, cotton exports are expected to exceed 7 million bales in 1956/57, as compared with 2.2 million bales during the 1955/56 marketing year.

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Any weakening of market conditions leading to a decline in world agricultural prices from recent levels can be expected to lead to a sharpening of the attacks leveled at our surplus disposal programs.

III. Constructive Uses for Surplus Agricultural Commodities

It has been suggested that our stocks of surplus agricultural commodities are both a headache, giving rise to the unfavorable repercussions examined in the preceding section, and a potential asset. If they were "surplus" in the most literal sense of the word, we might simply destroy them and be done with the costs of storage and problems of disposal once and for all. But destruction of food and fiber is "sinful," especially in a world where consumption levels in many areas are distressingly low.

It is also fresh in memory that on two occasions in our recent history accumulated stocks of agricultural commodities, which were becoming uncomfortably large, were abruptly transformed into valuable assets. During World War II the CCC investment in agricultural commodities, which had reached a peak of close to two billion dollars in December 1942, "constituted a military reserve of enormous importance,"[18] although they had been regarded as burdensome surpluses not so many months before. In similar fashion, CCC holdings and outstanding loans were at a near-record level in May of 1950 and were giving rise to serious concern. But with the outbreak of hostilities in Korea in the following month these holdings became a valuable reserve which helped to meet the upsurge in domestic and in world demand and cushioned the inflationary rise in prices. On the eve of Korea the CCC investment in wheat stood at close to 400 million bushels and approximately 5 million bales of cotton were in inventory or under loan. Two years later the investment in wheat was down to 165 million bushels and the figure for cotton was less than half a million bales.

Present holdings dwarf the stock levels reached in 1942 and 1950 despite the considerable reductions which have occurred since early 1956, chiefly as a result of the special export program. At the end of February 1956, the CCC investment in wheat exceeded 1.1 billion bushels. Stocks in inventory or under loan at the end of May 1957 were down nearly 250 million bushels from the February 1956 peak, but the CCC inventory of 850 million bushels was still large enough to meet our food needs for approximately a year and a half without the

[18] M. R. Benedict, *Farm Policies of the United States, 1790-1950*, New York, 1953, p. 407.

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production of another bushel. Cotton in the price support inventory and pledged for outstanding loans reached a peak of 14.2 million bales in January 1956. The CCC investment in cotton was down to 9.0 million bales at the end of May 1957 but this was still sufficient to meet a year's normal requirements of our mills. Such comparisons also underscore the disastrous impact on farm prices and incomes that would result from liquidating such stocks on the domestic market.[19] It is all too obvious why Congressional and other farm leaders have been preoccupied with schemes for disposing of our surpluses abroad rather than at home.

Possibilities for finding domestic outlets for surplus commodities "outside normal commercial channels" have, however, received some consideration. The Department of Agriculture has explored various possibilities for industrial uses of surplus commodities, notably the conversion of grain into alcohol for production of synthetic rubber or (as ethyl alcohol) for use as an additive to gasoline. But the economic value of grain for such uses would be ridiculously low, permitting a payment of only from 20 to 60 cents a bushel for grain used as a raw material for rubber, and a mere 10 to 25 cents a bushel if it is used as a blending agent in gasoline.[20]

Some enthusiasm has been generated for reviving the Food Stamp Plan which was in effect between 1939 and 1943 as a device for increasing food consumption of low-income families. An analysis of this possibility by the Department of Agriculture is a refreshing document because of the obvious reluctance of the agency to assume an additional function.[21] And the difficulties which are mentioned and which explain the lack of enthusiasm evident in this analysis are not to be dismissed lightly. Most discouraging for those who see a Food Stamp Plan as a solution of the surplus problem is the fact that enlarged purchasing power for low-income families in this country would mean substantially increased consumption of fruits and vegetables, some increase for livestock products, but a *decrease* for wheat products. Moreover, the administrative problems and costs of certifying eligibility of participating families, securing compliance with Stamp Plan regulations, and trying

[19] The seriousness of the impact would, of course, depend on how rapidly or gradually the liquidation was effected. In the case of wheat, a program to divert from 200 to 300 million bushels of wheat to feed use each year would lead to a decline in feed prices which feed grain producers would regard as painful but which could scarcely be regarded as "disastrous."

[20] USDA, *Disposition of Stocks of Agricultural Products Held by the Commodity Credit Corporation*, A Report Developed in the U.S. Department of Agriculture Pursuant to Public Law 480, 84th Congress, Transmitted to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, August 27, 1956, Part A, pp. 3-4.

[21] *Ibid.*, Part B, pp. 1-14.

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to minimize "substitution" (use of a part of the supplemental food money for normal food expenditures rather than for additional purchases) would be substantial; and such machinery seems a good deal harder to justify in 1957 than in the late 1930's, when unemployment was still substantial and recovery from the depression far from complete.

Strategic stockpiling of food within the United States as well as in other NATO countries has also been considered as a possible outlet for a part of our holdings of surplus agricultural commodities. The Agricultural Act of 1956 directed the Secretary of Agriculture to "submit to Congress within ninety days . . . detailed programs, with recommendations for any additional legislation needed to carry out such programs . . ." for the rapid disposition of CCC stocks of agricultural commodities and "for strategic stockpiling of foodstuffs and other agricultural products (A) inside the United States and (B) outside the United States. . . ."

In its preliminary report on strategic stockpiling for food, the Department of Agriculture manifested a rather skeptical attitude toward the need for such stockpiling within this country.[22] It should be made clear, however, that this report is an analysis of the problem, not a recommendation pro or con. Drawing upon the experience gained during Operation Alert 1956, the report concluded that probable damage of food supplies as a result of a nuclear attack would not be great. The most serious effects indicated were destruction of certain processing facilities in vulnerable areas, which might be on the order of 40 per cent in the case of the yeast industry and close to 30 per cent of our flour milling capacity, although "remaining mills could meet needs."[23] Some consideration was given to the possible need for area stockpiles because of possible disruption of movement of food from surplus to deficit areas. The report stated, however, that "Insofar as transportation is concerned, Operation Alert 1956 experience does not indicate a serious problem."[24]

Considerable emphasis was placed on "the obstacles and difficulties which are certain to be involved in any stockpile undertaking" to make it completely clear "that a strategic stockpiling need must be urgent and compelling in order to justify the substantial expenditures in manpower, money, and other resources which would be entailed."[25] (One may wonder parenthetically if the resources devoted to building up our huge surplus stocks were evaluated against such exacting criteria.)

[22] "Preliminary Report and Analysis of the Need for Strategic Stockpiling of Food in the United States and Its Territories and in Foreign Countries," *ibid.*, Part c.
[23] *Ibid.*, Part c, p. 7. [24] *Ibid.*, Part c, p. 9. [25] *Ibid.*, Part c, p. 2.

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Foremost among the difficulties stressed by the report was the "complex problem . . . of rotation and management of the food supplies involved."[26] It was also claimed that "the great majority of the items which would be required in a well rounded stockpile are items which are not now in surplus supply in the United States."[27]

Although the problems stressed in the Department of Agriculture report are not to be brushed aside lightly, certain types of emergency food reserves appear to merit serious study. The report stressed that further knowledge was needed concerning relevant factors, such as the probable extent of fallout damage to food supplies. Also the study seemed to imply what must certainly be quite obvious: that the conclusions drawn from Operation Alert 1956 might be unduly optimistic—and in any event the obsolescence rate for conclusions of this nature must be distressingly high.

Particular interest would appear to attach to a program for establishing food reserves in localities which our defense officials regard as likely to have an influx of refugees from target areas. It is true that our surplus stocks do not contain all the items required for "a well rounded stockpile" in an optimum sense. But nonetheless, immediately available reserve supplies of a few items such as wheat,[28] wheat flour, rice, dried milk, and edible oil, under the control of local police and civil defense authorities, might make a valuable contribution if the tragedy of a bombing disaster should ever strike this country. This would require milling of the wheat into flour and, a more costly proposition, special packaging in moisture-proof, airtight containers to maximize the storage life of such commodities. The Army has indicated that the "safe keeping time" of stocks of this nature ranges from 9 to 36 months when stored at 70° F. and from 24 to 60 months if stored at 40° F.[29] Recent investigations with wheat flour indicate that it may be stored in laminated bags for two years, perhaps appreciably longer, with little loss of nutritional value. While the baking qualities of such flour would be below standard, it would certainly be a valuable item for an emergency feeding program. Rice has outstandingly good storage characteristics—a three-year safe keeping time when stored in laminated bags, according to the Army's conserva-

[26] *Ibid.*, Part c, p. 3.

[27] *Ibid.*

[28] Although whole grain wheat is not suitable for human consumption, it can be crushed with simple equipment—even a kitchen meat grinder—and can then be used in a quite palatable and digestible porridge.

[29] *Disposition of Stocks . . . , op.cit.*, Part c, p. 21, gives estimates for these and a number of other products based on Army Technical Manual No. 743-200, Changes 2.

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tive estimates. The idea being suggested here is that items should be held in the emergency reserves as long as the foodstuffs remain "fit for human consumption"—at the end of which time they would simply be sold for animal feed. This would, of course, mean a considerable loss relative to the nominal value of the stocks. Since the alternative uses of our existing surplus stocks also involve a financial loss, it is difficult to evaluate the "true" cost; but the expense of packaging and storage would be considerable and could not be regarded in any degree as a "sunk cost."

Such a procedure would, however, reduce administrative headaches of rotating stocks, and the competition with normal commercial feed supplies would be almost negligible. Indeed, the principal objection to such a program from the standpoint of surplus disposal is that the quantities involved would be very small relative to the magnitude of our surplus stocks. The potential value of a reserve of this nature is in having certain supplies of food immediately available during the period of chaos and disruption of transportation and processing immediately following a bombing disaster. Consequently, stocks related to requirements for a period of only a week might be all that would justify the "insurance cost" of this type of emergency reserve program.

Consideration might also be given to another type of program, one which was not discussed at all in this Department of Agriculture study. In recent years Switzerland has placed heavy reliance on reserve stocks held by individual households; and our own civil defense authorities have on occasion exhorted housewives in or near critical target areas to store food sufficient to tide a family over for a week or two. It may be guessed that the number of families which are taking this precaution is somewhere between small and infinitesimal. This may be partly due to reluctance to think very hard about the calamity of a hydrogen bomb attack—an understandable disposition to regard it as something too horrible to happen. But it may also be due in part to the difficulties of "rotation and management," which pose formidable problems for a housewife as well as for a governmental agency. If our civil defense and military authorities are really convinced that there is value in household reserve stocks, considerable impetus could be given to such a program by making appropriate surplus items available to households through local civil defense authorities. There would be a strong temptation to use these commodities for current consumption, if, for example, the price of a ten-pound bag of flour intended as a food reserve was less than the cost of the same weight of flour at the local

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grocery. A price which merely covered the cost of moisture-proof, air-tight packaging might, at least for some items, be sufficient to discourage current use of these items. Moreover, a "trade-in allowance" on freshly packaged items could be given for the emergency reserve items when they had reached an age when they were no longer safe for human consumption. "Age-dated" products are nothing new to American processors or consumers.

A recent analysis by Jack Hirshleifer of the likely consequences of a hydrogen bombing disaster underscores the potential value of having food reserves immediately available in localities outside the areas of destruction which might be required to provide food and shelter for large numbers of refugees. In addition to calling attention to the conditions of social chaos and disorder which are likely to be at least the immediate consequence of such an unprecedented disaster, Hirshleifer makes it clear that these conditions might be aggravated by resentment against established authority. In this regard he points out: "The evidence concerning bombing in World War II shows a universal tendency to blame the home government for bomb damage almost more than the enemy, apparently because the bombing stimulates aggressive feelings which cannot be entirely channeled to a faraway target. These feelings are exacerbated whenever real inadequacies of defense exist."[30]

The intimate relationship between food and morale and the way in which people react under conditions of stress are by now a commonplace. But in the light of this problem of resentment against government which Hirshleifer underlines, foresighted action by our civil defense and other authorities in making constructive use of surplus stocks to constitute emergency reserves might prove to be of great value. It would of course be fervently hoped that in this case, as with most outlays for insurance, we would never realize a tangible return from the cost and effort required for a program to establish emergency food reserves.

Considerable thought has also been given to the possibility of using some of our surplus agricultural commodities either to establish a NATO food stockpile or to facilitate strategic stockpiling by individual foreign countries. A number of the NATO countries are dependent upon imports for a sizable portion of their food needs. The destruction of ports and the critical shortage of shipping which would

[30] Jack Hirshleifer, "Some Thoughts on the Social Structure After a Bombing Disaster," *World Politics*, VIII, No. 1 (January 1956), p. 212.

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undoubtedly be faced in the event of war suggest that food reserves in European importing countries such as the United Kingdom and Belgium—and in food-deficit Japan—would be of potential value for reasons additional to those which might justify emergency reserves in certain areas of the United States. In its report on stockpiling, the Department of Agriculture indicated that it would be "anxious to comply with any supply requirements for such a purpose," but emphasized that the advisability of United States support for such a program should be "determined by the appropriate defense and foreign policy authorities."[31] It pointed out, however, that "It appears most unlikely that there is much of a chance for substantial surplus disposal through strategic stockpiling of agricultural products outside the United States *unless the United States is willing to pay for most or all of the cost of establishing such national stockpiles.*"[32] Specifically, this probably means that if such a program were carried out under Public Law 480, it would be necessary to agree to allocate all, or virtually all, of the local currency proceeds to the country establishing the stockpile for "mutually beneficial" purposes such as defense expenditures which the country would make in any event. Conceivably, a part of these funds could be used to meet the costs of maintaining the reserve stocks.

Stockpiling in underdeveloped countries has also been considered as a possible use for surplus agricultural commodities. In fact, it has already been noted that reserve stocks are a prominent part of the $360 million agreement signed with India under Public Law 480. The possibility of using agricultural surpluses to create reserves to draw on in years of crop shortage was mentioned briefly in the FAO's "pilot study" of ways in which agricultural surpluses might be used to promote economic development in India.[33] In his review article on the FAO study, J. H. Richter of the U.S. Department of Agriculture expressed his belief that "construction of storage facilities and the accumulation of reserve stock in 'crop-cycle' or 'famine' areas" represented "a most important use of surpluses for economic development."[34] An FAO Working Party on National Reserves which examined this

[31] "Preliminary Report and Analysis of the Need for Strategic Stockpiling of Food . . . ," *op.cit.*, p. 17.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 18. Italics in original.

[33] FAO, *Uses of Agricultural Surpluses to Finance Economic Development in Under-Developed Countries. A Pilot Study in India* (Commodity Policy Studies, No. 6), June 1955, p. 44.

[34] "Agricultural Surpluses for Economic Development," *Journal of Political Economy*, LXIV (February 1956), pp. 69n, 71n.

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problem has recommended the use of surplus commodities for creating food stocks to be used in the event of crop failure, thus avoiding the acute food shortages and high prices which would otherwise act as a brake on economic progress.[35] There are a good many parts of the world where crop failures are a periodic occurrence and "where people live on the brink of disaster from one harvest to the next."[36] In French West Africa, for example, rainfall in the savanna region is notoriously unreliable, and the French authorities instituted a program of compulsory grain reserves as a safeguard against acute shortages in years of crop failures. But since those reserves had to be created out of current production, meager at best, there was much criticism of the program; and also there were accusations of favoritism and malpractice in distributing the supplies. In the spring of 1955 the French administration yielded to the demands for abolition of compulsory reserves, though it was hoped that the practice would be continued under voluntary arrangements.

More attention has usually been given to the possibility of using surplus agricultural commodities to enable underdeveloped countries to step up their rate of economic growth by undertaking investment projects that would not have been possible without "development assistance in the form of surpluses. . . ."[37] This is the main idea underlying the FAO study of possible uses of agricultural surpluses in India, which summarized the underlying rationale in these terms:[38] ". . . In most underdeveloped countries there are many unemployed or underemployed farmers and other workers. There are a number of projects which could be undertaken by putting these people to work with local materials and local resources, or with only small amounts of foreign equipment. This would speed their country's development and increase its productive ability by building roads, wells, dams, irrigation canals, schools, warehouses, processing plants, etc. But when unemployed people are put to work they have to be paid, and their increased purchases of food, clothing, etc., raise the levels of demand. This increase in demand for consumer goods, coming into the market before the newly created facilities can expand production, would tend to cause inflation. That is where the surplus farm products from other countries would come in. They could help to satisfy a large part of the increased

[35] FAO, Committee on Commodity Problems (CCP), Consultative Sub-Committee on Surplus Disposal, *Report of Working Party on National Reserves* (CCP 57/1, Addendum 1, CCP/CSD/56/65 Revised, mimeo.), Rome, January 9, 1957.

[36] "Agricultural Surpluses for Economic Development," *op.cit.*, p. 71n.

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 72.

[38] *Uses of Agricultural Surpluses . . . , op.cit.*, p. 3.

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demand from the extra people put to work until later expanding production satisfied it. This would make possible increased employment and consumption for the present, and higher productive power, demand for goods, and sustained employment for the future. But to do this, the surpluses would have to be made available without current expenditure by the country concerned, as for example, as free grants or as long-term loans with low interest rates."

Essentially, this is the classical idea of a "subsistence fund" which makes new investment possible. The establishment of such a fund is an appropriate use of agricultural surpluses, because in a country like India a large part of the increased demand generated by the additional investment will be a demand for enlarged consumption of food and clothing. Hence surpluses of wheat, rice, and cotton, the principal products included in our agreement with India, could be used to cover as much as 50 or 60 per cent of the cost of a possible, four-year, half-billion dollar additional investment program in India analyzed in the FAO pilot study. Needless to say, the value of assistance in this form is enhanced if it is made available over several years; the three-year term of the Indian agreement is probably a minimum term for planning and execution of additional investment projects made possible by the availability of agricultural surpluses.

It is significant that a major part of the Public Law 480 sales against local currencies represents exports to underdeveloped countries. A major reason for regarding the underdeveloped countries as the most promising field for using sizable quantities of our agricultural surpluses is simply that in these low-income countries there is a reasonably good chance that a substantial part of the surplus foods made available will represent an addition to consumption which would otherwise not have occurred. Some displacement of normal imports is almost certain to result from any special sales of agricultural products, but with appropriately designed programs for using surpluses to promote economic development the displacement should be considerably less than for most of the alternative foreign disposal measures.

The financial return to the United States from the use of surplus agricultural commodities to promote economic development will necessarily be very small since, as is stressed by the FAO pilot study, the supplies must be made available as grants or as long-term loans if they are to serve as a "subsistence fund" to enable an underdeveloped country to undertake additional investment which will lead to additional consumption as well as accelerated economic progress. From the

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viewpoint of the United States, arrangements of this nature must be justified in terms of the broader considerations which make it an appropriate foreign policy objective for us to assist underdeveloped countries to achieve their goals of economic advance and to build independent and, it is to be hoped, democratically oriented governments. For the underdeveloped countries, assistance in this form represents a possibility of obtaining aid on a scale which would otherwise not be forthcoming, although from their viewpoint economic assistance which could be freely used according to the priorities of their development plans would undoubtedly be preferable.

IV. Conclusion

The somewhat optimistic view of the possibility of using our agricultural surpluses for promoting economic development expressed in the preceding section presents a marked contrast to the seriousness of the problem of foreign repercussions stressed earlier. To a considerable extent, this contrast results from the fact that in considering possible uses of the surpluses I have taken the existence of our accumulated stocks as a fact and then proceeded to evaluate measures for their use which might make a contribution to our foreign policy or other objectives.

Before reviewing the principal conclusions relative to the problems and opportunities posed by the existence of our present surplus stocks, it is important to emphasize that there is a broader problem which is only mentioned in this article. Even if we find means of disposing of our existing stocks in ways which yield a certain return and do not harm other countries unduly, there is nonetheless an urgent need to modify our agricultural programs so that our farm income goals can be achieved without piling up enormous surplus stocks. The FAO has summed up the issue succinctly: "Measures to dispose of surpluses already in existence will not solve the surplus problem unless parallel measures are taken to avoid the accumulation of new surpluses."[39] It would be no real solution to keep foreign disposal programs in operation simply to prevent our domestic stock levels from repeatedly reaching embarrassing proportions.

There are cogent reasons for this country to make available substantial resources to promote economic advance in the underdeveloped areas, but a situation in which we are doing "the right thing for the

[39] *Report of the Council of FAO, Twentieth Session, 27 September—October 1954,* November 1954, Appendix c, p. 86.

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wrong reason" hardly recommends itself as a long-run policy.[40] To devise appropriate modifications in our domestic programs for supporting farm incomes which will avoid unfavorable repercussions on our foreign policy represents a complex problem; to secure their acceptance will be still more difficult. Moreover, the modification of our domestic farm programs and our export programs is made more difficult by the fact that the United States is by no means alone in pursuing programs which lead to the accumulation of stocks or government manipulation of prices which provokes charges of "dumping," "unfair competition," and, on occasion, accusations of holding up export prices artificially.[41] These problems, however, are not insoluble and deserve far more attention than they are currently receiving.

Principal attention here has been devoted to the matter of managing our present stocks, a huge, palpable fact. It has been suggested that use of a part of the stockpile as a war-emergency reserve in certain localities of the United States and in food-deficit NATO countries merits careful consideration, since the insurance value of such reserve stocks might be substantial; and the adverse effect on normal trade would probably be less than for virtually any alternative scheme for surplus disposal. Use of our surpluses to promote economic development was also viewed favorably, since programs for that purpose can make a significant contribution to an important foreign policy objective. There is bound to be some adverse foreign reaction to agreements such as the one that we have concluded with India; but legitimate complaints against this type of program should not be too serious if the agreements really lead to a significant addition to current consumption as a result of accelerated development or to the establishment of reserves which will in fact be maintained for emergency use. There would appear to be advantages in some form of international administration or, perhaps better, provision for international review of disposal measures to verify that they are in line with accepted principles and to ensure that the benefits outweigh any contemplated adverse effects.[42]

[40] If the only politically feasible alternatives were (a) price-support programs leading to surplus accumulation and foreign disposal and (b) a Soil Bank scheme which achieved a comparable reduction in domestic supplies at a cost likely to differ very little from the cost of the price-support program, my value judgment would favor alternative (a). But my pessimism has not matured to the point where I regard those as the only feasible alternatives.

[41] For a discussion of "political pricing" of wheat as practiced by various exporting and importing countries and the distortion of the world price structure for that commodity, see Helen C. Farnsworth, "International Wheat Agreements and Problems, 1949-56," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, LXX (May 1956), pp. 238-48.

[42] The proposals for an International Commodity Clearing House considered and

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The motivations and spirit recently indicated in Congressional and some administration approaches to the surplus disposal problem do not inspire much confidence. A real awareness of the impact on normal trade of disposal measures and the resulting foreign repercussions is shown in the so-called "Francis Report" prepared for the Interagency Committee on Agricultural Surplus Disposal.[43] But such concern is conspicuously absent in the intent of the Agricultural Act of 1956 and in recent statements emanating from the Department of Agriculture. A handsome report on *Increasing U.S. Farm Exports* released in the fall of 1956 by the Department declares (as though speaking of an achievement of which Congress and the administration should be proud) that government subsidies or other assistance to agricultural exports have been steadily increasing: "Agricultural commodities under U.S. Government export programs accounted for about 25 percent of exports in 1954 before the newer programs were underway. Subsequently, program exports rose to 30 percent of the total in 1955 and to 41 percent in 1956."[44] It is not surprising that no mention is made in this official report of the foreign protests which have been raised against our disposal measures, but the fact that no mention is made of the cost of the export subsidies and other special programs is a more serious omission. And it is a little disturbing to read the warm references to our exports having become more "competitive," with no hint that the competitiveness depends mainly on the largesse of the U.S. Treasury.

Admittedly, it would be difficult to assess the cost of some of the special programs to promote exports. In particular, sales against local currencies defy reasonable cost estimates. The Department of Agriculture report just referred to asserted that "The newer U.S. export programs are based on the ability of foreign countries to pay for their purchases, although these payments may have to be made in their own currency."[45] With regard to Public Law 480 sales for local currencies, nothing could be more misleading. Although all announce-

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rejected by the FAO Conference in the fall of 1949 are of some interest in this connection. More recently the FAO has urged the creation of a "World Food Capital Fund." See FAO, *Functions of a World Food Reserve—Scope and Limitations* (Commodity Policy Studies, No. 10), 1956, pp. 36-39; and a statement by B. R. Sen, Director-General of the FAO, on "Functions of a World Food Reserve," made before the Second Committee of the U.N. General Assembly on January 22, 1957.

[43] *Prospects of Foreign Disposal of Domestic Agricultural Surpluses, op.cit.*

[44] USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service, *Increasing U.S. Farm Exports*, November 1956, p. 14.

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

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ments of export sales for local currency stress the contribution to "convertibility and dollar shortage problems," the attraction of these special sales has very little relationship to the problem of soft currencies. Under Public Law 480 agreements, the use of the local currency received by the United States is strictly limited by an agreement between the two governments and, on the average, roughly half of the proceeds are turned over to the importing country as a long-term loan or grant for purposes such as financing development programs.

It is understandable that the Department of Agriculture and the "agricultural surplus disposal administrator," appointed in accordance with the Agricultural Act of 1956, are anxious to reduce our stockpile by foreign disposal as speedily as possible and to stress the importance of a positive return from our special export programs. With the Department operating under a directive from Congress to reduce stocks "as speedily as possible," there is strong pressure to pay little or no heed to adverse effects on the trade of competing exporters. Efforts are apparently being made to safeguard the "usual marketings of the United States" by means of collateral understandings with countries entering into Public Law 480 agreements, but this will have the effect of giving us a privileged position while concentrating the reduction in normal imports on the shipments of other exporting countries. It is to be hoped, however, that at the Cabinet level, the criterion which determines the management of our accumulated stocks will be *not* how much surplus reduction is achieved but rather how much good or harm results from each aspect of management. Savings in storage costs resulting from a reduction of the CCC investment are obviously a factor to be considered, but one which is outweighed by the intangible but far more significant harm which will result from an ill-considered approach.

It appears that the present approach may be best characterized as one of finding suitable euphemisms (e.g., "competitive," "safeguarding usual marketings," "contribution to the dollar problem") to gloss over the overriding goal of inventory reduction. Although it may not be feasible for countries harmed by such a policy to retaliate, owing to the great disparity in their economic power vis-à-vis the United States, the damage to our international position will nonetheless be real and substantial.

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INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND THE UNITED NATIONS*

By QUINCY WRIGHT

I. The Nature of the Conflict

THE United Nations Charter repeatedly refers to "disputes or situations" and to "threats to the peace or breach of the peace" but does not use the word "conflict." In the Kellogg-Briand Pact, however, the parties agreed "that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be solved except by pacific means." A "conflict" appears to be less formulated than a "dispute" but more formulated than a "situation." A "conflict" does not necessarily involve violence as does a "breach of the peace," but violence is probable, as in a "threat to the peace." Thus conflict always involves a considerable degree of tension. The close relation of conflict to violence is indicated by the derivation of the term from the Latin word *confligere*, meaning "to strike together." Thus, physical conflict is suggested.

In the social sense, conflict implies not only difference, disagreement, or inconsistency, but action to resolve these conditions, thus jeopardizing the peace. Conflicts may, however, be resolved peacefully, as indeed the Kellogg Pact required in the international field.

Sociologists define "conflict" as opposition among social entities directed against one another, in distinction to "competition" defined as opposition among social entities independently striving for something of which the supply is inadequate to satisfy all. Competitors may not be aware of one another, while the parties to a conflict are. "Rivalry," halfway between, refers to opposition among social entities which recognize one another as competitors. Conflict, rivalry, and competition are all species of "opposition," which has been defined as a process by which social entities function to the disservice of one

*This article, first presented as a lecture under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on May 22, 1957, attempts to summarize many studies which I have published in the fields of war and conflict, peace and law, and international relations in general. It may, therefore, be considered a supplement to the review article dealing with my *Study of War* published in *World Politics*, 1, No. 2 (January 1949), pp. 243-56. Because of its summarizing character, I have indicated in the footnotes the places in my published work where more detailed treatment of various points can be found.

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another. Opposition is thus contrasted with "co-operation," the process by which social entities function to the service of one another.[1]

These abstract definitions indicate that social conflict is a process which operates through time and, as it proceeds, may be manifested by varying degrees of tension or hostility. It may eventuate in open violence. It may be solved peacefully, or it may be continued indefinitely. Conflict between Islam and Christendom continued with intermittent war from the time of Mohammed until the eighteenth century, between Catholicism and Protestantism from the Reformation to the end of the Thirty Years' War, and between England and France, with truces of varying length, from the Hundred Years' War to the defeat of Napoleon. Conflict between communism and liberal democracy has continued with spasms of violence and periods of co-operation since the October Revolution of 1917.

Conflict is a form of relationship between entities which are somewhat similar. The conflicting entities may be physical, as in the case of billiard balls striking each other on the table. They may be biological, as in a conflict between two male stags. They may be psychological, ranging from emotional conflicts between religions to rational conflicts between theological doctrines, scientific theories, or legal interpretations. Sociologically, however, the entities in conflict with each other are "systems of action," that is, persons or groups of persons capable of making decisions. The "cold war" should probably be described as a conflict of this type between the NATO alliance led by the United States and the Warsaw alliance led by the Soviet Union, though the continuing psychological conflict between communism and liberal democracy serves as a propaganda instrument. Social conflict usually involves psychological conflict, and if violence occurs—as in industrial strife, rebellion, and war—biological and physical conflict may also be involved. War is waged on military, economic, diplomatic, and propaganda fronts. Social conflicts may be designated as industrial, political, international, and so forth, according to the character of the contending groups.

Social conflict occurs when two systems of action make decisions

[1] R. E. Park and E. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, Chicago, 1924, pp. 574ff.; W. F. Ogburn and M. F. Nimkoff, *Sociology*, New York, 1940, pp. 346, 369. See also Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, Chicago, 1942, pp. 956, 1439ff.; *idem*, *Problems of Stability and Progress in International Relations*, Berkeley, Calif., 1954, p. 146. Kurt Singer defines conflict as "a critical state of tension occasioned by the presence of mutually incompatible tendencies within an organismic whole the functional continuity or structural integrity of which is thereby threatened" ("The Resolution of Conflict," *Social Research*, XVI, December 1949, p. 230).

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which are so inconsistent that both cannot be implemented at the same time. Efforts to implement such inconsistent decisions may result in the realization of one at the expense of the other, in compromise or partial realization of both, in abandonment of both, or in re-interpretation of one or both decisions so that the inconsistency will be resolved in a higher order of discourse. These modes of solution may be described respectively as dictation, agreement, obsolescence, and adjudication. The last-named is achieved when the parties agree that their conflict is subordinate to the maintenance of peace, morality, justice, or law and, therefore, accept a solution emerging from the reasoning or dialectic of a mediator or the decision of a tribunal applying accepted standards. Numerous forms of action, sometimes initiated by the conflicting parties and sometimes by third parties, have been recognized in international relations, under such terms as negotiation, mediation, conciliation, conference, consultation, investigation, arbitration, judicial settlement, interposition, intercession, intervention, retortion, reprisals, and war.

Since social conflict arises from decisions, it implies that the conflicting entities have made choices of alternatives on the basis of appraisal of interests, objectives, purposes, or standards which they value. Thus, the antecedent of a conflict is a state of mind rather than a state of affairs. External conditions, circumstances, or events account for conflict only insofar as the choices or decisions of the conflicting parties are influenced by observation or knowledge of these facts. The center for the study of conflict is, therefore, the psychological, sociological, political, or legal processes by which choices or decisions are made—that is, in ordinary terms, the workings of the minds of the decision-makers. "Wars," says the Unesco Constitution, "begin in the minds of men."

Systems of action may make decisions from *necessity, custom, caprice,* or *reason.* Action by *necessity,* as in self-preservation from violent attack, may leave little "choice of means or moment for deliberation," as Secretary of State Webster said in the *Caroline* affair,[2] but there is usually some choice. A man if attacked may flee, fight, or surrender; a state whose territory is invaded may fight, protest, or acquiesce; and even a government defeated in war may accept or reject the victor's terms. If there is a total necessity, leaving no choice at all, the conflict is physical rather than social.

Decisions made from *custom,* as is often the case among primitive

[2] J. B. Moore, *Digest of International Law,* Washington, D.C., 1906, II, p. 412.

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peoples, involve relatively little choice and conflicts may resemble the instinctive behavior of animals, which deal with conflict situations by methods provided by inherited biological specialization. The tortoise recedes into its shell. The antelope runs away. The cobra, lion, or rhinoceros attacks with the weapons nature has provided. The mores of primitive people usually provide similar specialized modes of responding to conflict situations. National states may also sometimes become rigidly specialized by allegiance to a Monroe Doctrine, a Maginot Line, an atomic bomb, or other modes of defense or attack.

Decisions made from *caprice* imply a minimum of deliberation and of rational accommodation of means to ends or of action to principles. In such decisions the immediate situation overrides long-run considerations; emotion supersedes reason; action is spontaneous rather than calculated. Revolution is frequently marked by such spontaneous behavior and national governments, especially when controlled by uneducated democratic opinion, may meet conflict situations by caprice rather than calculation.

It is, however, a human characteristic to act from *reason*. Spontaneous behavior is inhibited, alternative courses of action are imagined, and choice is made after consideration of the probable consequences of each and judgment of the conformity of these consequences to interests and principles which the decision-maker values.

In international conflicts the entities involved are states or international organizations. The term *transnational* has been introduced to cover conflicts between individuals or corporations of different states, or between individuals or corporations and a foreign state.[3] Such conflicts may be closely related to, or merge into, international conflicts. International and, in lesser degree, transnational conflicts differ from other social conflicts in several respects, thus making them a subject deserving special study.

In the first place, as Hobbes pointed out,[4] the parties in conflict are not members of a single, well-ordered society capable of persuading or compelling them to subordinate their conflicts to the law as administered by established courts or other agencies. International law and organization, although they are developing, still fall far short of the comprehensive authority of national law and government. Because the number of states is small, because they are very disparate in size and power, and because some have more power than is likely to be

[3] Philip C. Jessup, *Transnational Law*, New Haven, Conn., 1956, p. 2.
[4] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (1651), ch. 13.

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available to the community of nations as a whole, international law, as distinct from a possible world-federal law applicable directly to individuals, will always have a character different from municipal law, and international conflicts will always be controlled less by legal means than are other forms of conflict.

In the second place, as the anthropologists insist,[5] the individual's concepts of morality and justice develop from the culture, nationality, or religion in which he has been brought up, and thus the moral standards of individuals differ from state to state. Representatives of different states may, therefore, differ greatly in judgments of what is right and just. It is true that increasing intercultural and international contacts have been gradually developing universal standards of morality and justice, but such standards are, for most people and even for governments and foreign offices, less acceptable guides than national standards.[6]

In the third place, as Vattel pointed out,[7] states are more self-sufficient and less in need of co-operation with other states than are individuals. Consequently, the necessity for self-preservation and satisfaction of the needs of life which, according to Hobbes,[8] has driven men to establish societies and governments is less active in the case of states, especially large states. It is true that the world is shrinking and states are becoming more vulnerable to, and consequently more dependent on, their neighbors, but the actual development of a high degree of interdependence among states has not yet sufficiently impressed people and governments to induce them to subordinate the state's sovereignty to any great extent to the law of the world community.

Finally, the monopoly of weapons by national governments, and the tremendous destructive power of these weapons, much greater now than ever before, creates frequent necessities for self-defense and consequently induces in governments a major preoccupation with military preparation if they wish to survive. "When princes," said Machiavelli, "have thought more of ease than of arms, they have lost their states."[9] Because of this continuing danger, "national interests" come to be defined in terms of military power to deter or to win wars. International politics has therefore assumed the character of "power politics." Security depends not on law, on morality, or on mutual appreciation of inter-

[5] E. A. Westermarck, *Ethical Relativity*, London, 1932.
[6] Quincy Wright, *The Study of International Relations*, New York, 1955, pp. 448ff.
[7] Emerich Vattel, *Le Droit des Gens* (1758), Fenwick trans., Washington, D.C., 1916, Preface, p. 9a.
[8] Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chs. 13, 17.
[9] Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince* (1513), ch. 14.

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dependencies, but on military defense or on an equilibrium of power minimizing the prospects of success by any aggressor. Such a balance of power rests on the hypothesis that if any government embarks upon aggression, many others will gang up against it because they appreciate that if it augments its power by success, it will then be able to turn upon the others in succession, perhaps establishing a "universal state," which, as Toynbee has pointed out,[10] has marked the penultimate stage in the life of most civilizations. The balance of power has functioned in modern Western civilization to frustrate the establishment of a new Roman Empire.

All of the circumstances which I have suggested mean, as indeed Thomas Hobbes and John Locke noticed in the seventeenth century, that sovereign states are, in relation to one another, not in a state of society, but in a "state of nature."[11] Hobbes described such a state as *bellum omnium contra omnes*. This is another way of saying that states in foreign relations behave like animals rather than like men. It is a peculiarity of men that they are guided by reason rather than by instinct or necessity, and reason induces all to sacrifice natural liberty for liberty under law sanctioned by the institutions of a society which give elementary security to all its members with at least a modicum of justice. Although often urged to do so, states have been hesitant to sacrifice any of their sovereignty to the society of nations; hence, like wild beasts they live in a state of nature with the security of each in continuous jeopardy.

It has been noticed that, in the case of international conflicts, states involved try to observe what Kautilya of ancient India called the principle of the fish: the big one eats the little one.[12] Those not directly involved tend, like chickens attacked by a hawk, to flee to an isolated neutrality, permitting the enemy to pick them off one after the other; or, like the jackal in Aesop's fable, to attach themselves to the lion in hope of picking up the bones he leaves, thus in fact sacrificing independence for his protection; or, like the monkeys observed by the psychologist Maslow in the zoo at Madison, Wisconsin,[13] to gang up

[10] Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Oxford, 1934, I, p. 62; Wright, *A Study of War*, p. 117.

[11] Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ch. 13; John Locke, *Concerning Civil Government, Second Essay* (1690), ch. 2, par. 14.

[12] Kautilya, *Arthasastra* (3rd century B.C.), Shamasastry trans., Mysore, Wesleyan Mission Press, 1929.

[13] A. H. Maslow, "The Dominance Drive as a Determiner of Social Behavior in Infrahuman Primates," *Psychological Bulletin*, XXII (1935), pp. 714ff. See also *idem, Journal of Genetic Psychology*, XLVIII (1936), pp. 261ff., and XLIX (1937), pp. 197ff.; *Psychological Review*, XLIV (1937), pp. 420ff.; Wright, *A Study of War*, pp. 43ff., 491ff.

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against the strongest of their number, establishing an unstable balance of power.[14] Such forms of behavior are the consequence of continuing necessity, leaving few choices of alternatives and a minimum of opportunity to exercise the imagination and reason which distinguish men from the chicken, jackal, or monkey in their individual behavior. It is difficult to see how states can advance from the jungle to human estate except by doing as men have done, and organizing "collective security." That implies acceptance of law according security to all and of procedures assuring its enforcement by agencies of the community as a whole.[15] Such a course, long envisaged by writers like Pierre Dubois, Emeric Crucé, William Penn, the Abbé St. Pierre, and Emmanuel Kant, was attempted in the alliance system after the Napoleonic Wars, in the League of Nations after World War I, and, in its most developed form, in the United Nations. The difficulty of the attempt is indicated by the failure of the first two of these enterprises and by the widespread criticism of the relatively successful effort of the United Nations, assisted by the United States and the Soviet Union, to frustrate the military interventions of Israel, Britain, and France in Egypt in the fall of 1956. This action maintained the rule of the Charter which prohibits the use of force in international relations except in necessary self-defense, or with the consent of the victim of intervention, or under the authority of the United Nations itself.[16] Many people chafed at the very success of this action in restraining forcible self-help by governments which they liked and in protecting a government which they did not like. Such an attitude can occasionally be found even within states. An experienced judge once told me that in his part of the country, in a murder trial, the jury was really interested in only two questions: "Did the victim deserve to be killed? Was the accused the right person to kill him?" If the answer to both questions was affirmative, the jury would give a verdict of not guilty. It is doubtful whether a viable legal order can be constructed on such principles. Men chafe at the rule of law, although they recognize its necessity. They find it difficult to apply to civil society, and even more to international society, the Biblical in-

[14] Wright, *A Study of War*, p. 1238.

[15] Thomas Hobbes, like some modern advocates of "world government," thought this implied permanent and total subordination to a sovereign commonwealth (*op.cit.*, ch. 17), but John Locke, like modern advocates of "international organization," thought it implied only a "giving up of all the power, necessary to the ends for which they unite into society, to the majority of the community, unless they expressly agreed in any number greater than the majority" (*op.cit.*, ch. 8, par. 99).

[16] Quincy Wright, "Intervention, 1956," *American Journal of International Law*, LI (1957), pp. 257ff.

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junction which may, for the latter case, be paraphrased as: "Whatsoever state will save its sovereignty shall lose it, but whatsoever state will subordinate its sovereignty to the law and society of nations shall save it."[17]

II. The Cause of Conflict

In the broadest sense, all conflicts arise from the demand of systems of action for autonomy. Without autonomy an entity is not a system of action. Thus, almost by definition, each system gives priority to self-preservation, self-interest, and the making of choices and decisions and carrying them out, or what the Greeks called *hubris*. Consequently, such systems are reluctant to recognize the interests of others and subordinate decisions to the requirements of a higher society of which all are members, or to observe what the Greeks called *themis*. In the sovereign state, *hubris* or self-assertion is at a maximum.

The discipline of communications has sought to measure the degree of *hubris* in a state by the relative abundance of internal as compared with external communications.[18] If there is no external communication at all, if iron, bamboo, or other curtains prevent the people and government of a state from communication with outside states, decisions will inevitably be based only on internal demands, and international conflicts will occur frequently, and will be impossible to solve peacefully. As external communication increases in abundance, the needs, interests, and probable reactions of others will become known and may be given consideration. Respect for *themis* will gradually enter into the decision-making process. In legal terminology, international law will play an increasing role in national decision-making. There is, however, a lag in this process. The initial effect of external communication may be to manifest *hubris* with increased efficiency. Only gradually will membership in a larger community be recognized.[19]

[17] Matthew 16:25; Mark 8:35; Luke 9:24. Hobbes, like modern "realists," was convinced that neither morals nor reason would assure observance of this injunction but "without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war" (*op.cit.*, ch. 13, par. 8).

[18] Karl W. Deutsch, "Self-referent Symbols and Self-referent Communication Patterns," in Lyman Bryson, *et al.*, eds., *Symbols and Values: An Initial Study* (13th Symposium on Science, Philosophy and Religion), New York, 1954, pp. 619, 628; *idem*, "International Communication, the Media and Flow," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, xx (Spring 1956), pp. 143ff. David Riesman has formulated this distinction in terms of the relative influence of "inner-direction" and "other-direction" (*The Lonely Crowd*, New Haven, Conn., 1950). See also Wright, *The Study of International Relations*, pp. 274ff., 294, 433.

[19] M. M. Willey and Stuart A. Rice, "The Agencies of Communication," in W. F. Ogburn, ed., *Recent Social Trends*, New York, 1933, I, p. 217; H. D. Lasswell, *World Politics and Personal Insecurity*, New York, 1935, pp. 203ff.; Wright, *A Study of War*, pp. 174ff.

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No modern state is completely isolated from external communications, but the predominance of internal communications is, and can be expected to remain, sufficient to maintain much international conflict. Foreign policy is primarily directed toward achievement of decisions based on internally generated conceptions of national interest over foreign opposition, rather than to the organization of a peaceful world through discovery and observance of international standards. Although most states are committed to the latter policy by the United Nations Charter, that instrument also recognizes the "sovereign equality" of states. We cannot expect states to abandon their autonomy entirely. If they did so, they would cease to be sovereign states.

Human reason functioning in foreign policy-making has not been sufficient to establish a peaceful international society, but it has been sufficient to develop societies of increasing size tending to a bi-polarization of power. This seems to result from the joint operation of the phenomena of scapegoating and power rivalry. The Freudians explain scapegoating as the tendency to displace animosities in order to escape unpleasant ambivalences. The child loves his mother, but also hates her because he resents her socializing discipline. In order to avoid this ambivalent attitude, he displaces the hatred upon someone else so that he can love his mother wholeheartedly. So also the hatreds which arise within the factory, the office, the club, or the nation may be displaced on outsiders, thus increasing the solidarity of the in-group. The use of foreign war to prevent domestic revolution is a well-known expedient of statesmen. Seward suggested such a course to Lincoln on the outbreak of the Civil War, and the Hapsburg Empire in 1914 welcomed foreign war as a means for suppressing the Yugoslav revolt within its territory. This mechanism tends toward the bi-polarization of power. The members of NATO, because of the great divergence of their national interests, are in need of a scapegoat to maintain the solidarity of their organization. All their hatreds and animosities are cast upon the Communist world, and similarly the Communist countries cast their animosities upon the capitalist world. Within mature democracies, a similar process tends toward the establishment of the bi-party system. Within a constitutional state able to prevent violence, a bi-party system tends toward greater stability than a multi-party system because it works against party doctrinairism and augments the government's capacity to maintain a legislative majority. In the international system, without an effective legal order, bi-polarization maximizes instability,

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however, because it makes for inflexible diplomacy and an arms race.[20]

Apart from the scapegoating mechanism, the necessities of power politics tend to the continuous expansion of alliance systems toward bi-polarization. As the range of weapons increases, no state can defend itself alone. It needs external bases and allies, so that power rivalry leads to the drawing of all states into one or the other alliance system. Obviously, such a process makes war more probable, because each side anticipates eventual war and continually considers whether time is favoring itself or its rival. The side which believes time is running against it is likely to start war now, rather than wait until its power position is even less favorable. Bi-polarization also makes war more destructive, because the whole world is involved. There is no place to hide.[21] Thus, as Lewis Richardson has pointed out in his mathematical analysis of international politics, statesmen under pressure of necessity turn the steering wheel in a direction which will destroy the ship of state in a titanic collision instead of bringing it into the harbor of peace.[22] States, with the capabilities of men but the behavior patterns of animals, live in a state of nature in which, according to Hobbes, life is "nasty, brutish and short."[23] While some states have lived a long time, both the birth and the death rate have increased as the world has shrunk.[24]

This brief description of the trend of international conflict, which like a Greek tragedy has led in the past, according to Toynbee,[25] to the eventual destruction of civilizations, must be examined in more detail if we are to do anything about it.

I suggest that particular conflicts can be examined within a general frame of reference to facilitate diagnosis, etiology, prognosis, and treatment. We want to be able to classify and typify conflicts, to understand the causes of each type, to predict the probable course of development,

[20] E. F. M. Durbin and John Bowlby, *Personal Aggressiveness and War*, New York, 1939, pp. 19, 84, 109; Lasswell, *op.cit.*, pp. 39, 166; Franz Alexander, "The Psychiatric Aspects of War and Peace," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVI (1941), p. 526; Wright, *A Study of War*, pp. 287, 1203, 1461; *idem, Problems of Stability and Progress in International Relations*, pp. 164ff., 764.

[21] W. C. McLeod, *The Origin and History of Politics*, New York, 1931; Wright, *A Study of War*, pp. 382, 763; *idem, Problems of Stability and Progress in International Relations*, pp. 150ff.

[22] L. F. Richardson, *Generalized Foreign Politics* (Monograph supplements, *British Journal of Psychology*, Vol. XXIII), Cambridge, Eng., 1939, p. 7; Wright, *A Study of War*, pp. 1268, 1482.

[23] Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ch. 13.

[24] Wright, *A Study of War*, pp. 257ff., 762-63. The recent "self-determination" of many nations may be a reflection of the influence of the United Nations in ameliorating the international "state of nature."

[25] See note 10.

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and to suggest modes of peaceful solution. The world statesman should look at conflict as a doctor looks at disease, but he must recognize that while conflicts carried to excesses of violence destroy civilization, some conflict and tension are essential to progress. The statesman cannot contemplate the impossible and undesirable task of eliminating international conflict altogether, but in the atomic age he must seek to solve conflicts peacefully.

More knowledge about particular conflicts may throw light on the best way to deal with the family of nations as a whole. The microcosm may teach us of the macrocosm, but I do not disparage the opposite approach of Plato—that is, seeking to understand the part by study of the whole, man by study of the state, and the state by study of the world community. Before considering the international institutions designed to control conflicts, let us consider international conflict from the points of view of the parties, of their relations, and of the field in which they occur.[26]

III. The Parties to a Conflict

Physics is based on the assumption that the ultimate particles of matter are all alike, and that everything can be explained by their relations in time and space. Law assumes that individuals are alike and general rules applicable to all can be enforced by the state. A similar assumption is made about states by international law. The Charter of the United Nations is based upon the principle of their sovereign equality. However, in fact, states are not alike in anything except the claim to sovereignty—certainly not in the reality of sovereignty. Furthermore, the space and time in which states function are not uniform, as are the space and time of Newtonian, though not of Einsteinian, physics. The culture and environment of states differ in different parts of the world and history produces changes in the atmosphere of values and interests affecting all human groups. Thus, the methods both of physics and of law are very imperfectly applicable to the study of the behavior of states.

Realists, therefore, tend to look at the character of the particular state, especially at its decision-making process and the personalities in control, in judging how a state is likely to behave in a given conflict. The problem is complex. In public statements in February and June of 1957, Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung, the leaders of Russia and China, disputed whether under communism there can be a "contra-

[26] An outline for research on international conflicts from these points of view was published in the *Western Political Quarterly*, x (June 1957), pp. 263-75.

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diction" between the leadership and the people. The most superficial observation indicates that under any form of society the policies of the government, the law of the state, the culture of the nation, and the attitudes of the people are always in some aspects and in some degree inconsistent. These levels of all large organized groups, especially political groups, though interrelated, may each be made the subject of special study.[27]

One can look at the *government*, identifying influential personalities, and ask: What is the relative influence in decision-making of key personalities, of the demands of public opinion and pressure groups, of the national culture and traditions, of obligations of international law and treaty, and of information concerning the policies and capabilities of foreign governments?

One can look back of the government at the *state*, and ask: What are the constitutional requirements in regard to legislative participation in foreign policy decision-making, in regard to judicial control, and in regard to executive power? What is the relation of international law to municipal law and what provisions of law and procedure tend to prevent foreign policy decisions in violation of that law?

Back of the state one can look at the *nation* and ask: What national interests have been established by history? Does tradition emphasize power, security, prosperity, or welfare as the goal of foreign policy effort?

Finally, back of the nation are the *people*, with individual values shaped by the prevailing culture and religion and with publicly expressed opinions based on interpretations of current events inspired by these values. F. S. C. Northrop,[28] Talcott Parsons,[29] Charles Morris,[30] and others have attempted to analyze the various value systems, and to distinguish the kinds of behavior to be expected from the beliefs arising from combinations of their elements. Doubtless the values of the people influence public opinion and national traditions, which in turn influence the law of the state and the policy of the government, though the latter may be so pressed by necessities of situations as they arise that little range of choice remains. Some studies have suggested that actual policies are more closely correlated with the conditions faced than with the proscriptions of the national ethos and law. Governments with cultural

[27] Wright, *The Study of International Relations*, pp. 544, 555-59.

[28] F. S. C. Northrop, *The Meeting of East and West*, New York, 1946.

[29] Talcott Parsons and E. A. Shils, eds., *Toward a General Theory of Action*, Cambridge, Mass., 1951.

[30] Charles Morris, *Paths of Life: Preface to a World Religion*, New York, 1942; *idem, Varieties of Human Value*, Chicago, 1956.

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backgrounds as different as those of the United States, India, France, and Japan seem to have behaved similarly when faced by similar external conditions. There are, however, some differences which in the long run may greatly affect policy.[31] The resemblance of Nehru's foreign policies to those of George Washington with respect to neighboring countries, to neutralism, to foreign trade, and to formulations of principle is striking. The differences in these policies, particularly in methods of implementation, influenced by differences in culture and economy, are, however, also important.[32]

Detailed study of all elements of the decision-making process of the parties to a conflict will, therefore, throw much light on the course of the conflict.[33] Certain broad classes or types of states with respect to this process may be suggestive. Autocracies appear to have been less amenable to pacific settlement than democracies; newly formed states less than old, mature states; states organized for military action less than states organized for economic production; states with varied and unintegrated cultures and populations less than states with a unified nationality. It would be interesting to examine these distinctions in more detail. Each of them has a history. Woodrow Wilson and Niccolò Machiavelli both referred to the greater peacefulness of popular and republican governments, Wilson attributing it to their greater respect for moral principles, Machiavelli to their inferior capacity for rapid decision.[34] Machiavelli distinguished the new prince who gained position by force and fraud from the old prince who maintained his position by custom and consent.[35] Herbert Spencer thought industrial states peaceful and military states warlike.[36] Mazzini emphasized the satisfaction and peacefulness of national states as opposed to empires and multi-nationality states, differing in this from Lord Acton, who thought the contact of many nationalities within a state bred tolerance.[37] I regret

[31] Wright, *A Study of War*, pp. 824ff.

[32] These points were brought out in discussion of a paper by Professor Adda Bozeman at the Columbia University Seminar on Peace on April 30 and May 14, 1957.

[33] Richard C. Snyder, *et al., Decision-making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics*, Princeton, N.J., 1954; David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," *World Politics*, IX (April 1957), pp. 383ff.

[34] Wright, *A Study of War*, pp. 839ff., citing Woodrow Wilson, War Address, April 2, 1917, and Machiavelli, *Discourses*, Detmold trans., I, p. 59.

[35] Machiavelli, *The Prince*, chs. 1, 2, 3, 6; Wright, *A Study of War*, pp. 220ff., 828, 1003.

[36] Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Sociology* (1896), I, pp. 556ff., and II, pp. 378, 675ff.; Wright, *A Study of War*, pp. 829ff.

[37] G. Mazzini, *To the Young Men in Italy* (1859), reprinted in Sir Alfred Zimmern, *Modern Political Doctrines*, London, 1939, pp. 176ff.; Lord Acton, *History of Freedom*, London, 1909, p. 295; Wright, *A Study of War*, pp. 828, 987ff.

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that space is lacking for elaboration of these distinctions and, particularly, of the exceptions that must be noted in regard to each.

IV. The Relations of Conflicting States

A conflict implies a relation. Clearly the behavior of the parties to a conflict cannot be explained by their characters in isolation. The most striking feature of conflicts is the process of action and reaction between the parties.[38] While it is popular, for example, to interpret the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union in terms of the inherent and inevitable aggressiveness of a Communist dictatorship such as the Soviet Union, close study of the history of Russian-American relations shows that there were periods of friendliness and of hostility during the century after the Czar ended his long non-recognition of revolutionary America in 1809. Such fluctuations were equally marked in the Soviet period, beginning with the refusal of the United States to recognize revolutionary Russia. If one considers the history of these relations since the Yalta Conference, when they reached a high point of friendliness, one can trace the deterioration of relations in terms of action and reaction.[39] The Soviet intervention in Rumania and Bulgaria to establish Communist control, perhaps under apprehension that it had been accorded a sphere of influence in this area by understandings with Britain (although the Yalta Agreements were to the contrary), followed by the controversy over the Polish government's representation at the San Francisco Conference; the sudden chopping-off of Lend-Lease aid by the United States after V-J Day, the refusal of the United States to make loans to Russia though it made them to England, and the initial expression of American determination to maintain a monopoly of the atomic bomb, followed by Stalin's announcement early in 1946 of a program of intensive industrial and military development; Truman's apparent endorsement of Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech at Fulton, Missouri, followed by increasing Soviet opposition to the Baruch program of atomic energy control; the Soviet seizure of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and the Berlin blockade, followed by the airlift, the formation of Western Germany, the Marshall Plan, and the

[38] L. F. Richardson, *op.cit.* (note 22); and *idem*, "Threats and Security," in *Psychological Factors of Peace and War*, New York, 1950, pp. 221ff.; Wright, *A Study of War*, pp. 1472ff.

[39] A good history from this point of view remains to be written for the post-World War II period. For the pre-Soviet period, see Max M. Laserson, *The American Impact on Russia—Diplomatic and Ideological—1784-1917*, New York, 1950. For the interwar and World War II period, see Victor A. Yakhontoff, *U.S.S.R. Foreign Policy*, New York, 1945.

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formation of NATO; the communization of China, the development of the Soviet alliance system, the Korean aggression, the United Nations resistance and the Warsaw Pact, followed by increasing rivalry in the production of atomic and hydrogen weapons—these actions, reactions, and counteractions marked a continuous deterioration of relations up to the death of Stalin in 1953. Such a history of action and reaction is implicit in considering the causes of conflicts and may illuminate points at which a different decision by one party or the other might have ended a downward spiral toward war and initiated an upward spiral toward accommodation.

Among the more obvious classifications of the relations of states is that concerning their relative power. Are both parties to a conflict small states? Are both great powers? Is one a small state and the other a great power? Closely connected is the military situation. Is each vulnerable to attack by the other, or are natural or artificial defenses effective for one or both? Economic relations are also important. Are the parties economically independent of each other? Are they interdependent, or is one dependent on the other? It is also significant to ask whether the parties are similar or different in culture, whether they have had a long history of feud or of peaceful relations, whether they are well-informed or ill-informed about each other. Such relations may be analyzed as aspects of the distance separating states. A formula respecting rates of change in the relation of technological, strategic, psychological, war-expectancy, social, political, ideological, and legal distances between states was actually applied to a number of pairs of states in 1937. The results predicted with considerable accuracy, as demonstrated by subsequent events, which pair was most likely to get into war.[40]

A significant aspect of international conflicts is the high probability of misinterpretation. The sociologist Charles Horton Cooley has pointed out that in every controversy there are at least six parties: A and B; A as imaged by B; and B as imaged by A; A as he thinks B images him, and B as he thinks A images him. The last two, which Cooley calls the "looking-glass self," may be very important.[41] A may behave, not according to his character, but according to what he thinks his adversary expects of him. The conflict may be between these images rather than between the parties as they actually are or, perhaps it would be better to say, as they would be interpreted by a completely wise and impartial observer. Since such observers hardly exist, the "real" A and B hardly

[40] Wright, *A Study of War*, pp. 1240ff., 1276ff., 1466ff., 1484ff.

[41] Charles Horton Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, New York, 1902; Wright, *The Study of International Relations*, p. 427.

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enter into the picture. It is the "life space" or mental picture of a situation, as Kurt Lewin points out, that controls action, not the objective reality.[42]

This is particularly true in international conflict, where information, especially that influencing public opinion, comes through narrow bottlenecks and may be seriously distorted. Aware of these misinterpretations, scholars have recently given considerable attention to the Soviet image of the United States and the American image of the Soviet Union, indicating some of the distortions in these images, especially the extent to which "projection" of the observer's hostility and stereotypes of the nation observed have affected the image.[43] Attention should also be given to the influence of "narcissism" upon the image of the United States which Americans attribute to the Soviet Union. To prevent war, the emotion-charged symbols which control opinion must everywhere be kept in closer contact with the conditions which people think they describe. Symbols must everywhere refer to conditions, not to myths, stereotypes, or fictions. As John Dewey observed: "The head and the heart must work together. Prising and appraising must unite in the direction of action."[44]

In a world dominated by conceptions of power politics, conflict often develops through assumption by each party that the policy of its rival is wholly malignant, that it is wholly untrustworthy, and that only its capability deserves study. Each attempts to negotiate from a position of military strength. This formula tends to overlook the mind behind the gun and also to overlook aspects of strength other than guns. Political power consists not only of armaments and armed forces in being, but also of industrial, educational, and population potential for making them, of the morale of the people sustaining national policies, and of a reputation attractive to allies. The relative importance of these factors from the points of view both of deterring and of winning war varies with circumstances, among which the probable duration of the war is important. Calculations of capability frequently pay less attention to reputation than to arms in being, though the history of wars through the past four centuries indicates that reputation attractive to allies has been more important in winning wars than superiority of arms at the

[42] Kurt Lewin, *A Dynamic Theory of Personality*, New York, 1935; Wright, *The Study of International Relations*, p. 428.

[43] Frederick C. Barghoorn, *The Soviet Image of the United States: A Study in Distortion*, New York, 1950.

[44] John Dewey, *Theory of Valuation* (International Encyclopedia of Unified Science), Chicago, 1939, II, p. 65; Wright, *A Study of War*, p. 1116.

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beginning of hostilities.[45] Technological conditions tending to make wars very brief may, however, alter the importance of this factor in the future.

Because of inadequate attention to the actual policies of a rival nation, of exaggerated belief in its faithlessness to agreements, and of neglect of the aphorism that good faith cannot be expected unless it is anticipated, opportunities for conciliation have sometimes been overlooked. Because of excessive attention to military capability, arms races have developed that often eventuated in war. Conflicts might be ameliorated if governments gave greater attention to the policy and opinions of the rival, to his reactions to our preparations which we interpret as defensive, but which he is likely to interpret as aggressive, and to the contribution of good reputation to political power.

In the cold war, Americans might well study the extent to which Soviet aggressiveness is induced by the Kremlin's conviction of a defensive necessity or by its spontaneous reaction against acts interpreted as hostile. May we not too often assume, without sufficient evidence, that Soviet aggressiveness and faithlessness are inherent characteristics of the Soviet state or that its leaders are motivated by an implacable ambition to dominate the world or to convert it to communism?[46]

Some recent studies indicate that Lenin and, to a greater extent, Stalin, while resorting to Karl Marx for rationalizations and propaganda, were primarily guided by the conception of national interest characteristic of all states—security, power, and prosperity—by special interests arising from Russia's geographical position and traditions such as access to warm-water ports, and by a more emphatic interest, induced by Russia's collapse in the war, in modernizing its backward economy. According to C. E. Black, after reviewing half a dozen of these recent studies, Russian leaders "have indeed been influenced by Marx, but perhaps no less by Frederick W. Taylor, Henry Ford, and Walther Rathenau. Would it not be appropriate, apart from being an oversimplification, to say that what is known as communism today is simply the Soviet method of modernization?"[47] Reflection on such

[45] Harold and Margaret Sprout, *Foundations of National Power*, Princeton, N.J., 1945; Wright, *The Study of International Relations*, pp. 138, 546ff.; *idem*, *A Study of War*, pp. 278, 746, 753, 636ff.; *idem*, *Problems of Stability and Progress in International Relations*, pp. 245, 352; Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, New York, 1948, p. 80.

[46] Americans who have negotiated with Soviet representatives display considerable variation in interpreting the difficulties. See Raymond Dennett and Joseph E. Johnson, eds., *Negotiating with the Russians*, Boston, 1951.

[47] C. E. Black, "Marxism, Leninism, and Soviet Communism," *World Politics*, IX (April 1957), p. 412.

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studies might contribute more to ameliorating the cold war than constant emphasis on atomic testing and intercontinental ballistic missiles accompanied by a steady flow of recriminatory clichés.

V. The Field of International Relations

In the shrinking world, no conflict can be wholly explained by a study of the parties and their relations to each other. Increasingly, every conflict is a function of the entire field of world politics. Today conflicts seldom can be controlled without consideration of the position of the major powers in that field. An analysis of the relations of pairs of states of the kind made in 1937 would be less instructive today. For example, an analysis of the relations between Bolivia and Bulgaria would rate the probability of serious conflict between them very low. Yet, in the contemporary world, because of the position of these states in the Organization of American States and the Warsaw Alliance, respectively, a war between them is a distinct possibility. The division of the world among Communist, liberal-democratic, and anti-colonial blocs affects almost every conflict. Thus, the state of the world in regard to regionalization and centers of power, in regard to political stability and tensions, in regard to rates of advance and regional differentiation in economic development and technology, and in regard to changes in population and production ratios must be considered in studying conflicts in the present-day world and in comparing conflicts at different periods in history. The sections of the world are becoming so interdependent that it may be relevant to study change in the world's general tension level, probably varying with its general level of economic energy and of institutional rigidity, as tension in a closed electrical system varies with the energy and resistance within the system.[48]

The present instability of the world with power bi-polarized, with many new and inexperienced states, with increasing differentials in prosperity and population density, creates the danger that any conflict may be a spark in a powder keg. Although the machinery for dealing with conflicts is better than ever before, because of these conditions the probability that serious conflicts will occur and that they will rapidly spread may be greater than it has been at most periods of history. I do not overlook the Churchillian emphasis on the deterrent influence of widespread belief that hydrogen war would be suicidal,[49] but a

[48] Wright, *Problems of Stability and Progress in International Relations*, p. 160; *idem, The Study of International Relations*, pp. 379, 429.

[49] Winston S. Churchill, House of Commons Debate, November 3, 1953, *Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. 520, col. 30.

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balance based only on fear is unstable. A state may assume the risk of death if it thinks its rival is about to jump, and may risk a small war in the hope that it can be kept small.[50]

The transition which technologies of transportation, communication, and war have wrought makes the world of Queen Elizabeth II very different from the world of Queen Victoria; indeed, it is probably greater than that which occurred in any other fifty-year span of human history. The world has been engaged in a race between the acceleration of change in the basic conditions of economy and politics that induce serious conflicts, and the development of international institutions to accommodate nations to this change. There is no certainty which will win.

What can be done to improve these conditions, now adverse to the peaceful solution of international conflicts? The peoples of the United Nations in the Preamble of the Charter expressed their determination "to establish *conditions* under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained," thus differing from the members of the League of Nations, who sought to achieve international peace and security "by the firm *establishment* of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among governments and by the *maintenance* of justice and the scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another." (Italics added.) The conditions of the world were considered more favorable in 1920 than in 1945 for the rule of law. It is clear that today basic conditions must be changed before great progress can be expected in subjecting international conflicts to law.

Any political system depends upon a stable equilibrium among the major forces within it. The bi-polarization of the world is a menace to peace and to the functioning of the United Nations because it makes the basic equilibrium exceptionally unstable. A system of power politics, however, tends toward bi-polarization, because it would be suicidal for either side to decentralize or demobilize while the other remains centralized and mobilized. Yet experience has shown that a race in the building of armaments and alliances tends toward world wars destructive of civilization. Simultaneous decentralization and disarmament of the great power blocs and the development of a third force should be the aim, but specific procedures for realizing it are difficult to devise.[51]

[50] Wright, *Problems of Stability and Progress in International Relations*, p. 312.

[51] The conditions which have tended to unstabilize the balance of power and pave

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Writing in *The Federalist*, James Madison discussed "factions," which he considered the bane of democracies, perhaps insufficiently appreciating that political parties are the life of free government. He said that one could not remove the causes of faction without unifying opinion, to the destruction of liberty, and that one could not control their effects without making government so powerful as to be oppressive. He found the answer in a system of checks and balances moderating both their causes and their effects.[52] So with international conflict, the causes cannot be removed except at the expense of progress, which depends on the freedom of states to experiment. Nor can the effects be wholly controlled without a centralization of power likely to be oppressive. Through better understanding of the situation, a more complex and stable equilibrium may be established in the society of nations to check the trend of international conflict toward expansion and war.

There have, since the death of Stalin, been tendencies for each of the great alliance systems to acquire built-in checks against aggression. The British government checked the aggressive policy of the United States in Formosa and Viet Nam in 1954, and the United States, working to the same effect as the Soviet Union, checked Britain and France at Suez in 1956. A similar decentralization can be observed in the Warsaw system. Both China and the European satellites, especially Poland and Hungary, have manifested a disposition to check Soviet domination and ambition. This simultaneous decentralization of each of the great alliance systems so that the less aggressive, rather than the more aggressive, government in any situation can determine the course of action in emergencies makes for peace. Even if the great alliances continue, they may become systems of checks and balances, strong for defense but weak for aggression, rather than power blocs in which all will feel obliged to follow and support the most aggressive member in any initiative it may take. This course of development might proceed toward the elimination of the two great alliances altogether, thus establishing six major centers of power within the United Nations.

Encouragement is also to be found in the tendency of third forces to develop in Asia and in Northern and Central Europe. The neutralism of India, which is unwilling to ally itself with either great alliance, and the similar neutralism of Sweden and perhaps other Scandinavian countries, together with the guaranteed neutrality of Austria and

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the way for universal conquest and destruction of civilizations in the past are discussed in Wright, *A Study of War*, pp. 112ff., 380ff., 760ff., 1143ff.

[52] Ralph L. Ketcham, "Notes on James Madison's Sources for the Tenth Federalist Paper," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 1 (May 1957), pp. 20ff.

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Switzerland and the possible reunion of the two halves of Germany as a neutral state, might provide further checks upon the bi-polarizing tendency. A world with eight major centers of power would be more stable than one with two. The possibility of some success in the long-stalled disarmament negotiations may also be noted as a factor that may increase world stability.[53]

VI. Control of Conflicts

Apart from continuous effort to increase the general stability of the world's equilibrium, what can the United Nations do to fulfill its primary purpose—to maintain international peace and security?[54]

First, it can deal effectively with particular conflicts. In the event of hostilities, the method of proposing a cease-fire and mobilizing members against the aggressor, provisionally identified as the state which refuses to accept the cease-fire, is well established. Less well-established are procedures to utilize the resources of fact-finding, mediation, conciliation, adjudication, negotiation, consultation, and public debate and recommendation in the United Nations to settle disputes before hostilities arise.

All such activities must be utilized with judgment and consideration of the nature of the particular conflict. The arts of mediation and conciliation need development, as does the art of utilizing commissions representing influential governments, and the art of invoking world opinion through debate and promulgation of carefully worded resolutions by the General Assembly or the Security Council. Every international dispute, situation, or conflict has various elements: military, political, economic, ideological, and legal. Often isolation of these elements and utilization of appropriate methods for dealing with each have proved advantageous. But, above all, attention should be given to the proper co-ordination of action, and to the appropriate time sequence in invoking the services of the individual mediator to explore and, if possible, to bring together the minds of the litigants, of technical commissions to elucidate facts relevant to the controversy, of consulting bodies to exert pressure by governments interested primarily in solution of the conflict with peace and justice, and of public debate and resolutions to mobilize world public opinion.

[53] The conditions tending to make a balance of power stable are discussed in Wright, *A Study of War*, pp. 755ff., 1389ff.

[54] In the following suggestions the writer has benefited by the 10th Report and attached papers of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, *Strengthening the United Nations*, New York, 1957.

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Doubtless the procedures of the General Assembly as an instrument for the expression of world public opinion are subject to improvement. Many doubt whether Assembly resolutions, approved by a two-thirds vote on the principle of one state, one vote—given the tendency of states to vote by blocs rather than by conviction, and to utilize debate and recommendations as means of propaganda rather than of peaceful solution—can be considered manifestations of world public opinion. The actual record of these resolutions and votes suggests that these apprehensions are exaggerated. If the votes had been counted by a system giving weight to population, financial contribution, and literacy, the actual results would not often have differed. Moreover, a system giving much consideration to population would reduce the weight of Europe, America, and the Middle East, and increase that of Asia and the Soviet group.[55]

The Assembly has manifested greater conviction on the necessity of maintaining or restoring peace than on any interpretation of the requirements of justice. It has sustained the Charter emphasis that peace is prior to justice. States have often found this objectionable when they believed themselves victims of injustice, as did Britain, France, and Israel in the events of the autumn of 1956. Judge Charles de Visscher has endorsed the principle by saying: "So long as the individualistic distribution of power among states persists, with the major political tensions that it engenders, peace will serve justice better than justice will serve peace."[56] Certainly military self-help to achieve justice can aid only the powerful and that in itself implies injustice.

Nevertheless, a peace based on serious injustice cannot last indefinitely, and war to preserve peace is a dubious expedient. The world has witnessed peace treaties which tended to end peace, and wars which failed to end wars. Ultimately, peace and justice must go together, but usually the stopping of hostilities and restoration of the *status quo ante* must come before a just solution is possible.[57] Individual intervention or aggression by a state, even to achieve justice, cannot be tolerated by the United Nations. In accord with the Stimson Doctrine, such enterprises must not be permitted to bring fruits to the aggressor.[58]

[55] Catherine Senf, "A Proposal for Weighting Votes in the UN Assembly," in Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, 9th Report, *Charter Review Conference*, New York, 1955, pp. 119ff.

[56] Charles de Visscher, *Theory and Reality in Public International Law*, Corbett trans., Princeton, N.J., 1957, p. 328.

[57] Quincy Wright, *et al., Research for Peace* (Institute for Social Research, Oslo), Amsterdam, North-Holland Publishing Co., 1954, p. 4.

[58] Quincy Wright, "The Legal Background in the Far East," in Wright, *et al., Legal*

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The Middle Eastern experience of the autumn of 1956 may prove an illustration of these principles.[59]

Secondly, the United Nations must develop principles of justice. If peace must come first, making military self-help unavailable and providing an opportunity for the delicate flower of justice to grow and bloom, how, it may be asked, can this flower be discovered? Can justice be found by negotiation and conciliation or by the application of law? The new international law of the Charter, stating the broad principles outlawing war, demanding good faith, protecting human rights, and promoting the self-determination of peoples, differs considerably from the international law generally accepted before World War I. The latter interpreted territorial sovereignty—the basic concept of international law—to permit states to initiate war for reasons of state, to massacre or enslave their citizens, and to subordinate their colonies to the interests of the metropole. It regarded states as the only subjects of international law, according no status to individuals, nationalities, and international organizations. It encouraged neutrality in war and sought to isolate conflicts to the parties. It would appear that the new international law, with its greater emphasis on international co-operation to achieve human goals, is better adapted to the shrinking world than was the old, and should be better developed by jurists and better understood by peoples.[60] But within it there must be much flexibility.

International law, dependent for maintenance primarily on the good faith of states, cannot be viable unless it corresponds to the actual interests of the states bound by it. These interests differ considerably. The domestic jurisdiction of states must be protected, not invaded, by international law, though modern conditions demand a minimum protection of human rights and an opportunity for genuine nations to develop their capacities and eventually to become self-governing.[61]

International law has been less utilized by the United Nations than it was by the League of Nations. This is doubtless due partly to the skepticism of the Soviet Union about an international law which developed under capitalistic conditions, and partly to the rapid change of conditions arising from new technologies, new states, and new opinions,

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Problems in the Far Eastern Conflict (Institute of Pacific Relations), New York, 1941, pp. 3ff.; H. Lauterpacht, "The Principles of Non-Recognition in International Law," in *ibid.*, pp. 136ff.; "Summary of Round Table Discussion," in *ibid.*, pp. 182ff.

[59] Wright, "Intervention, 1956," *loc.cit.* (note 16).

[60] Quincy Wright, *Contemporary International Law: A Balance Sheet*, New York, 1955.

[61] Quincy Wright, "The Prospects of International Law," *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law*, Washington, D.C., 1956, pp. 2ff.

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raising doubts as to the applicability of traditional rules and principles. A rule of law in the world requires continual adaptation of the law to changing conditions as well as institutions for its proper interpretation and application. It is believed that with ten years' experience, the law of the Charter has received sufficient political and juristic discussion so that the World Court can be trusted to apply it in a liberal spirit. The advisory opinion of the Court might be more frequently sought, especially on such questions as the domestic jurisdiction of states. This vital question, marking the line between the competence of states and of United Nations' organs, can, it is believed, better develop through judicial precedents, as in the United States and other federations, than through political debate in the General Assembly or other political organs of the United Nations.[62]

In the *third* place, the United Nations should seek to identify its principles and purposes with the national interests and the national law of its members. The United Nations can contribute to this result by serving more effectively to increase the security and prosperity of its members and to develop international law so that it conforms to the needs of modern states in the modern world. It should not conceive itself as an independent agency to make decisions, formulate policies, and establish law above states, but as a servant of its members to co-ordinate their decisions, policies, and legal claims in the interest of all as manifested by the purposes and principles of the Charter which all have accepted. Progress toward such an identification of the purposes and principles of the Charter and of the actions of the United Nations with the national interests of member states cannot depend on United Nations action alone. The members can contribute to this development by manifesting their loyalty to the obligations they have undertaken in the Charter and by supporting the United Nations in the achievement of its purposes of maintaining peace and promoting justice. Some of the members have done so by modifying their constitutions and laws so as to assure national fulfillment of Charter obligations. Presidents of the United States have often publicly proclaimed that maintenance of United Nations principles is a prime policy of the American government.[63] The movement initiated by Senator Bricker, which wishes to modify the constitutional principle that has accorded

[62] Quincy Wright, "Domestic Jurisdiction and the Competence of United Nations Organs," in Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, 9th Report, *op.cit.*, pp. 42ff.

[63] *Ibid.*, pp. 7ff.; Quincy Wright, "International Law and the United Nations," *Cursos Monograficos* (Academia Inter Americana de derecho comparado e internacional), Havana, 1956, v, pp. 319ff.

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internal legal status to treaty obligations, seems happily to have lost its dynamism.[64]

Finally, the United Nations cannot be strong and able to perform its major task of dealing with international conflicts unless the world community is strengthened, not only materially by stabilizing the power equilibrium, not only politically by genuine acceptance of United Nations purposes in the policy of member governments, not only legally by incorporation of United Nations principles in the law of member states, but also morally by inclusion of United Nations values in the culture of the nations and in the attitudes and opinions of the peoples. The specialized agencies contributing services and working understandings may gradually develop a sense of world community within which the United Nations agencies can deal with international conflicts effectively. The United Nations information office can also contribute by spreading information and developing the United Nations as a symbol of man's aspiration to make the world better for humanity.[65]

I have discussed the meaning of international conflict. I have analyzed conflicts from the points of view of the parties, their relations, and the field of their operation. I have considered the possibilities of United Nations action to solve conflicts with peace and justice. I have not exhausted the subject, but I have probably exhausted my readers. The problem is vital to the continuance of the world civilization that emerged in the age of discoveries, bringing all sections of mankind into continuous contact with one another, and that has been gradually and painfully seeking to regulate behavior by principles of humanity, liberty, tolerance, and reason, subduing the propensity of sovereign states to conceive themselves as gods, but to act like apes.[66] The United Nations has, under most inauspicious circumstances, done much to elucidate the meaning of world civilization and to narrow the gap between its precepts and its practices.[67] It cannot continue to progress unless men and women everywhere appreciate the importance and the difficulty of the problem it faces, and have faith that progress is possible.

[64] Quincy Wright, "Congress and the Treaty Making Power," *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law*, Washington, D.C., 1952, pp. 43ff.

[65] Wright, "International Law and the United Nations," *loc.cit.*, p. 325; *idem, Problems of Stability and Progress in International Relations*, pp. 22ff.; *idem, The Study of International Relations*, pp. 316ff.; *idem*, "International Organization and Peace," *Western Political Quarterly*, VIII (June 1955), pp. 149ff.; *idem, A Study of War*, p. 1295.

[66] Wright, *A Study of War*, pp. 169ff., 267, 1027, 1237. Aristotle thought a person who is "unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god" (*Politics*, I, 2, 3).

[67] Such a gap has often indicated the impending demise of a civilization. Toynbee, *op.cit.*, VI, p. 319; Wright, *A Study of War*, pp. 164, 257ff.; 370, 386, 402ff.; De Visscher, *op.cit.*, p. 364.

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THE CONCEPT OF ECONOMIC POTENTIAL FOR WAR*

By KLAUS KNORR

TOWARD the end of the Second World War, Field Marshal Rommel confided to his diary that, once the German U-boats were beaten in the Battle of the Atlantic, and the swelling stream of American soldiers and supplies could reach Europe, Germany "was doomed to inevitable defeat at any place which was accessible to the Anglo-American transport fleets."[1] Not everyone will agree with this assertion of the prominent role played by sheer masses of military manpower and matériel in deciding the outcome of World War II. It is suggestive, however, that the fortunes of that war turned in close association with the changing ratio of munitions production by the Axis powers and the United Nations.[2] Indeed, the evidence of the last two world wars gave rise to the widespread impression that, in any large-scale modern war, it was not military forces, mobilized in peacetime, that were likely to determine the outcome, but war potential, i.e., the ultimate capacity of belligerent nations to produce combat power. Economic war potential in particular came to be valued highly. Although the first atomic bombs had been dropped on an enemy, by the end of the war long-range defense planning in the United States was largely based on the concept of economic war potential or, as it was often called, "the mobilization base." Economic capability for war was to be enhanced by means of stockpiling strategic raw materials and by using government protection or subsidies in order to maintain certain critical industries at a desirable output capacity. Under the impression derived from the two world wars, Detroit and Pittsburgh had become the chief symbols of American military power.

But this orientation, though not some of the economic policies justified by it, was to be short-lived. No sooner had the lessons of the two world wars been learned than the validity of those lessons was called into question by the swift advent of nuclear airpower. This abrupt and revolutionary change in weapons seemed to imply that

* This article is a revised version of a lecture delivered at the Industrial War College, Washington, D.C., on March 19, 1957.

[1] B. H. Liddell Hart, ed., *The Rommel Papers*, New York, 1953, p. 507.

[2] U.S. War Production Board, Bureau of Planning and Statistics, *World Munitions Production, 1938-1944*, Document No. 21 (mimeographed), Washington, D.C., July 15, 1944, p. 33.

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wars of the World War II type were definitely passé, that future wars would be either all-out nuclear conflicts, with the economic mobilization base reduced to a shambles within a matter of days, or engagements in the "Gray Areas," which would be limited in area, target selection, time, objectives, and possibly in the application of weapons, and which would likewise require mobilized forces—"fire brigades" to extinguish "brushfires." In the age of thermonuclear bombs, it appeared to many that only mobilized strength counted; economic capability was irrelevant and economic war potential had ceased to exist.

Persuasive as this conclusion may seem at first, it appears to be rash on second thought. It is the main purpose of this article to demonstrate that the concept of economic war potential remains a useful tool of analysis. To be useful, the concept must be applicable in two ways. It must assist us to evaluate the military power which various countries are able to produce. This is its predictive use. And it must assist us to choose policies by means of which we can increase the military power that we are able to produce. This is its manipulative use.

I

In the traditional view, economic war potential was properly defined as the capacity to produce military forces and supplies in time of war and thus to add substantially to, and often to multiply, the amount of combat power maintained in peacetime. In this sense, economic war potential was seen to be determined by a nation's existing manpower, farms, factories, and other economic resources that could be diverted from other employment or idleness to the production of military power. Since a nation must subsist and carry on most of its peacetime activities even in time of war, though on a reduced scale, obviously not all of this economic capacity would be available for military purposes. But whatever military power could and would be mobilized had to come from this complex of resources, and their kind and quantity were therefore regarded as a prime condition of a nation's military strength.

Now, economic war potential in this sense seemed to be of crucial importance to the outcome of the last two world wars (and also of the American Civil War) because these were essentially wars of attrition. Among the conditions that made them wars of attrition, the following were prominent: there was no decisive imbalance of military strength during their opening phases; there was no gross imbalance between the technical efficiency of offensive and defensive weapons; the effective transmission of firepower over space was costly in terms of resources

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and time; and the war aims of the coalitions threatened the defeated with extreme deprivations. Since for these reasons these wars were of long duration, there was plenty of time to mobilize potential military strength.

The inclination to scrap the concept of economic war potential is predicated on the expectation that future wars will not be wars of attrition. In the case of all-out war, the new military technology not only has produced arms of unprecedented destructive power, but has also given offensive arms a striking and seemingly abiding edge over defensive arms; and it has drastically cut down the protective function of space and distance. In unlimited thermonuclear war, the decisive blows are expected to fall at the very outset. In strict logic, it may be said that attrition will not be absent, but that it will be consummated in a matter of days or weeks. In the case of brushfires, the dominant assumption is that military forces will be required at once and that the test of arms will be limited; the burden will fall overwhelmingly, if not entirely, on mobilized forces, and little need is foreseen for potential military strength.

The trouble with this thesis is that it rests both on highly uncertain predictions regarding the complexion of future hostilities and on a failure to adapt the concept of war potential to current conditions.

Do current predictions about the nature of future warfare exhaust not all possible, but all likely, contingencies? It can be granted that a long drawn-out and massive war conducted with conventional (i.e., modernized but non-atomic) weapons is so unlikely to occur that it may be safely neglected as a contingency. There definitely is no future for World War II.[3] It can also be granted that, once unlimited thermonuclear war has broken out, there is no economic war potential to be mobilized for its conduct. Even an ensuing broken-backed war would have to be fought with munitions on hand at the start of the hostilities. However, nations will differ in their ability to absorb and recover from nuclear attack. While there may be little diversion of rehabilitation potential to sustaining any broken-backed war, the capacity to recuperate is in a real sense part of a nation's defense capacity (for it is part of the nature of the target presented to the enemy), and the estimate of recovery potential may well influence the decision to participate in all-out nuclear war or in the prewar bluffing game. Thus, at the point where power to retaliate fails to deter an aggressor, awareness of a very low recovery potential may induce a threatened country to

[3] Cf. Brigadier General S. F. Giffin, USAF, "A New Future for World War II?" *World Politics*, IX, No. 2 (January 1957), pp. 280-86.

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give in, and eventually to capitulate, rather than continue its counter-threat (whose sole purpose lay in deterrence) or follow through by taking retaliatory action.

Limited war is far less capable of predictive definition than unlimited nuclear war. Envisaged as a contingency, it may vary greatly in geographic location, in the number and power of belligerents, in the use of weapons, in the nature of war aims, in scale and duration. Given the thermonuclear stalemate between the United States and Soviet Russia, we cannot be certain that the fear that a limited war will degenerate into unlimited hostilities will deter limited operations altogether, or will confine their magnitude and duration. A nation with nuclear airpower may hesitate, in some circumstances, to unleash this power against an opponent who has only non-nuclear arms at his disposal or who, though in possession of nuclear weapons, restricts himself to the employment of non-nuclear arms. In sheer logic, it is possible that a stalemate in thermonuclear airpower will encourage an aggressor to start limited operations because he is fairly sure that the opponent will not lightly choose to retaliate by starting unlimited nuclear war. Furthermore, it should not be assumed that limited wars will necessarily be cheap. That modern arms technology permits military manpower to be reduced owing to an increase in firepower per man does not at all mean a reduction in the real resources that sustain up-to-date fighting units. In short, it is unrealistic to assume that engagements in limited wars may not call for some mobilization of war potential following the precipitation of hostilities. Of course, the need for recourse to potential would become greatly intensified if participation in limited war were accompanied—as it is likely to be in any limited war involving major nuclear powers—by a stepping-up of defensive preparations for unlimited war. Finally, the outbreak of unlimited conflict may be preceded by a build-up period during which additional military strength is mobilized.

However, the disposition to discard war potential as a relevant concept in the nuclear age is, in addition and primarily, based on a rigid and unimaginative tradition governing its application. In a time without secure and presumably durable peace, the distinction between formal peace and war loses much of its operational significance when it comes to the maintenance and use of military power. This is especially true at present, when the militarily important countries are putting themselves, year after year, under a heavy strain in order to maintain large military establishments in so-called peacetime. It is

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conceivable that this condition will be of long duration and that some countries, unable or unwilling to bear the burden, will quit the race and be "defeated" without a single shot being fired or a single bomb dropped. If we simply dismiss the term "war potential" and substitute "military potential," or "defense potential," it becomes immediately apparent that the concept applies meaningfully to a wide spectrum of military effort, ranging from peacetime military establishments, through various types of police action and limited wars, to unlimited nuclear conflict. Since such a long-term, though possibly fluctuating, commitment of military effort puts any society to heavy exertion, the factor of attrition obviously re-enters the picture. Psychological factors—the will to provide for military power—will be predominant in this kind of attrition. But if the military sector persistently receives resources at the expense of investment, economic attrition may also occur. Clearly, the capacity of a nation to provide for its external security under these circumstances depends on its military potential. Military potential, then, is the ability of a nation to divert resources to defense in both formal peace and war.

Economic (including technological) capacity is, of course, one constituent of military potential in this sense. But before concentrating on this particular factor, its relation to other major constituents must be clarified. The production of military power demands an input of manpower and other productive resources which would otherwise be directed to non-military output or, marginally, remain idle. But at no time, not even when engaged in total war, can a nation allocate all resources to the production of combat power. The proportion which can and will be diverted to this purpose depends (a) on the structure and productivity of these resources and (b) on the nation's will to provide for military power, i.e., to pay the price for military strength. This price is to be paid not only financially but in terms of foregoing the satisfaction of a wide range of interests—consumption, leisure, comfort, safety, etc.—that conflict with the commitment of resources to the production of military power. The will to provide for military power is therefore another constituent of a nation's defense potential.

Furthermore, given any degree of willingness to pay this price (including the discipline with which the population supports government measures), the output of military power depends upon the efficiency with which the diverted resources are employed. Hence, organizational ability and especially administrative competence represent a third

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major constituent of military potential.[4] To illustrate, the amount of military power maintained by the United States at any one time is not only a function of the country's productive capacity. It also depends on the size of the defense budget (which permits a proportion of this capacity to be allotted to the output of combat power, and which is contingent upon a political decision reflecting the price the American people are willing to pay for defense), and on the efficiency with which every defense dollar—and, indeed, every non-defense dollar—is spent. As will appear in the following, any realistic analysis of economic and technological potential for defense must pay heed to these interrelationships.

II

While it is useful to theorize on the general meaning of military potential and on the general ways in which this concept can be put to predictive and manipulative use, practical application calls for an immediate descent from the general to the particular. In real life, a nation has no such thing as *a* military potential or *an* economic defense potential which is the same for all possible situations calling for the use of military power in formal peace or war. At present, for example, there are countries which have a relatively high potential for fighting with non-atomic weapons on their own territory or in nearby theaters of war; but they have a very low potential for conducting war with non-atomic arms in distant theaters of operations and a still lower, or zero, potential for waging thermonuclear war. It cannot be stressed too strongly that the analysis of the war potential of any particular country or alliance must begin with specific assumptions about the kind of situation demanding the use of military power. If we are interested in military potential, we must relate our analysis to the likely situations that require, or will require, a military effort. At the present time, and using the United States as an example in the following analysis, it is reasonable to concentrate on three such situations: (1) the long-run maintenance of an adequate defense establishment (which, in fact, it is hoped will deter aggression without jeopardy to vital American interests abroad); (2) involvement in limited wars; and (3) the outbreak of unlimited war. For illustrative purposes, we may furthermore assume that the first two situations demand a diversion of resources from the civilian to the military sector of the economy

[4] For an extensive discussion of this conceptual problem, see Klaus Knorr, *The War Potential of Nations*, Princeton, N.J., 1956, pp. 40-47 and *passim*.

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amounting to from 8 to 12 per cent and from 14 to 18 per cent of the Gross National Product (GNP), respectively.[5]

Obviously, the basic factors governing *economic* defense potential are the same for the two first situations, in the sense that a nation endowed with a high economic defense potential for fighting limited war usually also enjoys a high potential for maintaining a strong military posture in the absence of formal war. The main conditions that make up *economic* defense potential for limited war are:

(1) *The volume of the GNP.* The absolute volume is patently significant, since the economic effort for defense will be measured as a proportion of total capacity for producing goods and services. The volume of GNP per capita, or per head of the labor force, is a rough index of the productivity of labor and helps in estimating how much civilian consumption can be compressed in an emergency in order to release productive factors for the defense section. Clearly, it makes a difference whether the GNP *per capita* is the equivalent of $2,000, $800, or $100 per year.

(2) *The rate of growth of the GNP.* This datum will help in estimating changes in economic defense potential over time. Growth will result chiefly from increases in the labor force, from the rate of savings and investment, and from technological innovation. These three factors each have their own bearing on economic defense potential—e.g., a country with a high rate of savings and investment may be able to sustain the conduct of limited war by temporarily switching resources to the military sector entirely or largely from investment, rather than from consumption.

(3) *The structure of output.* The most relevant condition is the degree to which the normal product mix approaches the output mix required for waging limited war. This includes the value of industrial as against agricultural, mining, and service production; of heavy as against light industrial production; within these categories, of production of the many goods of special importance to defense such as arms, aircraft, electronics, and fuels; and the growth rate for all of these key products.

[5] Since the Korean War ended, United States expenditures on defense have hovered around 10 per cent of the GNP. The figure selected for limited war is more arbitrary. At the height of the Korean War, American expenditures on external security were about 14 per cent of the GNP. While it is possible that a very limited military action might be fought without any boost in the defense budget, it is also possible that a prolonged limited war on a larger scale might claim more than 18 per cent of the GNP. At the height of the Second World War, the major industrial belligerents devoted from 40 to 50 per cent of their GNP to warfare.

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(4) *The flexibility of output.* It is important to know the relative ease and speed with which output patterns can be modified and, especially, the output of key military supplies be expanded. To the extent that this depends on the flexibility of an economy rather than on government policy, the main factors are the organizational ability of management, the mobility of labor, and the state of such industries as construction, transportation, and machine tools which facilitate the conversion of plant from one output mix to another or the shift of labor from one plant or locality to another.

(5) *Science and technology.* The current pace of technological innovation in weapons production is unprecedented in history and is indeed so swift that a nation's endowment in scientists and technicians, the rates and quality of their training, the distribution of this precious personnel over various research fields, and its division between pure and applied research have become major constituents of economic defense potential.

(6) *Size and structure of the defense budget.* This factor will in large measure determine a country's ready capacity for producing military supplies and skills required in limited war.

(7) *The size and structure of the tax burden.* Both the magnitude of tax revenues in relation to the national income and the tax pattern affect the ease with which the financial instrument can be used in an emergency for allocating additional resources to defense production.

It should be noted that the degree of national self-sufficiency, as against dependence on foreign supplies, is considered as part of the "structure of output." For industrial nations, this problem is chiefly one of foodstuffs and primary commodities. Normally, there should be no problem so far as the long-range maintenance of defense forces in time of formal peace is concerned. But as the Suez Canal crisis and the sharp rises of raw materials prices during the Korean War showed, dependence on foreign supplies may be a very serious handicap in time of limited war. Yet, since most primary materials are storable, and since participation in international trade tends to raise labor productivity and the GNP—another determinant of economic defense potential—self-sufficiency achieved by a deliberate cutback of foreign trade is distinctly less of an asset than when it is the natural outcome of comparative production advantages.

In view of the number of main conditions affecting the economic war potential of nations, it is immediately apparent that there is no magic key to the estimation of war potential. An estimate of any one condition

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cannot be expected to yield more than partial results. For instance, a mere comparison of the GNP of two countries—although it offers valuable information—is not only difficult technically but also of narrowly limited value by itself.

When the conditions of economic defense potential are discussed, reference is often made to conditions that are not actually economic, but constituents of administrative capacity or of the nation's will to provide for military power. Thus, how large an input of productive resources is needed to generate a given amount of military strength depends in large measure on the administrative efficiency with which defense dollars are spent. The flexibility of the output mix depends on administrative competence, which is a considerable element in lead-times, whenever new admixtures of military end-items are urgently required.

The maintenance of a large-scale defense effort in time of formal peace must, in the long run, rest on a commensurate degree of taxation, so that there are no consumption and investment dollars in excess of what can be spent on consumption and investment goods at current prices. If the defense effort is not put on a pay-as-you-go basis whenever full employment prevails, inflationary pressures will result and, if strong and prolonged, they will have various debilitating consequences. Whether the defense effort will or will not be mounted on a pay-as-you-go basis is not, of course, an economic but a political and psychological problem (and, since public attitudes are subject to government leadership, it is an administrative problem as well). This crucial factor of the will to provide for defense is frequently slighted in American discussions of how large a defense budget the "economy" can stand. What the "economy" can stand is something quite different from, though not unrelated to, what the electorate will stand. Provided the electorate agrees to be taxed for a defense effort requiring year after year, say, 12 per cent of the GNP, the question is whether or not this tax load (in addition to taxes for the civilian purposes of government) will undermine the "soundness" of the economy. The economy might suffer if high taxes engendered a fall in the rate of savings and investment (public as well as private) and, in a private enterprise economy, weakened the incentive to work, innovate, and employ productive resources efficiently. Such ill consequences would slow down the rate of economic growth in, and reduce the flexibility of, the economy and thereby diminish economic defense potential over time.

Contrary to the assurance with which such deleterious effects are frequently predicted, we know unfortunately little about the circumstances

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under which they would represent a serious risk. We do know that the high tax rates levied in the United States since the outbreak of the Korean War have not prevented a very high rate of economic growth; that the effects on the incentives and the savings of high-income groups as a whole have been minor;[6] that harmful effects of severe taxation depend on the structure of taxation as well as on its level; and that, in democratic communities, the slackening of the electorate's will to provide for defense in peacetime is likely to keep taxes from reaching the level at which these subversive risks to the economy would become serious.[7]

During the Korean War, when United States expenditures on national security rose from $18.5 billion in 1950 to $51.5 billion in 1953, or from 6.4 to 14.2 per cent of the GNP, additional resources were allocated to the military sector by means of cutting the rate of investment somewhat[8] and by preventing consumption from rising as fast as the GNP. This diversion of productive capacity was effected primarily by hiking income taxes and by a relatively mild rise in prices. It is probable that the burden of any limited war, claiming from 14 to 18 per cent of the GNP, will be borne roughly in this way—i.e., the additional resources needed in the defense sector will come largely from a reduction in non-defense investment[9] and from any current growth in productive capacity; and this transfer of resources will be financed in part by an increase of taxation and in part by inflationary methods. This makes the level and structure of existing taxes and the choice of new taxes (i.e., administrative competence for war) a matter of considerable

[6] Thus, in the United States, the main effect of high taxes on executive behavior has been observed in the methods of executive compensation (deferred compensation plans, stock options, untaxable fringe benefits and perquisites, etc.). These loopholes in the tax system have protected incentives and preserved the ability and effort to save. G. J. Keith Butters, "Taxation, Incentives, and Financial Capacity," *American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings*, XLIV (May 1954), pp. 504-19.

[7] However, there is considerable evidence that high and steeply progressive income taxes are entailing harmful long-run effects in Great Britain. Although there, too, business executives have found legal ways of evading stringent tax rates, these loopholes have not offered relief, and hence protection of incentives, to other highly skilled occupations. The difficulties encountered in recruiting personnel for high civil service positions and the continuous emigration of highly trained technicians indicate the productivity losses which British taxes inflict on the economy.

[8] This cutback was achieved by keeping investment in durable equipment and residential construction stable and by a sharp decline in business inventories.

[9] The aftereffects of a reduced investment rate on economic growth will be relatively minor so long as the cut falls primarily on inventories and residential building. And even if the growth of the GNP is slowed down temporarily, this need not entail a *relative* decline of economic defense potential so long as the main adversary in limited war is the main adversary in any conceivable war and is likewise forced to accept a cut in investment.

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importance, lest taxpayers respond to new taxes or to inflation by slackening their productive efforts or by reducing their savings.

The will to provide for military power and the administrative capacity for doing so are also important in that the waging of limited war may well lead to a special scarcity of key materials and facilities, and this strain may require government allocation in order to keep the entire defense effort from being hampered by a few specific bottlenecks. As the first year of the Korean War demonstrated, there is also the danger that the public will anticipate shortages of greater spread and severity than are warranted by the objective situation, and that the resulting scare-buying will add materially to inflationary pressures. In that event, more comprehensive price and rationing controls may be advisable; and the choice, timing, and administration of such measures will again put a premium on administrative competence and the public will to provide for defense.

III

Because the predictive uses of the concept of military potential should be obvious from the foregoing, it may suffice to make some general observations on its manipulative use. For either the maintenance of a large peacetime defense establishment or the conduct of limited war, the following conditions are favorable to economic defense potential and can be promoted by public policy.

(1) The more rapidly and steadily the GNP grows, the more easily will a high but fixed defense budget be borne over time, since it will claim a progressively smaller share of the GNP; and the easier it will be—economically, politically, and administratively—to increase the defense budget by allowing it to rise short of, equal to, or somewhat in excess of the rise in the GNP. Again, the faster economic growth proceeds, the greater will be the opportunity to bear the burden of limited war without depressing consumption or investment, or without depressing them severely.

Appropriate policies for fostering the rapid growth of the GNP, and for avoiding or moderating its temporary shrinkage as a result of business depression, are therefore desirable for defense as well as other reasons. In addition to proper fiscal, monetary, and trade policies, the government is in a position to further growth by public investment of various kinds, notably for the purpose of augmenting human resources.

(2) The maintenance of a large defense budget will, in an industrial country, automatically stimulate over a wide range precisely those in-

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dustries which are of key importance to military power. Adroit public subsidies can be used for the purpose of maintaining reserve output capacity in a few selected industries, such as aircraft. Stockpiles of critical raw materials can be set up in order to minimize inconvenient shortages in time of limited war.

(3) Special efforts, financed from public as well as private funds, can be made to guarantee a sufficient supply of competent scientists and technicians, and to direct research into areas which, because of the long-range or uncertain nature of probable pay-offs, are likely to be neglected by private industry and the defense department.

(4) The administrative capability for conducting limited war can be improved by preparing in advance emergency programs for taxation and both selective and comprehensive price control and rationing.

Defense potential for unlimited thermonuclear war is far more of a conundrum than potential power for activation in peacetime or in limited conflicts. As observed above, there is no direct military potential to be mobilized for the waging of all-out war. Even under the assumption of a lingering, broken-backed war, economic defense potential after all makes up much of the back that has been broken. As also pointed out, however, the capacity of nations to recover from thermonuclear devastation is indirectly part of their military power, no matter whether recovery permits some diversion of resources to the conduct of broken-backed war or whether the recuperation potential affects the decision of a would-be aggressor to precipitate, and of his opponent to accept, unlimited hostilities or threats based thereon.

But what can be said about recovery potential? Despite obvious differences among countries in size and location of territory, and in density and layout of population and industries, any prediction of the productive capacity that might escape destruction and remain effective is so speculative as to be worthless, in view of current and imminent technological developments in nuclear weapons systems. This situation is bound to continue unless a breakthrough in active defense robs these offensive weapons of their decisive technical superiority.

One point, however, is quite apparent and merits emphasis. The very way societies are physically organized—economically, politically, indeed, for the pursuit of nearly all the peacetime interests of their members—makes them extremely vulnerable in unlimited war. They present a natural target for thermonuclear weapons. Recovery potential, therefore, must reside principally in deliberate measures designed to alter the target, to render it less vulnerable to destruction. To do so

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to a degree highly protective of physical assets is, of course, prohibitive in cost economically and in terms of all that makes life worth living.

At the present and now foreseeable stage of weapons development, however, the cost of protective measures (especially adequate emergency shelters) for substantially reducing civilian casualties is not excessive for a wealthy nation such as the United States, in the event that the will to provide for military strength and administrative competence can be made to extend to these matters. A nation which thus supplies the means to protect human life in thermonuclear war is protecting human resources, the most valuable economic asset of any economically developed country. Yet if a society takes this course, it and its recovery potential will suffer all the more keenly from a lack of complementary resources—that is, capital goods—which are destroyed in unlimited war and whose protection is not feasible to any substantial extent. What is feasible, however, are preparations which will maintain the surviving population and shorten appreciably the time needed for the repair, recombination, and reproduction of non-human resources. Among such measures would be the stockpiling of food and other essential supplies for civilian subsistence, the storage of key repair resources and, of course, preparations for the functioning of government under conditions of nuclear disaster.

To conclude: in view of the various roles which military power must be expected to play in the future, and given a refocusing of the concepts of war potential and economic war potential, these concepts retain demonstrable usefulness for predictive and manipulative purposes. Once the focus has been redirected, the main determinants of war potential for fighting the Second World War are found to determine military potential in the nuclear age; and much of what has been learned from an analysis of war potential under the conditions prevailing a decade or even a few decades ago can be adapted to present conditions. While there is no future for World War II, there seems to be a future for the concept of military potential. What remains to be done, but cannot be done within the confines of a brief article, is to develop its application in progressively greater detail.

To do so will by no means be easy. As various techniques of analysis are employed—whether GNP analysis, input-output analysis, process analysis, or others—it will soon become apparent that they can take us only part way toward complete knowledge, either because of the nature of the techniques or because of a paucity of data. In the end, when all we are able to learn is summed up, there will be disconcerting gaps in

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our knowledge and an obvious need to rely on "judgment." But such imperfection should be no cause for abandoning the effort to learn. The fact is that political and military leaders cannot escape the necessity of constantly estimating military power, of which potential power is still a part. Surely, it is better to learn as much as we can than to rely entirely on intuition.

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AMBASSADOR BULLITT AND THE FALL OF FRANCE

By GORDON WRIGHT

DIPLOMATS in our day rarely make much history, but in times of crisis they occupy unique vantage points from which to see it made. Such an observer was William Christian Bullitt, the American Ambassador to France from 1936 to 1940. Few other foreigners resident in Paris enjoyed so intimate a view of high politics during the last years of the Third Republic, and even fewer have left so lively and colorful a contemporary record of that period. Perhaps it is true that the bulky file of Bullitt's daily telegrams from Paris reveals more about Bullitt himself than about the state of France.[1] Yet those cables, sprawling, scrappy, and personal though they may be, also illumine two significant aspects of Bullitt's era: the slow conversion of American leadership from isolationism to interventionism, and the disintegration and destruction of the Third Republic.

Not all historians would agree that Bullitt did not make history as well as observe and record it. Some of them even see him as one of the authors of World War II: a kind of neo-Isvolsky, one of those "guilty" men who tempted both the French and the American governments onto the path of disaster, and drove Hitler into an unpremeditated attack on the West.[2] Others seem to regard him as a modern Paul Revere, moved by a desperate and patriotic sense of urgency to challenge the blind wishful thinking of his era.[3] Still others dismiss him as a superficial and confused Philadelphia dilettante, caught up in a crisis too complex for him to comprehend.[4]

But it is not the historians alone who disagree about Bullitt; his con-

[1] In the footnotes that follow, all official messages not otherwise identified are from Bullitt to Hull. The key *SD*, with appropriate file number, will identify documents from the State Department archives. The key *FR*, with appropriate page, will identify documents which have been published in *Foreign Relations of the United States* for the years 1936-1939 (Washington, D.C., 1953-1956).

[2] C. C. Tansill, *Back Door to War*, Chicago, 1952, pp. 555-57; W. H. Chamberlin, *America's Second Crusade*, Chicago, 1950, pp. 59-60, 100; F. R. Sanborn, *Design for War*, New York, 1951, pp. 47, 50, 54, 186.

[3] W. L. Langer and S. E. Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940*, New York, 1952, pp. 123-24; Forrest Davis and E. K. Lindley, *How War Came*, New York, 1942, pp. 38, 45-46, 51; W. L. Langer, *Our Vichy Gamble*, New York, 1947, pp. 5, 22.

[4] W. W. Kaufmann, "Two American Ambassadors: Bullitt and Kennedy," in G. A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, eds., *The Diplomats, 1919-1939*, Princeton, N.J., 1953, pp. 677-81. Kaufmann's incisive essay is the best available study of Bullitt's diplomatic career.

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temporaries differed just as violently. Our Ambassador Dodd in Berlin was inclined to regard him as a pro-Nazi social butterfly; our Ambassador Kennedy in London seems to have concluded that he was an anti-Nazi fanatic.[5] When Bullitt was assigned to Paris in 1936, irate citizens wrote to the American government denouncing him as a Soviet agent; when he returned from Paris in 1940, other citizens just as irate wrote to denounce him as a Fascist sympathizer. New Dealer Harold Ickes thought that Bullitt's brilliant successes in Paris fitted him to be Secretary of State; New Dealer Marquis Childs thought that Bullitt's disastrous failure in Paris required his prompt retirement from public life.[6]

Perhaps no man could have been Ambassador to France in that crucial period without arousing controversy. But, in the case of Bullitt, controversy was rooted in the man's very nature. All through his public career, from his defense of Lenin after the First World War to his crusade against Stalin after the Second, he managed to supply heaps of ammunition to both his critics and his defenders. Positive and cocksure in his judgments, voluble and persuasive in expressing his views, caustic and contemptuous toward little men, Bullitt was the kind of person who either attracted or repelled almost everyone he met. Among those whom he attracted were Franklin D. Roosevelt and Edouard Daladier; and it was his role as intimate intermediary between these two chief executives which gave him an almost unique opportunity to observe and even, perhaps, to influence the policies of two major nations.

Bullitt's friendship with Roosevelt began during the 1932 campaign.[7] A New York lawyer named Louis B. Wehle brought them together, and Wehle was struck by the immediate bond that was established between them. "There was a certain community of social background," he wrote later, "as well as a temperamental congeniality heightened by the fact that both were brilliantly and boldly intuitional. . . . They made an ideal team."[8] Roosevelt promptly adopted Bullitt as a kind of personal adviser on foreign affairs, and sent him to Europe immediately

[5] W. E. Dodd, Jr., and Martha Dodd, eds., *Ambassador Dodd's Diary*, New York, 1941, pp. 309, 372, 381; Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries*, New York, 1951, pp. 121-22.

[6] Harold Ickes, *The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes*, New York, 1953-1954, III, 230; Marquis Childs, "Trouble Maker," *Washington Post*, Sept. 9, 1944.

[7] A youthful acquaintanceship between the two men had withered soon after the First World War. Roosevelt, writing to a friend in 1919, commented disparagingly on "Billy Bullitt's" European mannerisms. Frank Freidel, *Franklin D. Roosevelt*, II, Boston, 1954, p. 23.

[8] L. B. Wehle, *Hidden Threads of History: Wilson Through Roosevelt*, New York, 1953, pp. 112-19.

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after the election to gauge conditions there. On his return, Bullitt reported in such sparkling and persuasive fashion that Wehle remarked to Roosevelt, "There is your man for Paris."[9] But the French post had already been promised, and Bullitt had to be content for a time with the new ambassadorship to the Soviet Union. Paris finally fell vacant in 1936, and Bullitt installed himself there just after the victory of the Popular Front.[10] There he was to remain until disaster overwhelmed the Third Republic.

The friendship with Roosevelt had grown meanwhile into warm intimacy.[11] Bullitt had free access to the White House, either in person or via transatlantic telephone; and he came to be widely regarded in Europe as the president's personal spokesman. Like a number of Roosevelt's ambassadorial appointees (and like the president himself), Bullitt was a maverick aristocrat whom other aristocrats regarded as a kind of traitor to his class. Bullitt also shared with Roosevelt an antipathy toward career diplomats and State Department bureaucrats.[12] These joint prejudices drew the two men even closer together, and led Bullitt at times to by-pass the State Department in favor of direct contact with the White House. The ambassador and the president even developed a curious kind of personal code—one might almost call it Aesopian language—for use in transatlantic telephone conversations and occasionally in telegrams as well.[13]

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 119.

[10] Bullitt's prediction just before he left for Paris was that France, like Spain, would soon be engulfed in civil war, "probably by October." Ickes, *Diary*, I, 658. Roosevelt was not much more sanguine about France's prospects. Early in 1936 the president had written to Jesse Straus, Bullitt's predecessor in Paris: "In more pessimistic moments I have of necessity come to believe, just as you do about France and the French future—yet I always say to myself that in previous parties [*sic*] France has always 'snapped out' of it. This optimism, I must frankly confess, has little foundation because of several well known incidents in the past 150 years where revolution or its equivalent and the emergence of some strong individual have proved the only salvation." Roosevelt to Straus, Feb. 13, 1936, Presidential Secretary's File, Box 4, Hyde Park Library.

[11] The Hyde Park papers contain many mementoes of this close friendship, ranging from acknowledgements of holiday gifts of boxes of apples or dachshund puppies to bantering exchanges of correspondence. In 1935, for example, Bullitt wrote to thank the president for the latter's telephone call while Bullitt was hospitalized: "And your letter, which arrived when I was feeling like a poisoned pup, was the perfect emetic. You are an angel as well as a President, and the best proof I know of how dumb old Uncle Henry Adams was when he wrote, 'A friend in office is a friend lost.' But, after all, he was speaking of Republicans—there were no Democrats in office." Bullitt to Roosevelt, Feb. 9, 1935, President's Personal File 1124, Hyde Park Library.

[12] Ickes, *Diary*, III, 216.

[13] In the midst of the French collapse in 1940, for example, this tantalizing cable from Bullitt reached the White House: "The story here is that the visitor who wanted a hot water bottle in the summer considered it unwise to permit frank statements about the progenitor of the little visitors because he expects at a given moment to act the

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Many ambassadors have been cronies of the presidents who appointed them; but it is a rare ambassador who also becomes a crony of the head of the government to which he is assigned. Bullitt was one of those striking exceptions. For a number of reasons, he had easy entree into French hearts. His ties with France were old and deep; indeed, he could even trace his remote ancestry to a family in Nîmes named Boulet. As a boy, French had always been the family language at the Bullitt dinner table, and part of his childhood had been spent in Paris.[14] After the First World War, he had leased an apartment near the Champs Elysées, and had spent part of every year there. One Paris daily, in welcoming his arrival, described him approvingly as "a boulevardier and a gourmet."[15] Bullitt promptly leased a magnificent suburban chateau, installed an excellent chef, and stocked the cellars with 18,000 bottles of the finest wines.[16] Before long, cabinet ministers were beating a path to his dinner table, and almost every day found him lunching or dining tête-à-tête with some prominent politician or foreign office official. Harold Ickes once noted in his diary, in characteristically elegant language, "Bullitt practically sleeps with the French cabinet."[17]

The politician who was most strongly attracted to Bullitt was Edouard Daladier, minister of war from 1936 to 1938 and then premier until March 1940. It was not until after the Munich crisis that the friendship between them matured; though even before that time, Bullitt's telegrams indicated a growing respect for what he considered to be Daladier's frankness and toughness, in contrast to the depressed defeatism of Foreign Minister Yvon Delbos and the unctuous sinuosity of Delbos' successor Georges Bonnet. Munich threw Bullitt and Daladier more closely together, for it aroused in them both a desperate sense of impending disaster. Daladier, who lacked real confidence both in his own foreign minister and in his British allies, found that he could safely unburden himself to Bullitt as to no one else, and he

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same way. Don't forget Oswald." Bullitt to Roosevelt, May 30, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/3389 1/2). Bullitt was evidently trying to warn Roosevelt that the British might set up a Fascist government under Sir Oswald Mosley in order to get favorable peace terms from Hitler. Sometimes, however, his meaning was almost brutally obvious. "Do you realize," he cabled late in May 1940, "that Berle's first name is planning to replace Sistie and Buzzie for your next reading of Dickens' Carol?" Bullitt to Roosevelt, May 29, 1944 (*SD*, 811.001 Roosevelt, F. D./7113 5/6).

[14] *Paris-Soir*, Sept. 24, 1936.

[15] *Paris-Soir*, Oct. 2, 1936. Only the monarchist organ *Action Française* was hostile to the new ambassador. It attacked him viciously as an "agent of Jewish finance and of the Soviets," and hinted that Bullitt would shortly arrange an American loan of a billion dollars to facilitate a French attack on Germany. *Action Française*, Sept. 13, 1936.

[16] Ickes, *Diary*, II, 520.

[17] *Ibid.*, III, 124.

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proceeded to do so almost as though he had been encouched beside his psychiatrist. By the time the war came, the friendship was so close that Daladier could ask Bullitt to serve as a kind of unofficial guardian to his young son in the event that he, the premier, were to die in a bombing attack. Bullitt in his turn told Harold Ickes that in his opinion Daladier was "the outstanding statesman of Europe." "And," added Ickes wryly, "Bill is not averse to having it known by his friends that he himself supplies a good many of Daladier's ideas."[18]

Critics of Bullitt's Paris career tend to fall into two antithetical groups. At one extreme are those who have labeled him an appeaser, and have charged that if he ever really awoke to the Nazi threat, he did so far too late.[19] At the opposite extreme are those who have described him as a warmonger, and have accused him of needling the democracies into an unnecessary conflict.[20] Superficially, the record gives plausibility to both charges, for Bullitt's activity in Paris breaks neatly into two parts. Until Munich, Bullitt was on the whole an appeaser and an isolationist; after Munich, he shifted ground, and eventually became one of the most vigorous advocates of outright American intervention. His evolution reflected the general shift in American attitudes during those years; his conversion simply came sooner, and more brusquely, than that of most of his countrymen.

How much of an appeaser was the pre-Munich Bullitt, and what were his motives? His more rabid critics have accused him of an

[18] *Ibid.*, III, 146.

[19] E.g., Edvard Beneš, *Memoirs: From Munich to New War and New Victory*, London, 1954, p. 173. Beneš believed that Bullitt's apparent abandonment of the appeasement line after Munich was only a sham.

[20] E.g., Joseph P. Kennedy, quoted in *The Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 121-22; and Tansill, *Back Door to War*, pp. 555-57. Contemporary critics of Bullitt's "warmongering" drew much of their ammunition from a slim volume of Polish documents captured by the Germans in Warsaw and published in the spring of 1940, with a foreword by C. Hartley Grattan: *The German White Paper: Full Text of the Polish Documents Issued by the Berlin Foreign Office*, New York, 1940. These documents purported to prove that Bullitt, from Munich onward, had assured both the Poles and the French that the United States would enter the war if the Western powers should decide to fight. Their publication caused such an outcry that Daladier, on April 4, 1940, wrote a personal letter to Roosevelt denying that Bullitt had ever made such promises. H. L. Trefousse, *Germany and American Neutrality, 1939-1941*, New York, 1951, p. 50.

These charges against Bullitt have been raked up again recently by Georges Bonnet. In a letter to the Paris daily *Le Monde* (March 3, 1956), Bonnet accuses Bullitt of having "repeatedly affirmed in his conversations that in case of war against Hitler, the United States would not fail to enter the conflict very early." Bonnet implies that the French government took this as a moral commitment, and insinuates that Bullitt may have failed to tell Washington what he was doing. What seems to emerge from all these accusations is the probability that Bullitt freely expressed his personal views, but took care to make no commitments on behalf of his government. How much influence his comments had on French and Polish decision-makers cannot be accurately judged.

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almost pathological blindness to the Nazi threat, and have traced this blindness to his vitriolic dislike of the Soviet Union after his experience there as ambassador.[21] Such critics have charged that Bullitt, soon after his arrival in Paris, cajoled or bulldozed the Blum government into a futile negotiation with Hitler, and at the same time did much to sabotage France's new pact with the Soviet Union by persuading French politicians and bankers that the Russians were not to be trusted.[22]

Such accusations, in their extreme form at least, rest upon only the flimsiest evidence. It is true that Bullitt came away from Moscow bitter and disillusioned; he did warn his French friends against trusting Stalin, and he did urge French leaders to try for a reconciliation with Germany.[23] Furthermore, he suffered from mild but chronic Anglophobia, and blamed the British rather than the Nazis when Blum's attempt to reach an understanding with Berlin broke down in 1937.[24] But there is no valid evidence that Bullitt's influence shaped French behavior, or that his pre-Munich failure to gauge the Nazi threat accurately was the pathological by-product of his anti-Sovietism. Despite Ambassador Dodd's suspicions, Bullitt was neither an open nor a secret pro-Nazi; and there is not a scrap of real evidence that he was scheming to use Hitler to destroy the Soviet Union. Bullitt's motives in that appeasing phase of his career seem to have been those of most wishful-thinking Americans of that day: a desire to avert war and to ensure a fair deal to a German nation which had been provoked to excesses by the "injustice" of Versailles. No doubt his firsthand knowledge of Europe should have insulated him against the common errors of the man in

[21] That Bullitt failed to grasp the real nature of the Nazi movement in 1937 is evident from his shocked reaction to the views of British Ambassador Phipps, who had just been transferred from Berlin to Paris. "Phipps," reported Bullitt, "exhibited a hostility to Germany and the German Government surprising to me. . . . He considered Hitler a fanatic who would be satisfied with nothing but the domination of Europe." April 30, 1937 (*FR* 1937, I, 84). Yet the French journalist Pertinax asserts that early in 1933 Bullitt warned him: "If you don't undertake a preventive war, France is lost!" Pertinax, *Les fossoyeurs*, New York, 1943, II, 89.

If Bullitt misjudged Hitler in 1937, so did some of the French. According to Foreign Minister Yvon Delbos, "Hitler reigned but did not rule. He remained at Berchtesgaden most of the time playing pinochle with his cook, his butler and his chauffeur while Goebbels sat in Berlin and directed Germany's destinies." August 26, 1937 (*FR* 1937, I, 118).

[22] Dodd, *Diary*, pp. 309, 372, 381; Robert Bendiner, *The Riddle of the State Department*, New York, 1942, p. 9.

[23] Kaufmann, "Two American Ambassadors," pp. 657-58. Bullitt's early reports from Paris suggest, however, that French attempts at a rapprochement with Germany preceded the arrival of the new ambassador, and that Bullitt exerted only mild pressure in that direction. E.g., Oct. 27, 1936 (*SD*, 762.65/242); Nov. 1, 1936 (*SD*, 851.00/1602); Jan. 20, 1937 (*SD*, 740.00/99); May 31, 1937 (*SD*, 852.00/5567).

[24] April 30, 1937 (*FR* 1937, I, 86).

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the street, or in the university classroom. Yet his outlook, like that of most Americans, was almost inevitably colored by the folklore about 1914 and about Versailles which passed for historical knowledge between the wars. Appeasement, he believed, was the quickest way to correct past errors and to restrain Nazi dynamism; and a frankly proclaimed neutralism was the best way to dissuade the Western powers from making future mistakes. Bluntly and repeatedly, therefore, he told French leaders not to expect another 1917.[25] If the Western powers got themselves into another war, he declared again and again, there would be no American troops to bail them out.

For the first two years of his stay in Paris, Bullitt clung to the hope that war might be averted if the French and British could be persuaded to take the initiative toward a reconciliation with Germany and Italy.[26] He took his task so seriously that when Roosevelt in 1938 personally urged him to come home to run for the governorship of Pennsylvania, he refused on the ground that to leave Paris would be an abandonment of duty. "My entire interest at the present time," he cabled Roosevelt, "is in devising ways and means to keep the United States out of the series of wars which are on the horizon."[27] Yet his confidence was already being undermined, and the months before Munich constituted a period of frustrated soul-searching and uncertainty. In June 1938 he told his friend Harold Ickes that he now thought a great war inevitable; that it would probably last twenty years, would end in stalemate, and would leave all Europe in ruins. Americans, he argued, had a great obligation to mankind; it would be their duty to stand aside, to emerge from the crisis free and strong, and then to salvage what might remain of Western civilization.[28]

This was Bullitt's mood in the late summer of 1938, as Hitler drove toward a showdown with the Czechs. He was irritated at Hitler's tactics, yet he resented also what he regarded as the bull-headed refusal of Czech leaders to retreat an inch even if the alternative were to be a European war. When the crisis matured in September, his troubled uncertainty reached its peak. He could not quite decide whether the French would really fight for Czechoslovakia, or whether he wanted them to fight. At the outset of the crisis, he praised the extraordinary calm and poise of Frenchmen, their quiet determination to face the

[25] Dec. 1, 1936 (*SD*, 800.51 W89 France/1057); Dec. 16, 1937 (*SD*, 800.51 W89 France/1065); Jan. 4, 1938 (*FR* 1938, I, 2).

[26] E.g., Feb. 20, 1937 (*FR* 1937, I, 46-54); Aug. 5, 1937 (*FR* 1937, I, 115); Dec. 1, 1937 (*FR* 1937, I, 181-82).

[27] Bullitt to Roosevelt, Feb. 25, 1938 (*SD*, 123 Bullitt, William C./401).

[28] Ickes, *Diary*, II, 409.

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worst. But a week later he reported that few Frenchmen were ready to fight for France's traditional interests in Central Europe, and remarked that the whole tragic situation there could be traced to Clemenceau's "criminal errors" in the Treaty of Versailles, "one of the stupidest documents ever penned by the hand of man." Four days later, he urged Washington to avoid encouraging the French to "go to war in order to keep 3,200,000 Sudetens under the rule of 7,000,000 Czechs"; but shortly thereafter he was declaring angrily that Hitler's behavior was too much for any self-respecting government to endure. On September 25 he predicted that Daladier would quickly back down if the British government should insist on peace; but on the 26th he reported that Daladier was "sure of himself and strong," that he had the country's support, and that France had "never been more magnificent."[29]

This crude summary of Bullitt's zigzags during the month of Munich is not entirely fair to him, for the situation altered from day to day. But his inconsistencies and his uncertainties were real enough nevertheless, and significant too. For these inconsistencies reflected the deepening split within the French government, made worse by the imminence of war. And they reflected, within Bullitt himself, the painful clash between the brutal facts of the Czech crisis and his deep-seated prejudices left over from the interwar era.

Munich converted Bullitt from appeasement to resistance. He left for Washington a few days after the crisis ended, and during his four months' stay there, he strongly urged Roosevelt to give the Western powers vigorous support.[30] Yet even now, he remained unsure whether the West would really fight. In December 1938 he remarked somberly to Harold Ickes that, in the end, the British and French would probably stand aside while Hitler and the Japanese attacked Russia, in the hope that they themselves might be spared.[31] Despite his anti-Sovietism, he

[29] Sept. 8, 1938 (*FR* 1938, I, 583); Sept. 15, 1938 (*FR* 1938, I, 601); Sept. 19, 1938 (*FR* 1938, I, 617-18); Sept. 25, 1938 (*FR* 1938, I, 648-49); Sept. 26, 1938 (*FR* 1938, I, 667-68).

[30] Langer and Gleason, *Challenge to Isolation*, pp. 37-38, 58; M. S. Watson, *United States Army in World War II. Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations*, Washington, D.C., 1950, pp. 131-32; Henry Morgenthau, Jr., "The Morgenthau Diaries," *Collier's*, CXX (Oct. 18, 1947), p. 17. Watson suggests that Bullitt's oral report to Roosevelt on October 13 had such a sharp impact that the president at once speeded up his preparedness program. Over the next few weeks Bullitt conferred frequently with Roosevelt, helped to arrange for the sale of planes to France and Britain, and appeared before congressional committees to testify on the European crisis. One congressman complained that Bullitt came before his committee as a "high-pressure salesman" rather than as an unbiased expert. *Congressional Record*, Vol. 84, p. 1503 (Feb. 16, 1939).

[31] Ickes, *Diary*, II, 519.

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evidently regarded such a policy as a risky and unwise facsimile of Machiavellian realism. But he knew enough of what Ambassador Kennedy was reporting from London to have grave doubts about the Western governments' toughness and determination.[32]

It was Bullitt's revulsion against the appeasers that threw him into steadily closer contact with Daladier in 1939. To him the premier at least seemed firm, frank, and clear-headed. Daladier was convinced that the Nazi threat was real and imminent, and that France must make a desperate effort to resist before it was too late. It is true that he disliked and distrusted the British; that he had little confidence in Russia's good faith or fighting ability, and little enthusiasm for the Poles.[33] Yet he was convinced that Poland must be defended and the Soviet Union brought into an alliance; and he was astute enough to resist the crude blandishments of Hermann Goering, who had asked him after Munich: "Why should France continue to tie herself to a decayed old nation like England—a rouged old maid trying to pretend that she is still young and vigorous and capable of being a satisfactory partner to anyone?" Goering had then proposed "that France should join Germany in finishing off England and that the British Empire should be divided between France and Germany." Daladier had replied ironically that "this all sounded very pleasant, but that France would then be the next morsel for Germany."[34]

Most of Daladier's opinions and prejudices Bullitt shared; and his telegrams suggest that he encouraged Daladier toward his chosen goals even though such a policy might end in general war. Several years later, ex-Ambassador Kennedy asserted that Bullitt's activities after Munich made him one of the principal authors of the Second World War. "Hitler," asserted Kennedy, "would have fought Russia without any later conflict with England if it had not been for Bullitt's urging on Roosevelt in the summer of 1939 that the Germans must be faced down about Poland; neither the French nor the British would have made Poland a cause of war if it had not been for the constant meddling from Washington." Kennedy recalled irritably how Roosevelt in 1939 had

[32] Bullitt's skepticism about British firmness was increased early in 1939 when a high French official showed him a secret dossier on British policy during the Czech crisis before Munich. This dossier convinced Bullitt that the Chamberlain government had been guilty of the most cynical duplicity in dealing with the French and the Czechs. *Ibid.*, II, 652.

[33] Feb. 6, 1939 (*SD*, 740.00/568); Feb. 13, 1939 (*SD*, 851.248/139); March 18, 1939 (*SD*, 740.00/632); March 23, 1939 (*SD*, 740.00/668); April 11, 1939 (*SD*, 740.00/772); April 28, 1939 (*FR* 1939, I, 177); May 6, 1939 (*FR* 1939, I, 180); May 16, 1939 (*FR* 1939, I, 225).

[34] Feb. 6, 1939 (*SD*, 740.00/568).

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repeatedly telephoned to London urging Kennedy to "put some iron up Chamberlain's backside"; and Kennedy was convinced that Bullitt was the man who had put the iron up Roosevelt's backside.[35]

Kennedy's testimony, however, can hardly be called that of an impartial witness. Munich had driven him not away from isolationism, but deeper into it, and his reports and Bullitt's increasingly diverged. After war finally broke out, the two ambassadors happened to meet during a press conference in Washington, and a violent clash occurred. Kennedy (if we are to accept Bullitt's rather lurid version of the affair) criticized Roosevelt and told the reporters that "Germany would win, that everything in France and England would go to hell, and that his one interest was in saving his money for his children." The aroused Bullitt accused Kennedy of both "abysmal ignorance" of foreign affairs and rank disloyalty to his chief, while Kennedy shouted back that he "would say what he Goddamned pleased before whom he Goddamned pleased," and stalked out in anger.[36] Such episodes rarely inspire cool objectivity, or produce the kind of judgments which historians can safely use.

There is in fact no way to gauge the extent to which Bullitt influenced either Roosevelt's or Daladier's thinking in 1939. Both leaders did take a stiff position toward Hitler, and Bullitt did urge or encourage them to do so; but there is no convincing reason to suppose that either Roosevelt or Daladier would have acted differently if Kennedy himself had been ambassador in Paris.[37] Kennedy believes that Bullitt tragically misled Roosevelt by arguing that Hitler would not fight if faced down, and that Bullitt's mistake in judgment later had to be paid for in money and blood.[38] But Bullitt's cables in 1939 indicated no such easy

[35] *The Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 121-22; cf. also the rather flimsy supporting testimony adduced by Tansill in *Back Door to War*, pp. 555-56. In only one of Bullitt's telegrams did he urge Roosevelt to have Kennedy put pressure on the British—with a view to getting a conscription law adopted in Britain. April 19, 1939 (*SD*, 841.2222/39). On one other occasion, Bullitt contacted Kennedy directly in an effort to get a firmer British commitment toward Poland. Lukasiewicz to Beck, March 29, 1939, *German White Book*, p. 53.

[36] Ickes, *Diary*, III, 147.

[37] Bullitt did complain to Ickes in February 1940 that he was overburdened by his responsibilities in Paris, since "the French consult him on everything and do everything he suggests." Roosevelt evidently accepted Bullitt's self-appraisal; he told Ickes that "he doubted whether he could take Bullitt away from France because not only the officials there but the people depend so strongly upon his advice and sympathy." *Ibid.*, III, 132-33, 136. Bullitt rarely hesitated to offer advice, especially when Daladier asked him to give it "as a friend, not as ambassador." March 18, 1939 (*SD*, 740.00/632). How much of it was followed is, however, another matter. And Bullitt seems to have distinguished carefully between offering personal opinions and committing his government.

[38] *The Forrestal Diaries*, p. 122.

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conviction that bluff would do the trick. On the contrary, he expected a war, and a big one; and neither he nor his closest French friends were sure that the West could win it.[39] Nevertheless, he had come to believe that it had to be fought, and that further capitulations would only make the chances of Western victory more dubious.

The critical problems for the West in 1939 were how to build up air power quickly and how to bring the Soviet Union into a pact against Hitler. Bullitt did his best to persuade Washington that aircraft were desperately needed, and that some device allowing the French to buy on credit ought to be found.[40] As for the Russian question, Bullitt's intense anti-Sovietism now took second place to his conviction that the Nazis were the immediate threat. He distrusted the Kremlin as much as ever, but he told Daladier that "in the present situation . . . no stone should be left unturned even though one might expect to find vermin under it." However, he cautioned Daladier that the French negotiator in Russia ought to be a man who would "examine every [Soviet] proposal with a microscope." Furthermore, the West should attempt to avoid a double-cross by negotiating with Stalin himself rather than with his underlings.[41]

Throughout the summer, Bullitt remained in close touch with the negotiations, both through Daladier and through Alexis Léger, secretary-general at the Quai d'Orsay. At times he even played an active role as intermediary—notably between the French and the Poles, whose relationship in 1939 Bullitt described as "bittersweet."[42] Both Daladier and Léger were irked at what they called Britain's "dilatory and half-hearted" attitude in dealing with the Kremlin, but they told Bullitt that British behavior resulted not from bad faith but from "ignorance and bad diplomatic information," and that London usually came around eventually.[43] By midsummer, Léger was sanguine enough to estimate the chances of an accord at eighty out of a hundred.[44] Bullitt was disturbed, however, by recurrent rumors of secret contacts between Mos-

[39] June 30, 1939 (*FR* 1939, I, 280); July 5, 1939 (*FR* 1939, I, 282; Aug. 27, 1939 (*FR* 1939, I, 377). Cf. also Ickes, *Diary*, II, 652.

[40] Feb. 13, 1939 (*SD*, 851.248/139); April 12, 1939 (*SD*, 851.248/175); Aug. 28, 1939 (*SD*, 851.248/251).

[41] March 13, 1939 (*SD*, 740.00/632).

[42] March 18, 1939 (*SD*, 740.00/632); April 7, 1939 (*FR* 1939, I, 117-19); April 9, 1939 (*FR* 1939, I, 120-22); April 11, 1939 (*FR* 1939, I, 124); April 12, 1939 (*FR* 1939, I, 128). Bullitt served as a kind of intermediary between Daladier and Léger on the one hand and Beck and Ambassador Lukasiewicz on the other, and listened patiently to their mutual recriminations.

[43] May 4, 1939 (*FR* 1939, I, 247); May 16, 1939 (*FR* 1939, I, 255); June 28, 1939 (*FR* 1939, I, 277).

[44] June 30, 1939 (*FR* 1939, I, 279).

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cow and Berlin, and by the fact that Washington seemed better informed than Paris about these reports.[45] Six times he warned Daladier, but the premier's services could discover no supporting evidence.[46] On August 18, soon after the West's military negotiators reached Moscow, Daladier told Bullitt angrily that the Poles were blocking progress by their refusal to authorize Soviet troops to cross their soil in case of war. If the Poles persisted, he told Bullitt, "he would not send a single French peasant to fight in defense of Poland." "I take this statement seriously," commented the ambassador, "but not too seriously although he repeated it three times. He was angry at the Polish Ambassador in Paris and inclined to overstate."[47]

Four days later came the staggering news of the Nazi-Soviet pact. Bullitt went at once to Daladier's office, where he found the premier completely stunned. "He said that he could not understand how the French diplomats and negotiators could have been so deceived. . . . The entire diplomatic structure which he had attempted to build up had been destroyed. . . . In spite of their courage the Poles could not hold out against the German armies for more than two months. . . . The British could not have a serious army ready for another two years. . . . Under the circumstances he was faced with the alternative of sacrificing the lives of all able-bodied men in France in a war, the outcome of which would be to say the least doubtful; or the worse alternative of abandoning the commitments of France to support Poland. . . ." At the Quai d'Orsay, Bullitt found Léger busily answering telephone calls from politicians who urged that it would be folly now for France to fight. "I asked Léger what he thought the result of war would be in case it should begin. He said that . . . it was exceedingly doubtful, to put it mildly, that France and England would be able to win the war. Nevertheless the chance must be taken since the chance would be even less if France should permit Poland to be destroyed."[48]

Over the next ten days, Bullitt was gratified to see French morale and determination stiffen markedly. "Never has any nation confronted a war of the most terrible sort with greater calm or courage," he reported on August 25; and, on September 2, ". . . the entire population of France is facing war with a resolute courage that is beyond praise. . . .

[45] June 28, 1939 (*FR* 1939, I, 278); July 5, 1939 (*FR* 1939, I, 281).
[46] Aug. 22, 1939 (*FR* 1939, I, 302).
[47] Aug. 18, 1939 (*FR* 1939, I, 225-26). Several months earlier, the Polish ambassador in Paris had assured Bullitt that while his government would make no peacetime agreement authorizing the transit of Soviet troops, "in time of war we would be ready to take help from the devil himself." March 20, 1939 (*FR* 1939, I, 80).
[48] Aug. 22, 1939 (*FR* 1939, I, 301-4).

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Those who wish to give in have no policy except that of submitting to enslavement and I cannot believe that they will be able to conceal this issue from the people of France, and by weasel actions draw their country into a position which in the end necessarily would be fatal. The alternative may in the end prove to be fatal but at least it offers a fighting chance."[49]

Thus Bullitt's view of France's proper course was clear and positive by the time war finally came. His opinion of his own country's duty was no less clear. Once the conflict began, he was convinced that it must be America's as well as France's and Britain's war. From September onward, he urged steadily that American supplies be sent to the Western powers without delay; he warned that an arms embargo would mean inevitable defeat for France and Britain; and he argued that the only possible way to keep American troops out of Europe, or Nazi troops out of America, would be to give the West the tools with which to fight. Advocates of an arms embargo, he asserted bluntly, were "not only ignorant allies of Hitler but also war mongers for America."[50]

Whether Bullitt was right in this fundamental premise has been a subject of bitter controversy ever since. At least he was consistent and persuasive in presenting his case, even though the impact of his appeals in Washington was not great enough to help the French materially when their hour of trial arrived. Where he was much less clear-sighted was in his assessment of the French nation's wartime spirit and leadership. His information and judgments on such matters came to him almost entirely from his contacts with a handful of intimate friends in the cabinet or at the Quai d'Orsay. When he reassured the State Department and the White House (as he often did) that French morale was absolutely sound, that French leadership was tough and vigorous, and that French defeatism was confined to a small coterie, he was reflecting his own personal confidence in men like Daladier, Paul Reynaud, and Alexis Léger, and in what those officials told him about their countrymen.[51] Although he had occasional doubts, he was on the whole too sanguine, too ready to believe what he wanted to believe; and events were soon to belie his confidence. Indeed, Bullitt's own reports, when read in retrospect, offer ample proof that France was

[49] Aug. 25, 1939 (*FR* 1939, I, 366); Sept. 2, 1939 (*FR* 1939, I, 410).

[50] Sept. 19, 1939 (*SD*, 740.00/2138).

[51] E.g., Jan. 9, 1940 (*SD*, 851.248/318); Jan. 25, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/1556); April 12, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/2167); April 25, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/2484).

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not really ready for the impending shock. Three disturbing undercurrents run through these reports: first, the rancor and suspicion that marked the relations between the French and their British allies; second, the feuds and factionalism that persisted at the upper levels of French political life; third, the curiously mixed morale of French political and military leaders, made up of roughly equal parts of cheerful optimism and black despair.

The personal relationships between French and British political leaders grew worse, if anything, after the two nations joined forces in war. Almost every major decision, whether diplomatic or military, led to mutual recriminations. Meetings between French and British leaders sometimes only increased the tension. After the first such wartime conference, Daladier told Bullitt that Neville Chamberlain had made a very bad impression on the French delegates, for he had "talked at great length in a vague manner and then half swallowed and chewed his fist in a somewhat unimpressive manner."[52] The French soon decided that the British had no interest in helping to check a German ground attack, and that they meant to let the French fight the war alone.[53] Meanwhile the British concluded that the French eagerness for a showdown with Hitler was contingent on staging the campaign in some remote area several hundred miles away from France, with the British navy and the RAF carrying the load.[54] One French politician, commenting on a British proposal to share the burden of loans and credits equally, went so far as to charge "that it was clearly Sir John Simon's object to have France exhausted before Great Britain should become seriously weakened so that Great Britain could control the situation at the end of the war."[55]

When Finland was attacked and the British refused for a time to join the French in sending aid (or even to transport a Franco-Polish unit to northern Finland in British ships), Frenchmen like Alexis Léger grew almost apoplectic. British policy, Léger told Bullitt, was to do nothing that might hurt Russian feelings because they thought that some day the Soviet Union might yet be won over to the anti-Hitler bloc. Such an idea, said Léger, was "entirely idiotic."[56] Bullitt was inclined to agree; for the Finnish war proved, he wrote, that

[52] Sept. 25, 1939 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/538).
[53] *Ibid.*
[54] Sir Edward Spears, *Assignment to Catastrophe*, London, 1954, I, 71-72.
[55] Nov. 3, 1939 (*SD*, 851.51/2794). Cf. Nov. 11, 1939 (*FR* 1939, I, 568); and Sept. 9, 1939 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/235).
[56] Jan. 15, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/1489).

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Stalin's system was the world's most inefficient in everything except "the production of misery and lice." "The spectre of Bolshevism sweeping Europe," he added, "has been replaced therefore by the hope of Europe sweeping out Bolshevism."[57]

When at last British forces did go into action in Norway, only to be promptly driven into the sea, one prominent Frenchman told Bullitt caustically that ". . . the general handling of the entire war in Norway by the British . . . had reduced him to extreme pessimism. He said that he had always been doubtful about the ability of British generals but he had now been obliged to doubt the ability of British admirals. . . . He felt that the French would have to carry henceforth the entire intellectual burden of organizing the war and would have to impose French control over all operations. He did not see, however, how this could be done."[58] The same politician added, only twenty-four hours before Hitler's western blitz, that while the French people had risen magnificently to the demands of war, the British had shown themselves totally devoid of able leadership. Across the Channel, he asserted, there was simply no one who could take matters in hand.[59] This attitude of condescending disparagement seems to have been fully reciprocated in certain high British circles.[60] Such mutual recrimination and contempt can hardly be called an encouraging prelude for the great test which the two allies were about to face in common.

Just as dismaying as this Franco-British friction was the feuding and bickering that went on unchecked in French political circles. The worst source of factionalism within the cabinet was suppressed when Georges Bonnet was dropped as foreign minister, but two or three other less prominent appeasers or semi-defeatists remained inside. Bullitt was convinced, however, that their following either in parliament or outside was meager, and that defeatism was confined to a kind of lunatic fringe.[61] A more serious problem was the growing personal rivalry

[57] Jan. 25, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/1556).

[58] April 30, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/2562).

[59] May 9, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/2776).

[60] The clearest reflection of this attitude may be found in the memoirs of General Spears, Churchill's personal representative to the French government in May-June 1940. Cf. also Bullitt's cable of May 16, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/3115 3/8). For a remarkable study of Anglo-French conflict during May-June, 1940, see J. C. Cairns, "Great Britain and the Fall of France: A Study in Allied Disunity," *Journal of Modern History*, XXVII (December 1955), pp. 365-409.

[61] Daladier once expressed the fear that a failure in the Norwegian campaign might put the French defeatists in power. Bullitt expressed skepticism: "Aside from certain salons in Paris connected with banking interests," he declared, "there is little or no discoverable defeatism in France." April 25, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/2484). According to Langer and Gleason, however, Bullitt wrote privately to Roosevelt on

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between two of the most vigorous bellicists in the cabinet: Premier Daladier and Finance Minister Reynaud. It is true that Bullitt was inclined to play down this rivalry, and to disregard some of its more lurid eighteenth-century aspects.[62] He saw both men frequently during the spring of 1940, and neither one, even in these confidential chats, criticized the other in vindictive fashion. Still, his reports did suggest a growing tension that was partly personal and partly the outgrowth of differences over military leadership and planning.

This latter issue centered around the figure of the commander-in-chief, General Gamelin. Gamelin was Daladier's man, while Reynaud frankly lacked confidence in him and wanted to substitute General Georges. When Daladier was overthrown and replaced by Reynaud in a surprise cabinet crisis in March 1940, the new premier hoped to reshuffle the high command. But his hold on power was too shaky to permit him to drop Daladier from the cabinet; and Daladier, from his entrenched position as minister of national defense, grimly protected Gamelin against demotion. After the fiasco in Norway, Reynaud lost patience and formally proposed that Gamelin be replaced. The issue was fought out at a cabinet meeting on May 9. Daladier protested that it was "totally indecent" to make Gamelin the scapegoat for the Norwegian disaster, which he insisted was purely a British failure. "Reynaud thereupon had said that if Daladier would not accept his point of view he would resign. He, Daladier, after consideration replied 'then resign.' "[63] The cabinet adjourned on that note, and Reynaud shortly went to the Elysée with his resignation. Before President Lebrun could act, however, Hitler's armies interfered to solve the cabinet crisis. The shock of invasion on May 10 forced the rivals to bury the hatchet, to resurrect the fallen cabinet and to leave Gamelin in command. But a more unpromising state of affairs at such a moment would be hard to conceive: a patched-up cabinet whose two strongest members had just fought each other to the ground, and a commander who had just been openly repudiated by his premier.

Bullitt took no sides in the Daladier-Reynaud controversy, and seems

April 28 expressing serious concern at the extent of defeatism and the lack of first-rate leadership in France. *Challenge to Isolationism*, p. 425. This letter, which Langer and Gleason consulted in the Hyde Park Library, has now been closed to scholars, along with most of the materials pertaining to Bullitt in that collection.

[62] The Daladier-Reynaud feud has often been traced to the rivalries of those two ambitious and jealous ladies, the Marquise de Crussol and the Comtesse de Portes (e.g., in Spears, *Assignment to Catastrophe*, I, 90-92, and *passim*). Bullitt's messages contain no mention of either of them.

[63] May 9, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/2776).

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to have lacked interest in the military aspect of the dispute. He rarely talked with soldiers, visited the front only once during the phony war, and had only a single conversation with Gamelin after war began. That conversation he reported without comment, except for his remark that Gamelin was "extremely confident and entirely serene." The Germans, Gamelin declared, had blundered badly by attacking Poland first instead of France. Their heavy losses in the Polish campaign, along with the clearly inferior quality of their Messerschmitts and their pilots, made it hopeless for Hitler to attack France now with any chance of success. Nor could the Nazis expect any useful aid from their Soviet allies; for, said Gamelin, the quality of the Red army was in every sense "extraordinarily bad."[64]

But Gamelin's breezy confidence contrasted sharply with the views which some other French leaders expressed. Even the most determined bellicists showed a dismaying degree of black pessimism about the chances of victory. When Poland fell in September 1939, Alexis Léger told Bullitt despairingly: "The game is lost. France stands alone against three dictatorships. Great Britain is not ready. The United States has not even changed the Neutrality Act. The democracies again are too late."[65] In the Chamber of Deputies, pressure for an immediate withdrawal from the war was so great after Poland fell that Bullitt was no longer sure of Daladier's ability to resist it. "I have avoided seeing Daladier for several days," he wrote on September 30, "since I have felt that as American Ambassador I must avoid having any influence in the terrible decision which now faces France."[66]

Bullitt was relieved when Daladier did succeed in resisting his defeatist critics, but the ambassador could have few illusions as to the premier's real confidence in victory. On November 23, Daladier called in Bullitt for a three-hour conversation which was "frank and detailed to an extreme degree." He said bluntly that unless the West could attain absolute domination in the air, the war would drag on "until a peace of exhaustion and compromise which would insure the exultant domination of Europe by Germany." Only the Americans, he declared, could furnish enough planes; and if they were to refuse his appeal, "he would unequivocally cease to be Prime Minister immediately. . . . He did not care how much the planes might cost. . . . He would not object to selling Versailles or any other possession of the French Government in order to get planes. . . . He was not a bourgeois but of the stock of peasants

[66] *Ibid.*
[64] Nov. 13, 1939 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/997).
[65] Sept. 30, 1939 (*FR* 1939, I, 460).

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who were used to facing facts however tragic and horrible they might be." Daladier insisted that Bullitt himself leave at once for Washington to transmit his personal plea for the immediate conversion of the automobile industry to plane production, and for the sale to France of at least 10,000 planes.[67]

Bullitt's request for permission to come home at once drew a prompt refusal. For several weeks Daladier continued to urge the ambassador to act, until Hull finally cabled bluntly: "Daladier is asking us to assume greater responsibility than is possible. Practically speaking it might well react against the very purpose he has in mind. Please make this clear to him. . . ."[68] By the time Bullitt finally did get instructions to return to Washington, where he remained from early February until April 10, 1940, Daladier must have been pretty well shorn of illusions that imminent and massive American aid might yet save France.[69] The premier sank increasingly into what Léon Blum called a state of "savage solitude,"[70] and ignored or offended enough of his parliamentary supporters to contribute to the overthrow of his cabinet in March. Even the distractions of his feud with Reynaud did not shake him out of the almost morbid gloom which was so deeply rooted in Daladier's temperament. Reynaud, on the other hand, introduced a new note of optimism and confidence which impressed Bullitt at once, but which was perhaps less well-founded than Daladier's pessimistic doubts. Whether Bullitt was quite aware of these curious contradictions in French morale is not entirely clear. He himself seems to have zigzagged between gloom and hope, even though hope always predominated.[71] Perhaps it was because

[67] Nov. 23, 1939 (*SD*, 851.248/296). Bullitt tried to persuade Daladier that he could achieve nothing in Washington because the State Department assured him that everything possible was being done; but Daladier replied that "the only opinion in which he would have absolute confidence would be my own. It is unpleasant to me to be obliged to report this sort of thing which sounds as though I were engaged in attempting to make myself appear more influential than I am; but I feel obliged to report the facts."

[68] Hull to Bullitt, Dec. 22, 1939 (*SD*, 123 Bullitt, William C./551).

[69] During his weeks in Washington, Bullitt did his best to speed the supply of planes, but without much result. Langer and Gleason, *Challenge to Isolation*, p. 345. What he wanted most, however, was a post in the cabinet which would obviate his return to Paris. Roosevelt demurred at first on the ground that Bullitt could not be spared in Paris, but in March he finally promised that Bullitt would be made Secretary of the Navy as soon as the incumbent resigned—probably in June. Bullitt to the editor, *New York Times*, Feb. 19, 1948.

[70] Murphy to Hull, March 23, 1940 (*SD*, 851.00/2005).

[71] For example, on February 11, 1940, Bullitt told Ickes that French and British morale was high, that the French pilots were the best in Europe, and that the Germans would hesitate to challenge the French or to invade the Low Countries. But on March 10 Ickes noted that Bullitt was "not at all sure that England and France may not be utterly defeated in the present war." Ickes, *Diary*, III, 133, 146-47. For another possible instance of Bullitt's contradictory views, see note 63 above.

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his own feelings were somewhat mixed that he failed to recognize the incompatibilities in French morale.

On May 10 the Germans at last struck westward; and for the next five weeks, Bullitt was swept into a crescendo of ceaseless activity. This period was to be the most dramatic phase of the ambassador's Paris career. Bullitt was a journalist by training; he had a flair for the colorful, and a sense of history. To read his messages sent during the western blitz is to recapture much of the excitement and tragedy of the times. No other foreign observer stood so close to the premier's elbow; no one else got so intimate a view of French leadership in crisis. Daily—sometimes several times a day—he saw Reynaud and Daladier, both of whom turned to him in their extremity as the one man who, they thought, might still save their country. Toward the end, a rumor even got out that Bullitt had begun to attend French cabinet meetings.[72] The ambassador angrily denied the charge; but he hardly needed to participate in cabinet sessions, so prompt and full was his information about what went on there.

For the first three days of the blitz, neither Bullitt nor the French grasped the nature of the German attack. Things went so well in Belgium that they thought the whole enterprise might be a mere feint prior to a direct onslaught against the Maginot Line.[73] But on May 13 the horizon grew darker, and Bullitt warned Roosevelt that a moment might come "in two to six months" when the French might find it impossible to hold.[74] On the 14th, Reynaud reported "appalling" German successes, and implored the ambassador to get the French more American planes at once.[75] On May 15, as Bullitt sat in Daladier's office, a telephone call came through from Gamelin at the front. Daladier sat "totally incredulous and stupefied . . . , exclaiming 'It cannot be true,' 'impossible' . . ."; then turned to Bullitt and reported the collapse of part of the Belgian army.[76] Bullitt proceeded to the premier's office, where he learned that Reynaud had just telephoned Churchill to warn

[72] June 12, 1940 (*SD*, 123 Bullitt, William C./600). Even Davis and Lindley, in their well-informed book *How War Came*, accepted the report as valid (p. 60).

[73] May 11, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/2849). Ten days before the attack, Bullitt reported: "So much information has reached the French Government recently with regard to a forthcoming German attack on the Netherlands that the French Government is convinced that this information is being put out by the German Government and it is considered probable that Hitler will turn his attention to Yugoslavia or Hungary before attacking the Netherlands." May 3, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/2637). Even as late as May 8, Reynaud and Léger continued to believe that Hitler's next move would be in the Balkans. May 8, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/2737).

[74] May 13, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/2913).

[75] May 14, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/2956).

[76] May 18, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/3131).

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him that without immediate British air support, the war might be lost within a few days. Churchill, said Reynaud, had "screamed at him that there was no chance of the war being lost," but had promised to try to persuade his cabinet to send over more planes.[77] By the 16th, things had grown even worse. "The final and most horrible and incredible blow," Reynaud told Bullitt, "was that all the railroad workers of Belgium had gone on strike and were refusing to transport French troops." "I am sorry for the democracies" were Reynaud's concluding words.[78] After this low point, the premier's morale recovered somewhat, for he told Bullitt on the 17th that "the situation is still excessively serious but it is now possible to hope."[79] At last, he added, the British were opening their eyes to the gravity of the situation, and might now send air support.[80] But on the 18th Reynaud admitted the possibility of "absolute defeat . . . in less than two months," and suggested that the only hope would be a morale-building declaration by Roosevelt that the United States could not permit such a defeat of the Western powers.[81] Despite Bullitt's attempts to dissuade Reynaud, the premier continued to plead for White House action, and even suggested that Roosevelt call in some influential politicians in an effort to pave the way for a congressional declaration of war. No other course, argued Reynaud, would prevent a German invasion of the United States.[82]

Meanwhile, French resentment at Britain's reluctance to send over the bulk of the RAF was rising to such a pitch that some of Bullitt's informants grew frankly abusive or hysterical.[83] On May 16, the ambassador warned Roosevelt that "in order to escape from the ultimate consequence of absolute defeat, the British may install a government

[77] May 15, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/2986).

[78] May 16, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/3052). Bullitt reported the next day that the Belgian strike had been organized by the Communists on orders from Moscow, and had been promptly broken by shooting the ringleaders. He also reported some minor cases of Communist sabotage in the French army. "Please for the sake of the future," he added, "nail every Communist or Communist sympathizer in our Army, Navy and air force." May 17, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/3115 7/8).

[79] May 17, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/3099).

[80] May 17, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/3115 4/8). According to Reynaud, the British ambassador had called on May 15 to deliver a polite note suggesting that the pocket in the French lines was no worse than many such pockets in the First World War. Reynaud had immediately wired Churchill: "The present war resembles in no way the war of 1914. It seems probable that German troops will enter Paris before midnight tonight." This message, said Reynaud, had brought Churchill to Paris at once, and his visit had ended his complacency.

[81] May 18, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/3140).

[82] May 22, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/3231 1/2).

[83] E.g., June 4, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/3500 1/2); June 5, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/3545 1/2); and June 9, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/3552 8/14).

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of Oswald Mosley and the union of British fascists which would cooperate fully with Hitler," and suggested that Roosevelt try to make a private agreement with patriotic British naval officers who would agree to sail the British fleet to Canada if their government decided to capitulate.[84] He urged that Washington put pressure on the British to send air support to France, and as late as June 6 rejected the British ambassador's contention that since France was beaten, the RAF must be saved for home defense.[85]

At the same time, a second problem was occupying Bullitt's attention: how best to keep "Al Capone" (as he called Mussolini) from entering the war. "My personal opinion," he cabled on May 20, "is that if Mussolini can be kept from stabbing France in the back the German drive on Paris will be held."[86] He bombarded Roosevelt with appeals to take some deterrent action such as sending the Atlantic fleet to the Mediterranean, or persuading the Pope to threaten the excommunication of Mussolini if the latter should declare war, or inviting the Holy Father to take refuge in the United States, in order to unsettle Italian opinion. The Italian-Americans, he suggested, might be mobilized to pass resolutions in favor of Italian neutrality. And finally, in a kind of cry of despair: "Why not telephone Fiorello La Guardia?"[87]

During these last days of May Bullitt's active mind, stimulated by excitement and danger, rattled like a machine gun as it fired off daily schemes for saving France. He begged Roosevelt to find some loophole through which to let the French get planes at once; he proposed that several naval vessels be sold to Peru for immediate resale to France; he supported French appeals that the United States turn over some out-

[84] May 16, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/3115 3/8). "It seems obvious," declared Bullitt, "that unless God grants a miracle as at the time of the battle of the Marne, the French army will be crushed utterly. The British, who have not yet sent to France the quantities of pursuit planes that they have in England to protect their factories (they have exactly two squadrons in France) are already beginning to be critical and contemptuous of the French. That was the tone of the British ambassador when he spoke to me this morning." As late as June 5, Bullitt continued to suspect that the British might try to save themselves by setting up a Mosley government. June 5, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/3545 1/2).

[85] June 5, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/3545 1/2); June 6, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/3552 1/2).

[86] May 20, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/2855). Some months earlier, Bullitt had described Mussolini in even more colorful language as "a turkey buzzard soaring and peering and looking for something dead to eat." Jan. 25, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/1556).

[87] Cf. Bullitt's telegrams to Hull, almost daily from May 16 to May 31, in the series 740.0011 Eur. War 1939. Bullitt even found time to suggest an appropriate residence for the Pope: the ancestral home of Charles Carroll of Carrollton. May 13, 1940 (*SD*, 866A.001/86).

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moded destroyers, plus the supply of World War I artillery in American arsenals; he even suggested that the army dig out 100,000 old Springfield rifles to equip Belgian troops in France, along with five thousand tommy guns to defend Paris itself. Toward the end, he added a plea for twelve tommy guns to be sent at his own expense to defend the Embassy building against pillage.[88] Washington's answers infuriated him by their slowness and inadequacy. "At the moment words are not enough," he complained. "Indeed unaccompanied by acts they are rather sickening."[89] "It was sad," he quoted Daladier, "that civilization in the world should fall because a great nation with a great president could simply talk."[90]

Although Bullitt's mood sometimes became glum and bitter, on the whole he clung desperately to his belief that a miracle might still save France. He pounded away at the thesis that French morale was superb, from Reynaud and Weygand down to the lowliest citizen. On May 15, while admitting that the situation was "more serious than at the worst moment of the Marne," he assured Washington: "Do not worry too much if at certain points German motorized columns break through. The French reserves are intact. . . . The fighting spirit of this country is just beginning to reach its peak."[91] On the 22nd he reverted to code: "Take the shortest line from 1914 angels to a shelled cathedral and remember taxicabs and hope."[92] On May 27 he saw General Weygand, the new French commander-in-chief, and found him "full of vigor and life."[93] "This war is not (repeat not) lost," he cabled on May 30.[94] His telegram of May 31, just at the moment of Dunkirk, culminated in a kind of urban rhapsody: "The calm of the people of Paris . . . is as extraordinary as it is noble. . . . The outdoor stamp market is still functioning calmly. Children are still riding the same old eight donkeys in the Champs Elysees and . . . watching the Punch and Judy show. The French at this moment do honor to the human race."[95] On the same day, exalted by the news from Dunkirk and by an inspiring meeting with Churchill in Paris, he reported that the Germans were bogging down. Three thousand of their best pilots had been lost, and their recent

[88] June 8, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/3531 8/12). Almost every cable sent by Bullitt from May 15 onward contained some such plea or proposal.
[89] May 31, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/2355 13/28).
[90] May 28, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/3352 2/8).
[91] May 15, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/3049).
[92] Bullitt to Roosevelt, May 22, 1940 (*SD*, 811.001 Roosevelt, F.D./7113 1/6).
[93] May 27, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/3343 4/10). General Spears' estimate of Weygand during these critical days was almost diametrically opposed to Bullitt's. *Assignment to Catastrophe*, I, 149-50, 190, 200-1.
[94] May 30, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/3391 1/2).
[95] May 31, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/3403).

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infantry attacks had been carried out "in the most crude mass manner as if their junior officers could not be compared to the junior officers of the Kaiser's army."[96] On June 7 he described French military resistance as "magnificent," and charged that the only disaster at the front was traceable to the collapse of a British division, which had not only retreated but had first taken time to blow up the bridges over which the French marines would have to withdraw.[97] As late as June 10, he continued to insist that there was still hope. "I cannot express my admiration for the courage with which the French are meeting one of the most tragic situations in history. The British are still keeping at home three-fourths of their pursuit planes."[98] Only occasionally was there a jarring note: as when Reynaud remarked on May 28 that "the French army would fight to the bitter end, but it seemed certain that the end would be bitter and rapid," and when Pétain on June 4 predicted the imminent fall of Paris.[99]

Bullitt's reports of these last days, marked by passionate partisanship and wishful thinking, can have been of little use to policy-makers at home. At this stage of events, however, it was too late for Washington to be helped much by even the most coldly accurate and analytical account of the state of French disintegration. Bullitt already knew that the French government was preparing to evacuate Paris, and that the State Department would order him to leave along with the cabinet. But the quixotic strain in his character had long since led him to decide that if the Germans should ever take Paris, he would stay on the ramparts to meet them.[100] His determination was strengthened when Reynaud and Interior Minister Georges Mandel asked him to assume responsibility for order and security in the city, and to treat with the Germans for its peaceable occupation. He was convinced that during the interlude between French departure and German arrival, the French Communists would try to seize control, though he was skeptical about Daladier's even more gloomy prediction that the Germans might deliberately mark time for several days in order to give the Communists a chance to ". . . burn, pillage and murder every one decent" in Paris.

[96] May 31, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/3411 1/2 and 3412 1/12).
[97] June 8, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/3552 7/14).
[98] June 10, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/3552 12/14).
[99] May 28, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/2855 8/28); June 4, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War. 1939/3500 1/2). According to Davis and Lindley (*How War Came*, p. 48), Bullitt sometimes consciously distorted the facts as a code device. They cite a case when Bullitt cabled a report of a brilliant French victory, then telephoned the White House to convey the idea that Roosevelt should read it precisely in reverse. This was probably Bullitt's cable of May 27, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/3343 8/10 and 9/10).
[100] Bullitt to Roosevelt, June 12, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/3691 3/14).

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"Such happenings," Bullitt commented, "would be unpleasant but brief and no one here would have any great objection to anything except being treated like Schussnigg and fed atropine and bromides until the brain disintegrated."[101]

This sense of imminent danger may explain the slightly maudlin tone of the ambassador's last messages out of Paris. "The Germans," he cabled on June 11, "are now approaching my house at Chantilly and in my garden is the last line for the defense of Paris. In this city today . . . there are sights that tear the heart. . . . I cannot exaggerate what it has meant to those who stay behind to know that I am here. . . ."[102] And on the 12th: "My deepest personal reason for staying in Paris is that whatever I have as character, good or bad, is based on the fact that since the age of four I have never run away from anything however painful and dangerous. . . . If I should leave Paris now I would be no longer myself. . . . The fact that I am here is a strong element in preventing a fatal panic. . . . Remember Gouverneur Morris and his wooden leg in the terror, Washburne in the Commune, Herrick. It will mean something always to the French and to the Foreign Service to remember that we do not leave though others do. FOLLOWING IN FRENCH: J'y suis. J'y reste. END FRENCH."[103]

What followed was distinctly anticlimactic. The Germans took over the city quickly and efficiently, and no Communist made a move to disturb the public order. By remaining in Paris against the State Department's wishes, Bullitt only exposed himself to Secretary Hull's irritable complaint that the ambassador, by failing to follow the government to Bordeaux, had missed the last chance of keeping France in the war.[104] Hull's estimate of Bullitt's personal influence over French leaders was flattering, but probably exaggerated.

Bullitt himself soon realized that his usefulness in Paris was over, and late in June he left for the temporary seat of Pétain's new government at La Bourboule, fully expecting that somewhere along the road he

[101] May 27, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/3343 1/10); June 8, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/3531 8/12). It has often been asserted that Interior Minister Georges Mandel was the one hard-headed realist who scoffed at the idea of Communist disorders. But Bullitt reported on May 28 that "both Reynaud and Mandel now expect a Communist uprising and butcheries in Paris and other industrial centers as the German army draws near," and added, "Mandel appealed personally this morning for speed" in securing American submachine guns. May 28, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/3343 7/10).

[102] June 11, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/3658).

[103] June 12, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/3691 3/14).

[104] Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, New York, 1948, 1, 789-91; cf. Davis and Lindley, *How War Came*, pp. 69-70, and Langer and Gleason, *Challenge to Isolation*, pp. 524-25.

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might be assassinated by Nazi agents.[105] But martyrdom still escaped him; he arrived safely, spent several days in lengthy talks with all the prominent men around Pétain, and then flew off home to report. Some hasty and thoughtless remarks to newspapermen on his arrival led to the charge that Bullitt had become an enthusiastic admirer of Pétain, and that he intended to convert Roosevelt to his new cause.[106] This charge was unfair, although Bullitt did make a sharp distinction between Pétain himself and the men who served him. Most of Pétain's subordinates, reported Bullitt in one of his last messages from France, "desire to cut loose from all that France has represented during the past two generations. . . .Their physical and moral defeat has been so absolute that they have accepted completely for France the fate of becoming a province of Nazi Germany. . . . Their hope is that France may become Germany's favorite province—a new gau which will develop into a new Gaul." Indeed, he added, they were so eager to have companions in misery that they hoped for the prompt defeat of Britain and Italy as well.[107]

But Pétain himself Bullitt found to be "calm, serious, and altogether dignified," weighing the past without excessive bitterness and the future without illusions. "Pétain," he reported, "recognizes that only a defeat of Hitler by some other power can restore independence to France. He is, therefore, sincerely desirous of a British victory." The full significance of this comment lies in the fact that Pétain expressed it on July 4, the day after the British attack on the French fleet near Oran. The reaction of other French leaders, reported Bullitt, was "violent in the extreme," and they openly favored "immediate acts of war against England"; but Pétain was ready to write off that tragic incident "by attributing it to Churchill's personal lack of balance."[108] It is not surprising, therefore, that Bullitt was inclined to single out Pétain as an unselfish patriot who merely hoped to save something from the wreckage of his country. While Bullitt did favor the diplomatic recognition of the Vichy government, he was not a Vichy sympathizer or even the principal author of what has been called "our Vichy gamble."[109]

[105] Ickes, *Diary*, III, 276.
[106] *Ibid.*, III, 329.
[107] July 1, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/4361 1/2).
[108] July 5, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/4556).
[109] W. L. Langer believes (*Our Vichy Gamble*, p. 76) that Bullitt "no doubt had much to do with the formulation of American policy in these uncertain months." Even this cautious judgment may exaggerate Bullitt's influence, but it is sounder than the view of Edvard Beneš (*Memoirs*, p. 173) that Bullitt's hatred of the Soviet Union made him a Pétainist, or the charge of Robert Bendiner (*Riddle of the State Department*, pp. 76-79) that Bullitt "put across the concept of Marshal Pétain as the George Washington

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Soon after his return, Bullitt went to Hyde Park for a week of intimate consultation with Roosevelt. Both men believed that Americans were in the same dangerously complacent mood that had marked French thinking just before the blitz, and they were convinced that the country needed a sharp jab in the ribs. Roosevelt, who was facing his third-term election campaign, hesitated to speak out too bluntly, so Bullitt was delegated to play the role of Paul Revere. A lecture engagement in Philadelphia on August 18 gave him his chance to sound the alarm. Bullitt's reveille brought an extraordinary outcry of mixed approval and almost hysterical rage. A Wisconsin congressman demanded that "our multi-millionaire New Deal, international, un-Christian, warmonger Ambassador Bullitt" be "locked up right away," and an Idaho senator denounced the speech as "very little short of treason."[110] Two million copies of the Philadelphia address were promptly turned out by the Government Printing Office, apparently with a view to burying the isolationists under sheer weight of paper.[111] A few months later, Bullitt formally resigned as ambassador to France and was made a kind of roving representative of the president.

Bullitt by no means regretted that the Paris phase of his career was over, for he confidently expected that Roosevelt's re-election would bring him an even higher destiny. A cabinet post was still his immediate ambition, and the president continued to toy with the idea for several months. But somehow the point of decision was never quite reached; Bullitt was passed over repeatedly, and watched with growing irritation as all the key posts were filled. The warm affection that had bound him to Roosevelt gradually cooled. He found it harder to get access to the White House, and eventually came to believe that the nefarious influence of Harry Hopkins had sabotaged his career.[112] Such lesser offers as the ambassadorship to London, and a post as head of a speaker's bureau in the OWI, he indignantly rejected. These roles scarcely fitted a man who

of France," and that he "probably more than any other single individual may be held accountable for our subsequent policy toward Vichy."

[110] *Congressional Record*, Vol. 86, pp. 10478-80, 15019 (Aug. 19, 1940). Bullitt's senatorial critics accused him of advocating dictatorship in the United States, of "roaming around the country pleading the cause of the . . . Nazi-controlled Pétain government," and of having once been a collaborator with the Communists. Senator Reed read from *Who's Who* to prove that Bullitt had married the widow of John Reed; Senator Wheeler declared that "the judgment of no man in the Government service has been more wrong than that of Mr. Bullitt with reference to the whole European situation." Only Senator Ashurst rose feebly to Bullitt's defense, pleading that for such a man it would be torture to keep a speech "bottled up in his bosom," and adding: "To imagine Bill Bullitt remaining silent would be to imagine a fat sylph, or an iron balloon."

[111] *New York Times*, Sept. 23, 1940.

[112] Ickes, *Diary*, III, 342, 369, 374, 486-87, 538, 615-16.

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had been so close to the throne, who craved action and power, and who, some of his friends believed, had seriously thought of himself as a potential successor to Roosevelt in the White House.[113] In 1943 Bullitt left government service, embarked on a brief and disastrous political venture as candidate for mayor of Philadelphia, and at last, in a kind of quixotic gesture, accepted a commission as major in de Gaulle's Free French Forces.[114] When he returned to France in 1944, it was in the uniform of his second country.

Bullitt's record as envoy to France does not support the charges leveled against him by his more vindictive critics. But neither does it mark him out as one of our great ambassadors. Judged both by the general standards of his profession and by the special demands of the crisis period through which he lived, his rating cannot be much higher than mediocre. He was too often biased, impetuous, and inconsistent. His confidence in his own judgment was excessive, and the base upon which he built his information about France was too narrow. He rarely took time to analyze the French or the European situation in perspective and in depth, or to correlate his views with those of his staff. The lively, gossipy telegram summarizing a luncheon conversation was more congenial to his temperament than the lengthy, reflective despatch.[115] These shortcomings might tempt the historian to conclude that Bullitt represents a kind of horrible example of the wealthy dilettante in a key diplomatic post, and that he not only observed the fall of France but shared some responsibility for that catastrophe.

Yet so severe a verdict would be flagrantly unjust. Despite his aberrations, Bullitt's judgment probably was sound more often than it was wrong; and it was on the big issues that he tended to be almost instinctively right. His emotionalism and his partisanship did often distort his views; but, more quickly and more firmly than most Americans of his time, he came to be aware of the threat to American security posed by totalitarian systems of every type. He realized, furthermore,

[113] In 1939 some Pennsylvania Democrats tried to start a presidential boom for Bullitt, aiming at the 1940 election. *New York Times*, March 23, 1939.

[114] Bullitt met de Gaulle only once during his years in Paris. "He is a young man who appears to be vigorous and intelligent," the ambassador noted on that occasion. Bullitt to Roosevelt, June 5, 1940 (*SD*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/3545 1/2).

[115] Bullitt's penchant for voluminous telegrams, some of them twenty or thirty pages long, must have made him one of the most expensive ambassadors in our history. I noted in the State Department archives only one Bullitt despatch of the "think-piece" variety, sent via diplomatic pouch rather than by cable. April 19, 1937 (*SD*, 851.00/1672). The Department hastily sent Bullitt a commendation, and suggested that more such despatches would be welcome. But if Washington hoped that the ambassador would change his ways, it hoped in vain.

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that Americans could not safely deal with that menace by ignoring it in the hope that it might disappear, or by gambling that the totalitarians might conveniently destroy each other. On the whole, Bullitt's record in Paris stands up better than the record of those contemporaries who most vehemently denounced him.

How much influence Bullitt really had on either American or French policy cannot be accurately gauged. Probably that influence was less great than Bullitt and his friends believed was the case, and much less great than his more violent detractors have alleged. A different ambassador in Paris would neither have hastened nor averted the fall of France. Indeed, Bullitt's career might lead a cynic to conclude that it seldom matters much any more whether an ambassador is great or only mediocre. Doubtless there are times when ambassadorial errors may have fatal consequences, but none of Bullitt's mistakes fell into that rare category. Perhaps, then, it is in his role as observer and reporter of dramatic events rather than as shaper of history that Bullitt will be longest remembered. Or perhaps, in the end, he can expect no better fate from the historians than to be embalmed in a footnote.

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SOVIET ECONOMIC AID IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Threat or Windfall?*

By CHARLES WOLF, JR.

THE new Soviet diplomacy in Asia involves an active effort to extend economic aid to a select group of countries who qualify as non-allied with the United States, or, in some sense of the term, as "neutralists." To date, the Soviet Bloc has made aid commitments in South and Southeast Asia of over $500 million to India, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Cambodia, and Burma.[1] Virtually all the aid has been committed in the past two years; most of it since early 1956. TABLE 1 shows the size and character of the commitments.[2]

The scope and timing of the Bloc's aid efforts raise a number of basic questions for United States foreign economic policy. Is Soviet aid in Southeast Asia a clear threat to U.S. interests? Should offers of aid by the Bloc be responded to by U.S. counteroffers of more aid on more favorable terms? And what can be said about the effect of Soviet aid to non-allied countries on our SEATO allies? In the following comments, I suggest that Soviet Bloc aid is perhaps not simply the threat we have assumed, but may entail some windfall benefits as well; that bigger and better aid offers by the United States are not necessarily warranted as a *counter* to Soviet aid, though they may well be warranted for other reasons; and that U.S. policy toward our SEATO partners is likely to be complicated in some interesting ways by Soviet aid to non-pact members. As the tenor of these conclusions suggests, the following pages are intended to raise some not wholly obvious issues, rather than to provide definitive answers.

* It is a pleasure to acknowledge the comments I received on an earlier draft from Oleg Hoeffding and Norman Kaplan. This paper is part of my larger study at The RAND Corporation of U.S. assistance programs in South and Southeast Asia.

[1] In the interest of brevity rather than accuracy, the entire area will be referred to as Southeast Asia. There is some question whether Burma belongs on the list at all. Soviet aid to Burma, though formally announced as a "gift," has been accompanied by an equivalent "gift" from Burma to the Soviet Union of an "appropriate quantity of rice and other products" (*Burma Weekly Bulletin*, Rangoon, v, No. 1, April 5, 1956, p. 1).

[2] It has also been reported that Communist China agreed in October 1956 to a grant of $12.9 million to Nepal. Since the report is not confirmed and details are not available, the grant is not included in the table.

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TABLE 1. SOVIET BLOC AID COMMITMENTS TO NON-BLOC COUNTRIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: AMOUNT, PURPOSE, REPAYMENT TERMS, AND DATE OF AID AGREEMENT[1]

RECIPIENT / DONOR	AFGHANISTAN	BURMA
CHINA		
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	*$5.*: cement plant, leather-processing plant; textile mill; 5 years at 3%; September 1954[2]	
EAST GERMANY		
USSR	*$6.6*: grain elevators, oil storage tanks, road-building equipment; 5 years at 3%; January 27, 1954[3] *$100.*: hydroelectric stations; irrigation facilities; auto repair shops, etc.; 30 years at 2%; January 28, 1956[4]	(amount not specified) Technological Institute, hospital, sports stadium, hotel, theater; April 1, 1956[5]
RECIPIENT TOTAL	*$111.6*	—

1 Aid figures are in millions of U.S. dollars, but the real dollar value of the figures is not too clear. In some cases, the original agreement is apparently stated in dollars; in others, rubles; and in others, in the currency of the recipient country. In all dollar conversions, official exchange rates are used.

The data include only loans of more than five years' maturity, as well as the single grant extended by the Bloc in Southeast Asia, and the technical services accompanying the individual projects. Short-term trade credits are excluded, as are Bloc contributions to the United Nations' expanded technical assistance program. To date, Bloc contributions to non-Bloc countries in Southeast Asia have amounted to $3 million under the U.N. program, the bulk going to India. See *Soviet Technical Assistance*, Staff Study No. 7, Subcommittee on Technical Assistance Programs, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, July 12, 1956, pp. 60-61.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 12.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 2. Repayment terms and date of agreement apply to $3.5 million.

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CAMBODIA	INDIA	INDONESIA	DONOR TOTAL
$22.4 (grant): hydraulic works, industrial, agricultural, and transportation equipment; June 21, 1956[6]			$ 22.4
			$ 5.0
		$7.: sugar mill; 6 years, interest rate not available; February 3, 1955[10]	$ 7.0
	$132.: steel plant; 12 years at 2½%; February 2, 1955[7] $10.: industrial diamond-mining equipment; credit terms not available[8] $126.: fertilizer plant, oil refinery, coal-mining equipment; 12 years at 2½%; November 14, 1956[9]	$100.: industrial and automotive equipment, etc.; 12 years at 2½%; September 11, 1956[11]	$474.6
$22.4	$268.	$107.	$509.0

The remainder was committed later in the year. Repayment terms are not available.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 2; *New York Times*, December 19, 1955.

5 *Burma Weekly Bulletin*, April 5, 1956, p. 1; see also note 1 to text of this article.

6 *New York Times*, June 21, 1956, p. 21.

7 *Indiagram*, Information Service of India, Washington, July 20, 1956, p. 4. The figure is from a speech of the Deputy Finance Minister to the Indian Parliament. It is the highest that has yet appeared, exceeding initial estimates by $40 million.

8 *Soviet Technical Assistance*, *op.cit.*, pp. 2, 16-19.

9 *International Financial News Survey*, IX, No. 25 (December 21, 1956), p. 201.

10 *Ibid.*, p. 32.

11 *New York Times*, September 12 and September 16, 1956.

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I

A major premise of the following remarks is that the returns derived by the United States from economic aid depend largely on the economic effects of such aid. Aid supplements the resources otherwise available to recipients for increasing investment and consumption, spreading technical knowledge, and providing various institutional requirements for growth. And it is on these kinds of effects that the returns from aid depend. This is not to say that the returns are not "political," but rather that the economic changes produced by aid are a necessary instrument for achieving political returns. In much of Southeast Asia, the disparity between widely held aspirations, on the one hand, and economic conditions—currently experienced or actively expected—on the other, is a major source of political instability. If the economic changes induced by aid contribute to lessening this disparity, aid can be said to yield political returns.[3] For abbreviated reference, I shall refer to this as the "instrumental" view of economic aid.

By contrast, it is sometimes held that the returns from aid are rather to be found in holding, winning, and influencing friends. In this view, aid is a monument to international friendship between recipient and donor, and an inducement to the recipient to behave in a more friendly fashion toward the donor. Gains from aid thus depend more on the disbursal of aid and the sentiment it is supposed to evoke than on the economic changes it produces. I shall refer to this as the "sentimental" view of aid.[4]

To some extent the two views are merely different, rather than conflicting. Aid may contribute to sound economic growth as well as make recipients more amicably disposed toward the donor. And if there is a conflict between the two views which is resolved by considering one of the objectives as primary, we at least implicitly constrain rather than exclude the other objective. Clearly, the economic growth of an aid recipient is hardly of interest to a donor if the recipient is likely to become hostile toward the donor.

However, quite different policy conclusions result from adopting one view rather than the other. For example, adherents of the sentimental view tend to see the sometimes less-than-friendly behavior of neutralists, like India and Indonesia, as an indication that U.S. aid programs in these countries are not achieving their purpose, and hence as justifica-

[3] For amplification, see the author's *Economic Development and Mutual Security*, RAND RM-1778-RC, August 14, 1956.

[4] While the term unfortunately has pejorative implications, it is used here descriptively, not normatively.

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tion for reducing or eliminating them. Since the instrumental view regards the economic effects produced by aid as the link between aid and the political returns sought, it tends to be more concerned with productivity than friendship as a criterion for allocating aid.

The two views also contrast in their evaluation of Soviet aid outside the Bloc. The sentimental view regards Soviet aid as intended and likely to evoke obligation and good will toward the Bloc, and hence as a threat to American interests in the recipient countries. The instrumental view tends to look at Soviet—and American—aid in terms of whether and how much it contributes to a recipient's productive capacity to meet the economic aspirations of its people. If Soviet aid contributes to this end, it represents a positive score for the United States. Admittedly, this is only part of the story. I will come back to other parts in a moment.

But first let me make explicit a preference for the instrumental view. My main reason is a feeling that aid is too unreliable a means of winning friends for this to be its objective. Economic aid may be a necessary condition for holding on to friends we already have, e.g., the Philippines. It is certainly not a sufficient condition, as is suggested by the case of Egypt, which until recently has received more than twice as much aid from the United States as any other Arab country. Moreover, from our experience with aid in the neutralist countries over the past six years, it may be said that aid is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for winning or influencing *new* friends. It is interesting, in fact, that the only neutralist country which has become perceptibly more friendly toward the United States in the past few years is Burma, where our grant aid program was discontinued in June 1953 at the request of the Burmese government. At the least, this experience warrants a certain amount of skepticism toward the view that aid builds up credits in the international good-will account of the United States.

In any event, in these comments I am adopting the instrumental view as a premise. Once this is done, certain fairly obvious things can be said about Soviet aid. Thus, it either provides resources for projects similar to those financed by additional U.S. aid, or it does not. If it does, Soviet aid will have an economic effect comparable to an equivalent amount of dollar aid. If economic effects constitute some sort of proximate measure of U.S. political returns, then we have gained.

Of course, it does not follow that the Soviet Union has not also gained: competitive coexistence is a non-zero-sum game. Participants may and do register gains and losses on different scales. On some, the

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Soviet Union may gain; on others, lose. Rates of exchange between the scales may not be known, or, if known, may differ for different participants. For example, internal Communist parties in recipient countries may, as a result of Soviet aid, acquire a new respectability and enhanced political appeal. Or Soviet technical assistance may be larded with increasing numbers of Communist organizers or agitators—though it is very likely that the Indians or Indonesians will watch and control this quite carefully. And there is a question whether increased dependence on Soviet aid and Soviet sources of supply for replacement parts may induce neutralist recipients to become politically more favorable toward the Bloc.[5] Anticipated gains on any or all of these scales may lead the Soviet Union to extend aid even if we (the United States) believe the growth effects in recipient countries will redound to our advantage.

If, on the other hand, Soviet aid is restricted to quite different uses than American aid, it is not clear what the consequences—in term of payoffs to the United States—may be. Say Soviet aid were to produce sectoral imbalances in recipient economies. This might be done, for example, by using aid to increase the output of subsidized steel faster than demand is rising in other sectors, and hence lowering prices and driving private producers out of business; or by overexpanding transport capacity so that operation is at a loss.[6] Or Soviet aid might be directed toward less essential projects which a particularly interested ministry in the recipient country had been unable to retain in the country's formal development plan. By giving foreign exchange credits for such projects on condition that their local currency costs are borne by the recipient country, Soviet aid might have the effect of diverting internal resources from more to less essential uses, thereby actually slowing down growth in the "aided" country.[7]

While such designs are not to be dismissed lightly, there are a number of reasons why they might have quite different consequences from those expected by the Bloc. For one thing, a clever recipient can usually extract some benefit from aid regardless of the intention of the donor. Substitutability of resources generally permits a recipient to realize the

[5] At least one reason for doubting this latter eventuality is that to date the relatively much greater dependence of neutralists on Western aid and sources of supply has not seemed to influence their behavior toward the West.

[6] Clearly, the loss could be eliminated by scrapping the excess capacity provided by Soviet largesse. The recipient, however, may not do so—and may not be expected to—either because it mistakenly estimates that future income from the equipment has a present value exceeding the loss, or because it is unaware of the doctrine of sunk costs.

[7] It is by no means impossible, for example, that some of the Soviet "aid" projects in Burma, e.g., the sports stadium, hotel, and theater, may have this effect.

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additive effect of aid in a different sector by cutting back its own efforts in the sector to which the aid is directed. And even if Soviet aid does have the intended effect, it is by no means clear that the Bloc will benefit, on balance. There is an asymmetry to the credit-blame consequences of economic aid which tends to discourage a donor from attempting to use it to create imbalances in the recipient economy. When aid is used productively and effectively, credit for its use redounds to the recipient government. When, however, aid creates bottlenecks, surpluses, or other grievances, blame usually redounds to the donor government. If the USSR has not already learned this lesson from American experience, it will probably learn it the hard way before very long.[8]

It is also reasonable to expect that Soviet aid to neutralist countries, regardless of possible Soviet criteria governing its use, will lead to certain repercussions within the Bloc. For example, the claims of the Eastern European satellites, and of China especially, on the Soviet Union for aid may be expected to increase as a function of Soviet aid to non-Bloc countries. While the signs may be less apparent, there is no reason to doubt that the same kind of invidious comparisons that have followed U.S. aid will bother the Soviet Union, as a newcomer to the field. If complaints by Bloc claimants are heeded, the Soviet economy may incur some strain.[9] If they are not, the political cohesiveness of the Bloc may diminish. That this has been a factor in the recent disaffections within the Bloc is at least an interesting possibility.

The picture that emerges is admittedly not conclusive. If Soviet aid contributes to economic growth in recipient countries outside the Bloc, it may yield payoffs to the United States similar to those associated with the growth-effects of U.S. aid. If the Soviet Union tries to use aid to create imbalances in recipient countries, its effort may be circumvented by the substitutability of resources. And if its effort is nevertheless successful, the result may well be public blame and hostility

[8] Recently, Burma ordered for immediate delivery 60,000 tons of cement—a year's supply—from the Soviet Union under their bilateral trade agreement. The arrival of the shipments at the beginning of the monsoon season, and Burma's lack of storage space to receive it, resulted in substantial losses. The Burmese hold Soviet promptness to blame, and this is probably one factor in the recent stiffening of Burma's attitude toward the Bloc.

[9] It is also true that trade with countries outside the Bloc may reduce the strain on other sectors of the Soviet economy. If food and other agricultural products are in relatively short supply in the Soviet Union, there is always an opportunity for a profitable exchange, e.g., of Soviet capital goods for Asian rice and raw materials, quite apart from aid. The gains from trade should not be confused with the gains and/or losses from aid.

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directed against the Soviet Union, rather than against the recipient government. There are, too, fair possibilities that Soviet aid to non-Bloc countries will have repercussions within the Bloc, and that these will either place some strain on the economy of the Soviet Union or on the political solidarity of the Bloc.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union may also derive benefit from its aid programs. The prestige of Communist parties in recipient countries may be bolstered; good will toward and dependence on the Soviet Union may be engendered in recipient countries; and Soviet agents and agitators, packaged along with Soviet technicians and equipment, may go about their work in recipient countries to the benefit of the USSR. For reasons already suggested, I would rank these contingencies, respectively, as likely, doubtful, and unlikely.

On balance, then, perhaps all that can be said is that Soviet aid is not simply a threat to U.S. interests as it on first glance appears to be, but that it may also carry with it potential gains for the United States. Consequently, no presumption seems warranted that Soviet aid offers or commitments should be countered by bigger and better American offers. There may be special cases where such counters are indicated, but the general case may indeed be to the contrary. This is not to say that increased economic aid by the United States may not be warranted for other reasons. The problem of allocating U.S. resources in the international field is so difficult that the actual allocation may frequently—perhaps usually—be less than "optimal." If, for example, the success of India's Five-Year Plan represents an indirect but important payoff to the United States, then additional aid to India may well be to our advantage—whether or not India is receiving assistance from the Soviet Union. Soviet aid may focus our attention on the need, but it does not create the need. And the need, once recognized, can and should be considered without falling into the challenge-and-response approach to increased aid, where Soviet aid rather than the problems of the recipient country appears as the challenge and our aid the inevitable response.

A further qualification needs to be added to this argument. While Soviet aid may be a windfall rather than a threat to American interests, *given* a substantial U.S. aid effort, this will certainly not be the case if American aid is eliminated or curtailed. On its part, the USSR may be expected to try to exact from recipient countries some political-economic price for its aid, figured in whatever terms the Soviet Union registers its potential gains in this field: political, for example, in terms

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of an implied support for Soviet foreign policies; economic, in terms of interest and repayment terms. The effect of on-going U.S. aid is to lower the price the Soviet Union can expect. As a monopolist, the Soviet Union could charge a higher price for its aid, or discriminate in the prices it charges "buyers" of aid so as to maximize its returns. Competition in aid, no less than trade, tends to raise the quantity (of aid), and to lower the "price" paid by users.

Of course, the comfort this gives us is not unalloyed. Soviet aid, for the same reason, will tend to lower the price we can charge users, as well. For example, interest rates of 2½-3 per cent on Soviet development credits seem to be standard practice in the region, as compared with rates of from 4 to 5 per cent on U.S. government (Export-Import Bank and I.C.A.) loans. Consequently, it is likely that subsidized Soviet rates will tend to lower ours, either in the form of reduced interest rates, longer maturities, or both.[10]

Despite its inconclusiveness, the foregoing argument may have some direct bearing on a number of problems we face in the foreign aid field. It may, for example, help to forestall our being propelled by a fear of Soviet aid offers into precipitate counteroffers; the Aswan Dam and its sequel are a case in point. If, as has been suggested here, we can anticipate some of the ways in which Soviet aid may be *both* a threat and a windfall, appropriate actions on our part may enable us to maximize the latter consequences while limiting the former. Thus, we might consider whether a proposal to the Soviet Union to channel its aid through the United Nations, along with a conditional commitment from us to do likewise, might not remove the possibly adverse consequences of Soviet aid and leave it on balance a gain to the free world. If aid remains on a bilateral basis, we might consider whether and how a judicious allocation of our aid in recipient countries can serve to prevent structural imbalances from arising as a result of Soviet aid.

The foregoing discussion may also have some implications with respect to potential frictions within the Bloc. If, for example, an opportunity is developing within the satellite countries for some expression of both governmental independence and public opinion, it might be advisable to encourage the flow of information within the Bloc concerning Soviet aid activities outside the Bloc.

In these matters, of course, we are always uncertain about outcomes.

[10] In the case of loans under the Mutual Security Program, the repayment period (forty years) is so long that the loans are probably already at least competitive with Soviet credits. Cf. Howard P. Jones, "U. S. Economic Policy and Programs in the Far East," *Department of State Bulletin*, xxxv, No. 904 (October 22, 1956), pp. 640-41.

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But if we try to consider the potential gains and losses of possible counteractions by the United States, we can probably characterize some as more likely than others. At the least, we may be in a better position to take advantage of the opportunities for gain—however limited—that are afforded us by Soviet aid activities.

III

Another aspect of the Soviet aid offensive which has not been touched on yet concerns its effect on our Asian allies in SEATO. It is interesting to note, in this connection, how fine the line apparently is in Soviet thinking between "neutralist" countries which are eligible for aid and "committed" countries which are not. Cambodia, for example, which receives military aid from the United States and is within the area covered by the SEATO agreements, though not a formal signatory, nonetheless is considered sufficiently neutral to qualify for aid—at least, aid from Communist China. Another explanation for this apparent anomaly is, of course, that China and the Soviet Union may apply somewhat different considerations in deciding on aid recipients.

In any event, the record suggests that an Asian country's formal membership in SEATO is a sufficient condition for disqualifying it from receiving aid from the Bloc as a whole, though not necessarily from entering into bilateral trading arrangements with the Bloc. If, as is not unlikely, the USSR makes aid offers conditional on withdrawal from the pact, what will be some of the consequences for American aid policy?[11]

Under these circumstances, clearly, the cost to a SEATO country of its membership rises. Assume, for example, that our economic aid to SEATO countries is divided into two components: one justified on more or less the same instrumental grounds as those on which we extend aid to the neutralist countries; the other, a separate "inducement" component relating to a country's membership in a defense organization benefiting our strategic position in the region. If we think of this inducement component as a subsidy which makes the benefits of membership just exceed the costs, then the effect of a conditional Soviet aid offer is to raise the required subsidy. How far we are prepared to raise the subsidy will depend on how highly we value the strategic benefit of the regional pact.[12] In fact, if the SEATO members knew this limit,

[11] The condition might instead take the form of a less active participation in the pact by a potential recipient of Soviet aid.

[12] And also on how much of a difficulty, e.g., in terms of resource burdens on the Soviet Union or intra-Bloc frictions, we think would be created for the Soviet Union if its offer were accepted.

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they could in theory push us toward it, even in the absence of Soviet aid offers, simply by a firm and credible commitment not to take less. Since they probably do not know this upper limit any better than we do, they are only likely to move in this direction under the stimulus of conditional aid offers from the USSR.[13]

There is another way in which Soviet aid is likely to affect U.S. aid to SEATO members. The politically "necessary" rate of growth in any one Southeast Asian country depends, in part, on its observation of levels of living in other countries of the region. If people improve their lot in India, the demands of people in Pakistan tend to rise. If Soviet aid to neutralist countries helps them to grow faster and to raise consumption levels, this in itself is likely to boost development targets and resource requirements in the SEATO countries as well. The chances are that the latter's foreign aid needs will rise and that we will find it to our interest to meet these needs. Stated differently, the "instrumental" component—no less than the "inducement" component—of U.S. economic aid to the SEATO countries is likely to rise as a result of Soviet aid to the Asian neutralists. If the contest proceeds and the Soviet Union is prepared to raise the ante, Asian aid recipients might become increasingly split into two groups: the neutralists receiving all or most of their external assistance from the Soviet Union, and the SEATO members receiving aid only from the United States. While recent developments in the allocation of American foreign aid make this prospect appear unlikely, it is not one to be overlooked.

[13] The point can be represented in an idealized way by the following diagram:



The horizontal axis represents the size of the inducement component of U.S. economic aid to a SEATO member. The vertical axis shows what the SEATO country nets from membership in the pact. If membership entails some incremental costs to the SEATO country (e.g., an amount of dollars equivalent to OA), then the inducement component must be OA as a minimum. Assuming the U.S. places some maximum value OC on the country's membership in the pact, the maximum the country can net is shown by CE, the intersection of a 45° line drawn from A, with the "SEATO-country-nets" axis. The actual size of the inducement component will be negotiated along the line AE.

If now the SEATO country is confronted with an opportunity to receive Soviet aid in an amount equivalent to AB if it withdraws from SEATO, then the minimum inducement component becomes OB, and the maximum the country can net—in the sense of what it gets from membership above the price of non-membership—is CD. The actual amount received will be negotiated along the line BD.

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Review Articles

THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: 1956 VERSION

By FRED A. SONDERMANN

M. Margaret Ball and Hugh B. Killough, *International Relations*, New York, The Ronald Press Co., 1956, 667 pp. $6.50.
Ernst B. Haas and Allen S. Whiting, *Dynamics of International Relations*, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1956, 557 pp. $6.00.
Charles O. Lerche, Jr., *Principles of International Politics*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1956, 430 pp. $5.00.
Lennox A. Mills and Charles H. McLaughlin, *World Politics in Transition*, New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1956, 757 pp. $6.50.
Arnold Wolfers and Laurence W. Martin, eds., *The Anglo-American Tradition in Foreign Affairs: Readings from Thomas More to Woodrow Wilson*, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1956, 286 pp. $4.50.

I

THE publication of four new textbooks in international relations provides the occasion for analyzing recent trends in the field, since in all probability there is a close relationship between textbook writing and classroom teaching of the subject. A text, after all, inevitably carries the imprint of the author's own teaching experience; and few teachers are apt to venture in directions which differ basically from those indicated by the most accessible literature in the field.

The number of texts from which teachers of international relations may choose has increased greatly in recent years,[1] until it now exceeds fifteen. However, the available choice is not as great as a listing of titles in print might suggest, because most texts do not differ greatly from each other. There are two main categories of international relations textbooks. One type consists of large collections of data, strung together in a "freight-train pattern"—with a number of topics (boxcars) labeled State, Sovereignty, Nationalism, Imperialism, Power, Collective Security, etc., combined in more or less random fashion. This approach results in a book whose chapters can be taken apart and rearranged at

[1] Two new works have already appeared in 1957: Frederick H. Hartmann, *The Relations of Nations*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1957; and Vernon Van Dyke, *International Politics*, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1957.

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the instructor's discretion. The second type of text attempts a more unified presentation of the subject matter of international relations by organizing its contents around one or more central propositions or assumptions. Professor Morgenthau's well-known book[2] was the first postwar example of this type of text and has lacked effective competition, within its own category of presentation, for a remarkably long time.

Of the four textbooks here under review, two (Mills and McLaughlin, Ball and Killough) fall into the first of the foregoing categories, while the other two (Lerche, Haas and Whiting) fall into the second. This article will concentrate mainly on the various authors' organization of materials, in the hope that such concentration may yield deductions as to the concepts, if any, of the field of international relations which are represented by these texts as well as the usefulness of the books for both teacher and student.

When one reflects upon the tremendous range of knowledge and the difficult art of organizing and presenting the many aspects of an ambiguous subject which are the prerequisites of an international relations text, one can only admire the courage with which so many of one's colleagues enter upon the task of producing such a book. In a field of study as young and marked by as great uncertainty, variety, and experimentation as international relations, criticism is always easier than performance; it must therefore proceed with that much more restraint. The comments which follow should not be interpreted as connoting anything less than respect for the various authors' learning and effort, although the reviewer must perforce give his judgment as to the success of their respective endeavors.

II

The text written by Professors Mills and McLaughlin, *World Politics in Transition*, presents vast quantities of factual materials, but these are organized in such a way that it is difficult to perceive what central themes or concepts hold all of them together. The various topics themselves come from the common pool from which international relations texts generally draw; and they are treated in traditional and usually highly competent fashion. The problem is less the material than its organization. Thus, a portion of the book entitled "Basic Factors of

[2] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1948. (A revised and enlarged edition of this work was published in 1954.)

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International Relations" includes such varied topics as "Political Nationalism," "National Character and Ideology," "Force and Power Politics," "Techniques of Political Propaganda," "Geography and Foreign Policy," and others. The rationale for combining all these topics is obscure, as is the arrangement of data within some chapters. Another problem is that at various points the authors either present such vast amounts of data on a given topic as to swamp the student, or else they slide over vast topics of great importance with an ease which is enviable but inappropriate. The foreign policy of India, for example, is dealt with in three pages, that of Canada in one page, that of Ceylon in a third of a page.

The book lacks a theoretic framework within which events in the international field can be meaningfully organized. The instructor who wishes to use this text will be free to supply whatever unifying principles he deems important and relevant. This is not necessarily a shortcoming of the book, especially when available alternative texts either require a similar effort or else are so tightly woven around a theoretic scheme (with which one may or may not agree) as to prevent the teacher from following the organizational scheme most congenial to him.

To a somewhat lesser extent, the need for the instructor to supply the unifying focus also applies to *International Relations* by Professors Ball and Killough, who organize the subject under the following major headings: the international community, the pursuit of national policy, international organization in the field of human welfare, the collective security system, and a review of recent foreign policies of major powers.

A careful reading of the text suggests certain problems. The authors have drawn so heavily on data from history, political science, and economics (one of them is an economist) that they seem all but oblivious to the contributions which other disciplines could make to a better understanding of international relationships. The traditional approach also becomes quite apparent in the detailed descriptions of institutional arrangements and in the highly technical discussions of such subjects as diplomacy and war.

The book fails to provide, except by implication, a framework within which one may view the data of international relations. Indeed, it even lacks a definition of its subject! Historical accounts of tremendous detail, often on a country-by-country basis, make it very difficult to gain any general view of the subject. It may well be a revealing commentary on the state of international relations studies that competent scholars can present so much detail accompanied by so few generalizations.

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Having said all this, it remains to be noted that the organization of this text is both understandable and defensible. Many of its chapters are extremely well written and are thoroughly informative. Yet one may ask whether, on balance, the text represents a real advance or whether it is merely a restatement and rearrangement of advances made some time ago. This reviewer tends toward the latter view. But it may be unfair to judge a book on the basis of criteria which its authors never intended to satisfy.[3] The text by Professors Ball and Killough, as well as that by Professors Mills and McLaughlin, will serve as a conveniently accessible storehouse of many relevant facts and figures concerning the complex phenomena of international relationships. If this was the authors' aim, they have achieved it.

The purpose of Professor Lerche's *Principles of International Politics* is not to present vast quantities of facts, but rather to provide an analytic scheme within which the abundant data about international political relationships can be organized and understood. One may take issue with many aspects of the book: its shortage of substantiating data, the mechanistic character of its principles; some challengeable interpretations, and some unfortunately loose use of language. But these problems are less important than the validity and usefulness of Professor Lerche's general propositions. Here is a thoughtful attempt to produce a set of significant statements designed to facilitate systematic thinking about international politics.

The key concept is the "national interest"—unfortunately an ill-defined and apparently undefinable term. The policy process, according to the author, consists of the translation of the general concept of the national interest into concrete terms; the formulation of a series of specific policy objectives; and, finally, the selection of techniques appropriate to the attainment of these goals. In this task the statesman is confronted with two factors—namely, his own state's national interest; and the existence of other states, all of which pursue policies based on their own national interests. He is also faced with a formidable set of variables: all possible policy objectives deriving from his state's national interest, all available techniques to pursue those objectives, and likewise all possible objectives and techniques of other states.

In a chapter on the "Dynamics of International Politics" Professor Lerche attempts to describe what happens when the foreign policies of

[3] A publisher's advertisement for this text states that ". . . the book informs the student but avoids forcing any interpretation or judgment upon him. It consistently encourages him to . . . draw his own conclusions."

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various states come into contact with each other. He identifies two categories of principles: (1) those which arise logically from the nature of the nation-state system, and (2) those which statesmen actually do follow. One wonders how, over the long run, these two can be kept separate. The resultant relationships take place within a context of constant change and general trends toward disorder. Imminent chaos is kept in check only through the efforts of statesmen (coupled with the general anxiety to avoid modern war and the slow development of international institutions) to preserve a minimum of stability within this highly volatile system.

Students of international relations must be grateful to Professor Lerche for having made a serious effort to bring order to the elusive subject matter of their field. Still, one's judgment must be based not on the attempt itself but on its success; and about that subject this reviewer has some doubt.

The fundamental question is how useful a scheme can be which is based on the concept of national interest without providing specific guidance as to how this national interest may be discovered, defined, or translated into policy. Let it be noted that Professor Lerche realizes this. He does come to grips with the problem. He wrestles with it. But he loses (pp. 34-36). A typology of national interest is surely essential before the concept can begin to be a meaningful basis for an analytic scheme. It is not enough to know that national interest is permanent but at the same time not immune to change; that it is difficult to identify; and that it is usually conceived in such general terms as to allow statesmen wide leeway in formulating specific steps in its implementation. Given all these ambiguities, would it not be better to dispense with the concept altogether and concentrate attention on the nature of the specific objectives which given types of leadership groups, in given types of societies, under varying (but specifiable) conditions are apt to pursue? One final observation seems in order: in the reviewer's judgment, the introduction of the "national interest" is not as essential to Professor Lerche's scheme as he apparently believes. Even though his model *seems* to be based on the concept, this prop could be removed without damaging the structure which he has so laboriously erected.

It is a pleasure to be almost unreservedly enthusiastic about any textbook. *Dynamics of International Relations* by Professors Haas and Whiting warrants such enthusiasm. The authors have apparently taken to heart Professor Quincy Wright's suggestion that "relations between powerful groups" appropriately describes the real subject matter of

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international relations[4] and have written a text which is squarely based on sociological concepts of groups and elites and their relations to state policy.

In addition to its theoretic portions, which will be discussed below, the book includes sections dealing with factors of power, methods of international relations, international law, and organization; and a most interesting attempt to establish a typology of foreign policy behavior on the basis of the social structures and institutions of selected countries. Among the many commendable qualities of the text one can single out the clarity of terms, the logical organization, and a refreshing willingness on the part of the authors to stick their necks out on some truly controversial issues.

The theoretical framework of the text consists of a number of propositions derived from political sociology: (1) international relations are not merely the relations of nations or states, since they include relations between groups other than states; (2) almost all state policies are the result of the aims of specific groups within the states; (3) within groups, it is the leaders (the elite) who exercise influence over state policies; (4) the constant and universal end of state policy is the security of the ruling group which defines and executes the policy of the state; and (5) policy consists both of formulating aims and of evaluating capacities to attain these aims.

While one can take exception to these propositions, they do have the merit of lending themselves to considerable refinement and, within limits, empirical investigation. Quite possibly the authors overargue their position. But perhaps that is necessary in a path-breaking effort.

The present text is so good that it is probably unfair to say that it might have been even better had it utilized more of the considerable contributions which other fields might make to the study of international relations. There exist (perhaps in too great abundance to permit intelligent selection by any single outsider) many potentially relevant concepts, theories, and data in the behavioral sciences which have not yet been fully tapped by specialists in international relations.[5] Having done so much to advance their field, one may hope that Professors Haas and Whiting, and others following their lead, will do even more by

[4] Quincy Wright, *The Study of International Relations*, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1955, p. 7.

[5] Two surveys in this field which merit the attention of international relations specialists are Mark A. May, *A Social Psychology of War and Peace*, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1943; and T. H. Pear, ed., *Psychological Factors of Peace and War*, New York, The Philosophical Library, 1950.

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attempting to make these additional materials accessible to their colleagues.

III

A review of these four texts emphasizes one pressing need: students of international relations should become more precise about the nature of the linkage between foreign policy and international relations. Professor Lerche is one of the few authors who have tried conscientiously to distinguish between the two topics, and so have Professors Ball and Killough. But they are in the minority among textbook writers.

One must start with the assumption that "foreign policy" and "international relations" are not identical (hence two different terms); although they are more often than not treated as if they were synonymous and many texts in international relations turn out to be texts on the making of foreign policy.

On the one hand, it can be said (and by implication this is what has been said by most authors) that whatever happens in "international relations" happens only in terms of—and is the result of—the behavior of the participants in the process. In the political field, this reasoning implies that the field of international politics is merely an extended version of the field of foreign policy, and that the difference, if any, lies in the generality of the propositions that are advanced.[6]

The assumption that international relations are a consequence of the behavior of participants obviously directs attention toward the analysis of that behavior. There can be no quarrel with such emphasis. It results in valuable contributions to knowledge about the institutions and processes of states, governments, and other groups within national societies. The only question is whether there are not also other approaches to the study of international relations which are worthy of exploration. For example, it is possible to argue that decisions of one

[6] To cite a concrete example: Haas and Whiting identify various factors which keep international violence from breaking out more frequently. These include ideological restraints, institutional restraints, and the unwillingness of domestic interest groups to resort to force because of fear that violence might be disadvantageous to them. "The restraints are self-imposed and self-administered; they do not originate from some outside power" (pp. 49-50). But is the outbreak of violence not also restrained by the relative capacities of participants and, even more to the point, by the operation of the balance-of-power process in international relations? (This process, incidentally, is neglected by several authors for obvious reasons: it does not fit very well into an analytic scheme which centers on state/group behavior.) Granted that the balance of power process does not operate autonomously, without being invoked by some group or groups. Might it not be argued, however, that its use is an inherent consequence of the real "dynamics" of international relations and of the nature of the environment in which these relations take place?

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group do not constitute an international "relationship" even if they are directed at other groups across national frontiers; that international *relations* take place *between* groups (or between individuals belonging to certain groups) when the policies of one, taken in pursuit of decisions, meet and interact with those of others. If this is a tenable proposition, then it should direct attention to the study of this interaction.[7]

One may suggest another possibility: that participants in international relations behave as they do because of the nature of the environment in which they operate (rather than that the environment is what it is because of the behavior of the participants). If this is a truism, it is surprising how often it is glossed over. The statement directs attention to certain dimensions of the subject which have in the past yielded revealing insights (the "security dilemma," the impact of the expectation of violence, etc.) and might do so again.[8]

IV

It remains to comment briefly on the fifth of the books here under review, *The Anglo-American Tradition in Foreign Affairs*, edited by Professors Arnold Wolfers and Laurence W. Martin. This is a book of selected readings rather than a text, and thus does not lend itself to comparative evaluation within the scope of this essay. It is nevertheless relevant to some of the questions raised above. The readings themselves are well chosen and the accompanying commentary is most helpful. For present purposes, however, the specific selections are less relevant than the underlying rationale of the book, which is stated in an admirably written introduction by Professor Wolfers. In this statement the author laments the reciprocal lack of knowledge and interest on the part of political theorists and specialists in international relations. Professor Wolfers believes that the area of ignorance can—and should—be narrowed; both because of growing skepticism about the possibility of

[7] See, for example, a review of an earlier international relations text in this journal: Harold Sprout, "In Defense of Diplomacy," I, No. 3 (April 1949), pp. 404-13). Professor Sprout's "tentative and fallible notions of the scope and structure of the field" of international relations included (in addition to points on objectives of foreign policy, motivations of statesmen, tools and techniques of statecraft, state capabilities, and regulatory mechanisms) an item on "Interstate relationships: What relationships arise from the simultaneous and often antagonistic efforts of states to attain their foreign policy objectives?" It would seem that this point has frequently been neglected.

[8] Frederick S. Dunn, in "The Scope of International Relations," *World Politics*, I, No. 1 (October 1948), pp. 142-46, points out that knowledge of international relations is not merely the extension of knowledge of domestic relations to a wider field but has important unique elements due to the nature of the environment in which international relationships take place.

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making the study of international relations a purely empirical enterprise, and also because of a renewed appreciation of the importance of value preferences and philosophical assumptions about man as starting points for investigation. More than thirty years ago, Graham Wallas, an early student of the psychology of politics, recognized that "The student of politics must, consciously or unconsciously, form a conception of human nature, and the less conscious he is of his conception the more likely he is to be dominated by it."[9]

Professor Wolfers presents a strong argument for a philosophical underpinning of the study of international relations, and it would be regrettable if the opportunity to broaden one's grasp of the subject were not fully utilized when a means for doing so has been so conveniently placed at our disposal. It would, however, be equally regrettable if proponents of either philosophical speculation or empirical investigation were to create a controversy where none needs to exist. This was doubtlessly not Professor Wolfers' intent. On the contrary, his critique of certain present trends in international relations research will serve a useful purpose if it leads advocates of the more rigorous techniques to re-examine their position carefully.

V

Even after the publication of several new surveys of international relations, the field obviously still lacks a generally accepted theory and a generally agreed-upon organization of materials. Of the texts here under review, it seems clear that those by Lerche and Haas-Whiting approach a unified framework of inquiry more closely than those by Ball-Killough and Mills-McLaughlin. This does not mean that the latter two books lack merit, but rather that their contribution lies in the different area of providing the data on which theory must be based. Professor Lerche explicitly attempts to establish a theoretic framework in traditional terms; while Professors Haas and Whiting have drawn freely on another discipline, where there has been great emphasis on model-building and precise investigation. The Wolfers-Martin readings provide a useful caution-signal that, in the attempt to create an empirical discipline, the important aspects of our subject which lie outside the realm of precise measurement must not be neglected.

If it is desirable to erect a theoretic framework of some sort, it seems clear that certain approaches are less apt than others to lead

[9] Graham Wallas, *Human Nature in Politics*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1921, p. 38.

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toward that goal. Major emphasis on current events does not appear suitable for the task at hand. One must also have reservations about lengthy discussions of the foreign policies of individual states in international relations texts, unless such discussions are presented as case studies in support of general propositions. The great emphasis on international law and organization in many introductory texts is also of questionable merit. Overemphasis of these subjects can easily lead to the impression that legal/organizational methods suffice to render the explosive stuff of international relations harmless.

The study of international relations, in its present stage, needs the *integration* of existing evidence from various fields, not random *accumulation* of more and more facts. What, then, are the specific directions in which progress can be sought? A number of possibilities suggest themselves. A combination of the Haas-Whiting approach with a thorough examination of other approaches from other disciplines is bound to reveal new and exciting aspects of the field. It would also be useful to compare and add to the theoretic frameworks that exist.[10] A full debate of certain key points on which prominent authors differ would help to introduce added clarity. For example, who is the most important participant in international political relations: the state, or groups and elites within states? Is power an end in itself, a means to an end, or merely an ingredient of means? Can "national interest" be made sufficiently concrete to serve as a useful concept for systematic inquiry? What is really meant by "international politics" and "international relations" and other key terms which are now used fairly loosely; and what are the relationships between the general field and the narrower study of foreign policy?

Such an agenda provides for not just one but a number of "great debates" which can only be conducive to a healthy development of the study of international relations.

[10] The new texts by Professors Hartmann and Van Dyke (see note 1) organize their subject within theoretic schemes and thus lend themselves to comparative analysis with the books by Professors Lerche, Morgenthau, Haas-Whiting, and others.

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MORE ABOUT LIMITED WAR

By BERNARD BRODIE

Rear Admiral Sir Anthony W. Buzzard, RN (Ret.), *et al., On Limiting Atomic War*, London and New York, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956, 46 pp. 50 cents.

Robert E. Osgood, *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1957, 315 pp. $5.00.

P. M. S. Blackett, *Atomic Weapons and East-West Relations*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1956, 107 pp. $2.00.

WHEN the United States found the way to make a thermonuclear weapon small enough to be carried in an aircraft and inexpensive enough to permit its being made in substantial numbers, a number of specific ideas were bound to occur to those who knew of the American achievement. First was the thought that what the United States could do, the Soviet Union could also do, and probably rather soon. A slightly more sophisticated but still irrepressible thought was that so vast an increase in the power of the weapon advanced decisively the already tremendous advantage which the first atomic bombs gave to the offense over the defense in strategic bombing. A third consideration which at this point entered the mind, if it was not shut out by bias, was that a large-scale *mutual* exchange of thermonuclear weapons on cities reduced war to a suicidal absurdity. It is almost impossibly difficult to imagine a set of positive national objectives that could be realized through such a war even by the side that was "victorious" (the quotation marks so frequently put round the word merely call attention to the need to reexamine its meaning). The threat to wage such a war would still have to be used as a "deterrent," but few things could be so protected if the threat was to be convincing.

From this stage of thinking various further refinements (and thus divergences) of thought became possible, depending on one's imagination, information, degree of involvement in strategic thinking or planning, and extent of commitment to certain institutional preconceptions. Also certain ideas became possible during and following the Korean War which would have appeared as hopelessly aberrant without that experience. The Korean War demolished the basis for the glib axiom that all modern wars must be total, and demonstrated conspicuously some of the major constraints necessary to keeping a war limited—above all, willingness to settle for goals representing a considerable degree

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of compromise with the enemy, and thus readiness to keep contact with him and to enter into and maintain negotiations with him.

The fact that we were ideologically unprepared for such an experience is probably the chief reason we did not accomplish a great deal more with the strength we committed to it. Certainly it was a cardinal error—having almost nothing to do with whether or not we wanted to keep the war limited—to abandon offensive pressure at the very moment that a retreating enemy showed a willingness to enter into armistice negotiations. We paid bitterly for that error in the prolongation of negotiations, in the terms of settlement and, above all, in the disillusionment and distaste which the American people were permitted to develop as the main emotional residue of their experience with limited war. Nevertheless, thoughtful people were taught much about war from Korea, which enabled them also to view in a new light such earlier experiences as the Berlin airlift and our involvement in the Greek civil war.

But one may ask why serious thinking about limited war had to await the coming of the thermonuclear bomb. Why was not the ordinary Hiroshima-type atomic bomb enough? One reason has already been hinted at above. Fission bombs were limited enough in power to make it appear necessary to use fairly large numbers of them in order to achieve decisive results, at least against a country as large as the United States or the Soviet Union. The requirement for delivery of large numbers made it in turn possible to visualize a meaningful even if hardly satisfactory air defense, both active and passive. One could still think in terms of a struggle for command of the air in the old Douhet sense. Perhaps such ideas were illusory; possibly the feeling that the H-bomb was distinctively new and significantly different from the A-bomb argued merely an underestimation of the A-bomb. But when one has to confront a basic change in circumstances, it helps if it is unequivocal. It is, after all, enormously difficult even now to think through the various ramifications of the idea of limited war, and many if not most political and military leaders are still unconvinced that one ought to make the attempt.

Anyway, this reviewer can think of no one who seriously advocated exploration of limited-war techniques prior to the coming of the H-bomb. A few military writers, like Major Hoffman Nickerson, Major General J. F. C. Fuller, and Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, exhibited well before World War II considerable distaste for the modern style of total and orgiastic wars. These writers expressed an abhorrence of mass

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armies, which to their minds signified an abandonment of controls and of rational direction; but one got the feeling that what troubled them most was the attendant suppression of the element of *art* in war and in strategy. Liddell Hart, to be sure, in his *Revolution in Warfare*, published in 1946, specifically tied his appeal for a return to limited war to the existence of atomic weapons. "Warfare as we have known it in the last thirty years is not compatible with the atomic age" (p. 98). And again: "The problem, like a coin, has two sides—'head' is the prevention of war, but the 'tail' is the limitation of war. If experience has taught us anything, we should now be capable of realizing the danger of concentrating exclusively on the perfectionist policy of preventing war, while neglecting the practical necessity, if that policy fails, of limiting war—so that it does not destroy the prospects of subsequent peace" (p. 109).

We must also remember the contributions of those historians and sociologists who explored and elucidated the conditions of limited war in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the development of the concept of total war in the twentieth. One thinks especially of those papers by Dr. Hans Speier which were gathered together in Part III of his *Social Order and the Risks of War*, published in 1952. Most of these papers were originally published years earlier, well before the atomic era; they were contributions to historical and sociological scholarship and not intended to be policy-oriented. Quite different, of course, was his paper, "War and Peace," presented in December 1953 as part of the Columbia University Bicentennial Broadcast Lectures. Also, the distinguished book by Professor John U. Nef, *War and Human Progress: An Essay on the Rise of Industrial Civilization*, published in 1950, examined the cultural and moral as well as the material restraints upon war in the past; but concerning the present and future the author simply threw up his hands.

In using the term "limited war" today, we are not talking about a return to something. We are talking about something quite new. If wars were limited in ages past, the reasons why they were so have on the whole little relevance for us today. Apart from the existence of moral and religious scruples, wars were kept limited by the small margin of the national economic resources available for mobilization, as well as by the relatively small capabilities for destruction that could be purchased with those narrow margins. Today, on the contrary, we speak of limited war in a sense that connotes a deliberate hobbling of a tremendous power that is already mobilized and that must *in any*

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case be maintained at a very high pitch of effectiveness—for the sake only of inducing the enemy to hobble himself to like degree. No problem like this one has ever presented itself before. The problem of modern limited war is the problem of sanctions for keeping out of action, even though in being, precisely those instruments which from a strictly military point of view are the most efficient.

Thinking ahead is an unnatural phenomenon. The first real thermonuclear explosion occurred at Eniwetok on November 7, 1952 (it was not actually described in an official release until more than a year later), but even scientifically trained people who presumably knew for months ahead what was likely to happen were stunned by what did happen. The same was true of the first Soviet thermonuclear explosion, which took place distressingly soon thereafter. Few persons seemed willing to think about the long-run implications of a Soviet capability until that capability was an existing reality. Until then, a plea for the study of limited war as something that might have relevance to future contingencies was likely to fall on uncomprehending ears, if not hostile ones.

Concerning the opposition, let us acknowledge some facts that must remain of supreme importance to the future environment of thinking about limited war. General MacArthur's remark following his dismissal that "There is no substitute for victory" reflects a bias endemic in all the armed services which works against any use of restraint upon one's strength during wartime. However, important elements within the Army especially are beginning to see that their own service might have no function at all to perform in a total war. In such a war the Navy would also be without its *traditional* function, which is the exercise of command of the sea, though it might participate in strategic bombing through its carrier-borne aircraft or submarine-launched missiles. Members of the Air Force, however, know that a total war would be primarily theirs to fight, and most airmen feel confident that it would be exclusively theirs. A limited war, on the contrary, seems to throw the Air Force back into the distasteful role of "support to the ground forces."

Air Force officers have been reared on the philosophy of the predominance of strategic bombing. Although that philosophy did not fare as well in World War II as followers of Douhet had hoped, it received at the end of that war a tremendous, though gratuitous, boost from the atomic bomb, which to almost any unbiased observer seemed to quell all the previous arguments about the ineffectiveness of strategic bomb-

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ing. Strategic air doctrine was riding high, when suddenly it began to be bruited about that perhaps atomic and especially thermonuclear weapons made strategic bombing *too* effective, too tremendously destructive to be released under any but the ultimate challenge. The idea could hardly be congenial to the service that had but lately won not only its right to an independent mission, but also the position of most-favored-service in the allocation of the defense budget. And let it be said, too, that in an era when peacetime defense budgets amount to around 35 or 40 billions of dollars, the argument that the thermonuclear bomb can do everything—and that nothing is likely to be done or should be done without it—carries a tremendous political appeal in the name of economy!

These attitudes represent one important reason for the strong official resistance to the new thinking about limited war—thinking that began to pour out in the form of books and articles in this country and the United Kingdom beginning late in 1954. Among the relevant authors whose articles appeared in this country about that time are Henry A. Kissinger, Richard S. Leghorn, and the present reviewer. A noteworthy contribution was the book, *Military Policy and National Security* (1956), edited by W. W. Kaufmann, which contained pertinent chapters by the editor especially and also by Roger Hilsman and Klaus Knorr. Various classified papers in the same field antedated any of the published articles referred to above—some, by the present reviewer, being circulated early in 1942, when the thermonuclear weapon was known to be in the offing but had not yet been tested. In the United Kingdom, the name of Rear Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard has achieved special prominence, partly because he made popular the phrase "graduated deterrence," and also because he has become the leading figure in a political and intellectual movement to win official attention for his views.

Another important reason why official resistance to limited-war thinking is bound to continue high is that there remain some extremely knotty problems in existing concepts of limited war. Some of these problems will be exposed in the discussion of the new items reviewed below.

The first such item, published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, is a pamphlet entitled *On Limiting Atomic War*. An introductory note explains that the paper "springs from a number of discussions held during the summer of 1956" by Rear Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard, Professor P. M. S. Blackett, Mr. Denis Healey, M.P., and Mr. Richard Goold-Adams.

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None of the basic arguments for the desirability and practicability of attempting to limit war that are presented here is distinctively new, but this reviewer knows no other place where they are more lucidly and concisely stated. However, one distinctive feature of the problem is indicated in the title, which emphasizes the limiting of *atomic* war. Although some writers have been content to leave it an open question whether or not limited war must in practice be synonymous with non-atomic war, the authors of the present pamphlet make a special point of insisting upon the use of nuclear weapons even in limited wars. They feel that limitations that kept out nuclear weapons would excessively advantage the Soviet bloc. In our own country, Dr. Kissinger is identified with a similar view.

However, the use of any kind of nuclear weapon greatly increases the difficulties in the way of maintaining limitations. For one thing, it is much easier for an observer to distinguish between use and non-use of nuclear weapons than between the use of, say, a 10-kiloton atomic weapon and a weapon two or three times as large. If there are going to be sanctions against violations, the violations must be unequivocal. In trying to maintain limitations, as the authors agree, "the need for simplicity is paramount" (p. 28). They do not attempt to solve these difficulties except to say that "there is certainly no reason for supposing that distinctions between tactical and strategic weapons, and their use, cannot be worked out in theory, even though an arbitrary line might have to be taken between the several different factors involved" (p. 28). And, on the same page: "The broad object is certainly clear enough. This must be to spare from mass destruction as many civilians as possible, without unduly upsetting the relative military situation either in favour of the Communist Powers, whose possible aggression must be effectively deterred, or in favour of the West."

The authors stress the fact that such distinctions must be established well in advance of any crisis in which they are supposed to apply. And the nice balancing they are calling for would seem to necessitate explicit rather than implicit international understandings. We offer as the understatement of the year the observation that such agreement is not going to be easy to get.[1] In this connection, it is well to clarify one fact that

[1] My colleague, Dr. Oleg Hoeffding, has called my attention to, and translated for me, the opening paragraph of a review of the above-described RIIA pamphlet in the Soviet foreign affairs monthly, *Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn'* [International Life], No. 3 (1957):

"Let us imagine that a murderer is addressing his victim as follows: 'Look, here I have an enormous, heavy Mauser, and here a pretty little Browning. Don't fret, I'm not going to shoot you with the clumsy Mauser, I prefer to use the elegant little

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seems to be considerably confused not only in the lay mind but also in the minds of scientists and professional military people. One frequently encounters references to "tactical" nuclear weapons as distinct from "strategic" ones, the implication being that the former are of small yield and the latter large. But there is no military reason why tactical weapons should be small. Usually, where a small weapon is good, a larger one is better; and the delivery of the latter is likely to be about as feasible and not much more expensive. There is little if any inherent reason why the larger one cannot be as accurately aimed, and a large bomb exploding at some distance from one's own troops (if there are any in the area) is not necessarily a greater hazard to them than a smaller bomb exploding close. At least, these remarks hold for a very wide range of yields, and since our authors emphasize that they want to use only the smallest atomic bombs (p. 27), they are talking about a restriction which will have to be arbitrarily imposed rather than one for which the users will have an automatic preference.

Finally, it must be asked why one is justified in ruling out non-use of such weapons if one is also insisting on using only the smallest nuclear weapons. Especially since our authors recognize that as a possible battleground Europe "presents a special case" (p. 29)—i.e., an area where any restrictions may be exceptionally difficult to apply—it is hard to see why the West, with its much greater economic resources than the Soviet bloc, is *inherently* at a disadvantage in other areas of the world in any kind of combat, atomic or non-atomic. The authors talk about the presumed greater deterrent effect of readiness to use atomic weapons; but since we are *not* considering a unilateral use (or, if we are, we should make clear the circumstances under which we would expect to get away with it), it would seem that readiness to intervene is of more importance as a deterrent than the choice of weapons. And it is by no means obvious that our readiness to intervene will in most cases be greater if we are expecting two-way nuclear hostilities rather than the non-nuclear variety. One must also take into account the preferences of the people whom we will presumably be defending against aggression, for however "peripheral" a war may be to the areas *we* regard as of central importance, the places we find ourselves fighting over are not going to be uninhabited. It would be, to say the least, diplomatically embarrassing to have to intervene without the express invita-

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Browning. . . .' This kind of speech has lately been addressed to the public by the propagandists of atomic war. . . ."

The review is entitled "The big lie about 'little' atomic wars."

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tion and perhaps against the wishes of the people whom we would claim to be supporting. But they are not likely to want nuclear weapons falling about their homes.

The book by Professor Osgood, entitled *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy*, is a different sort of effort. Although the pamphlet just described is avowedly a political tract, the Osgood book identifies itself as a scholarly work bringing "theoretical and historical insights to bear" on the current problem, on which the author, however, does not refrain from taking a position. The project of writing the first comprehensive book in the field provided a splendid opportunity, and the author must be congratulated on having seized it. And let us say at once that the effort is impressive. The subject matter covered is appropriate to the objective, and it is well handled. Professor Osgood consistently produces observations and conclusions that strike this reviewer as sound, and often incisive. And yet, perhaps because the opportunity was so great, the realization of it leaves one dissatisfied that it was not handled even better.

To mention less important things first, the author's style suffers from a certain prolixity—or possibly it is only discursiveness. But this point would not even be worth mentioning if Professor Osgood's book really made its mark in terms of scholarship. The author surveys the material of each chapter as though he were almost the first arrival on the terrain. A conspicuous though not unique illustration is provided in the chapter called "The Communist Approach to War," where the author, who makes no claim to being a specialist on Russia, mentions in the thirteen footnotes for the chapter only two monographs dealing directly with the Soviet Union, plus two or three articles; yet he manages to cite also Volumes VIII and XX of Lenin's *Selected Works* as well as the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*!

Among the several thoughts provoked in this reviewer by such handling of the literature, one is that the author shows excessive disdain for the better specimens among what scholarly usage unfortunately terms "secondary works." Also, it happens that Lenin's *Selected Works*, published in New York in 1943 and 1945 (not in 1936-38, as the author indicates), run to twelve volumes, so that the use of a Vol. XX suggests that the author is really referring to Lenin's *Collected Works*. On the other hand, the latter, which began to be published in New York in 1929, does not yet contain a Vol. VIII.

The third item before us is by P. M. S. Blackett, the distinguished scientist who wrote the book published in the United Kingdom as

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Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy (1948) and in this country as *Fear, War, and the Bomb*. This earlier work attempted to prove that the atomic bomb was much overrated as a strategic weapon, and, considering that the Soviet Union had no atomic capability at that time, it was difficult to escape the feeling that the author's conclusions were much affected by his obvious pro-Soviet bias.

The present work is of a quite different character. It contains only three chapters, which follow closely the three Lees Knowles lectures on military science given by the author at Cambridge University in the spring of 1956. Of these, the most notable and useful is the first, in which Professor Blackett surveys the opinions of others who have recently written on the subject of limited war. He is also interested in the merits, if any, of British and American official pronouncements on military doctrine. The pages in which he reviews official policy, explicit and implied, are probably the most valuable in the book.

Professor Blackett's arguments in this first chapter are tightly reasoned, devastatingly logical, and simply and lucidly put. And his criticism of other writers in the field is incisive and wholly just, even if sometimes merciless. The other two chapters, in which he reviews the atomic arms race during the first decade of the atomic era, and also the prospects of reaching an accord with the Soviet Union, are of another quality. Although his pro-Soviet bias seems to have been very much attenuated since his earlier book, he still sounds least impressive when he is discussing the Soviet Union and its alleged motivations.

One idea on which the entire book is based, and which tends to be implied in a good deal of the literature in the field, needs, however, to be examined. It is the now-familiar one that, to use Blackett's words, "all-out total war between East and West is highly unlikely" (p. 5). In the very next paragraph, Blackett permits himself to use the word "abolished." This has come about, he says, because of the "strategic atomic stalemate" which he considers to be "already in existence" (*ibid.*).

Now total war with thermonuclear weapons may well be "highly unlikely" over some definite period of time, for reasons which are by now generally recognized. On the other hand, it is wrong and dangerous to assume that we already enjoy now and will enjoy in perpetuity a guarantee against such a war. On the contrary, as the authors of the Royal Institute pamphlet indirectly point out, one of the reasons why it is necessary to push for greater official interest in limited war techniques is that it would help to unwind the complex of existing attitudes

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and preparations that constitute a trigger-action waiting to propel us into total war on suitable provocation.

Although "suitable provocation" may mean different things to different people, its minimum meaning for many intelligent as well as politically important people is for some time going to include more than simply direct attack upon ourselves. The special character of Europe has already been noted. It is possible to conceive of alternatives to "massive retaliation" as the primary means for defending Europe, but no alternative has yet been suggested which appeals to the civilian and military leaders of the several nations involved.

Finally, certain precautions still have to be taken concerning total war in order to reduce critically the chances that it will occur. Some of these precautions may be quite costly. For example, if the Soviet leaders should ever decide that by a surprise attack they could confidently count on destroying our strategic air force, whose very purpose it is constantly to threaten their existence, it would be their duty as good Bolsheviks to launch that attack. And far from preventing them from forming such an opinion, the existence of thermonuclear weapons is the chief stimulus to their entertaining the idea! Professor Blackett considers, and of course dismisses, preventive war initiated by us; but we must see to it also that the prospects for a preventive war never look good to the other side either. Professor Blackett's assumption—which seems to be also that of the other authors we have considered—that that essential objective is achieved automatically is almost certainly wrong. It may in fact require a good deal more money to guarantee the security-on-the-ground of our Strategic Air Command, as opposed to its strictly offensive power, than we have thus far seen fit to spend for that purpose.

It remains, in other words, an unfortunate fact that while total war is the one kind of war we cannot afford to have, it nevertheless must continue to claim, indefinitely, a first-priority call upon our resources. It is not clear that we are already in the position where we can afford to cut back on the scale of resources we have so far been allocating to it. On the other hand, that is no reason for refraining from intellectual preparation—and preferably planning as well—for other kinds of military containment of aggression, such as we are much more likely to have to use. New ways of thinking always have at least the merit of being cheap, though one would not think so from the general reluctance to engage in them.

How much extra it will cost us to prepare a limited-war capability in addition to the minimal one we must have for total war is something

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we cannot really know until there is a good deal more study of the relevant problems. No doubt economies are possible in areas of defense expenditure which would seem to have little pertinence *either* to a limited war or to a modern total war. A really objective tri-service examination of our defense needs, if we could ever have one, would certainly expose such areas. Meanwhile it is useful, though sobering, to have Professor Osgood remind us that we have not yet begun to push the limits of what we can afford for our security.

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THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER IN AMERICAN SOCIETY

By TALCOTT PARSONS

C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1956, 423 pp. $6.00.

I

IT has been remarked that it is relatively rare, in the United States at least, for social scientists to attempt interpretive analyses of major aspects of the total society in which they live. This is particularly true of sociologists,[1] unlike economists, who have made notable attempts in recent years to interpret their societies—for example, Schumpeter's *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* and Galbraith's *American Capitalism*. If for this reason alone, the present book of Professor Mills, which must be understood as one of a series as yet far from complete, would be worthy of serious attention.

In the nature of the case, to produce such a study is a very difficult enterprise. However operationally useful precise data may be—and Mr. Mills makes copious and, with some exceptions, relatively good use of them—they cannot suffice for a full empirical grounding of interpretive conclusions, not only because on their own level they are fragmentary and incomplete, but because many of the crucial empirical questions arise on a level at which available operational procedures are not of much or any use. This is not in the least to say that observation is not feasible, but rather that it cannot be precise observation in the usual operational sense.

I am referring to questions of the type which are central to Mr. Mills' argument, as to whether and in what sense a relatively small group of the occupants of "command posts" in the society has acquired a paramount position of power, as to whether the relative power of such a group has greatly increased in the last twenty years, as to how unified such a group is, and the like.

There are technical ways of reducing the element of arbitrariness in such judgments and protecting them against at least the grosser sorts of ideological distortion. Checking against all the available precise data

[1] The main exception here is Robin M. Williams' excellent *American Society* (New York, 1951), which has received far less general attention than it deserves, perhaps because of its somewhat textbookish orientation.

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is one such method; viewing the problem from the perspective given by wide and deep knowledge, not only of our own society but of others, is another. But I think the most important is exercising control through the use of a relatively well-integrated and technical theoretical scheme. Undertaking as a professional sociologist to review Mr. Mills' book, I am motivated largely by the opportunity to test some of his main conclusions against expectations derived from a type of technical theory that is at best only partially shared by the author of the book. In these terms I wish to take serious issue with Mr. Mills' position on a number of very important points and to outline an alternative interpretation of what I take to be the salient facts of the situation. There are some points at which I differ from Mills on simple questions of fact, but for the most part my criticisms will deal with empirical generalizations and their theoretical background.[2] These generalizations concern not only the facts he chooses to state and emphasize but others he omits or treats as unimportant.

What is the gist of Mills' argument? I am able here to give only a very brief summary. The reader should not depend on this review alone for his information about the contents of the book itself, but should go directly to Mills' own statement of his case.

Mills' central theme is the contention—in contrast to what he refers to as the traditional view of the political pluralism of American society—that there has developed to an unprecedented degree in the last generation or so a concentration of power in the hands of a small, relatively tightly integrated group of people. These are defined as the people occupying the institutional "command posts" of the society, the places where the decisions are made that have the greatest immediate and direct influence on the course of events in the society and on the shaping of its future and that of the rest of the world, so far as that future is dependent on what happens in the United States. Mills argues that the power of this group has grown disproportionately to the growth in size and power of the society as a whole.

The "command posts" in question are centered in large-scale organizations, which are certainly a prominent feature of American society. The power elite are in general those who occupy the decision-making positions in these large organizations. Mills identifies these in only two basic areas, business and government—although for his purposes the

[2] Mr. Mills is clearly writing only partly for an audience of technical social scientists. Though my own argument will be largely based on considerations of technical theory, I shall not introduce explicit justification of my theoretical judgments into this review, but will try to state my case in relatively non-technical terms.

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field of government is subdivided into the military and the political sectors; indeed, he almost tends to treat the military as independent of the rest of government. He clearly is thinking of the centralized type of organization where a few "top executives" exercise the main immediate decision-making power, in contrast to the democratic association with a somewhat more decentralized structure of authority and influence. It seems to be largely on this ground that he contends that the executive branch of the federal government has gained a pronounced ascendancy over the legislative. He relegates Congress—even the most influential group of Senators—to what he calls the "middle level" of the power structure; such people do not belong to the "power elite."

Mills broadly identifies the power elite with the "upper class." But he does not agree with Lloyd Warner and his group that the primary element of this upper class is a hereditary group of families or lineages; its position clearly depends on occupational status, though there is also emphasis on the importance within it of the "very rich," the majority of whom have inherited their wealth. Contrary to most sociological usage, Mills restricts the term "class" to an economic meaning, so that by "upper class" he means, essentially, the rich. But this still leaves open the question of the substantive relations between inherited and newly acquired wealth, family status relatively independent of at least very large wealth, occupational status within various income ranges, and similar problems.

Generally, Mills is rather vague on the relations between the power elite and other elements which in some sense enjoy rather high prestige. He emphasizes the prominence of lawyers among the "political directorate," but there is no clear analysis of the role of professional groups in the occupational structure generally; one presumes that except for a few lawyers who are successful in politics or business, and perhaps some engineers, professional people do not belong to the power elite. Similarly he emphasizes that members of the power elite have more than the average amount of education, and in particular he stresses the proportion who have been to select private schools and to "Ivy League" colleges. In general, he is greatly concerned about the fact that the power elite are not "representative" of the population as a whole in the sense of constituting a random sample by socio-economic origin, by education, by ethnic group, etc. This is a point to which I shall return.

Neither the "higher circles" generally nor the component of the "very rich" (Mills' term) are a leisure class in Veblen's sense; many, if not most of them, "work" in various fields of business and financial

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management. Furthermore, the processes of recruitment are about what social scientists have come to expect. Mills does not give any exact criteria for what he considers to be "upper class" as a category of social origin, but I have the impression that he puts the line somewhat lower than most sociologists would. But, however that may be, it is clear that there is a considerable element of stability from generation to generation in the higher-status groups in American society. Thus if, to employ a pattern used by Mills, we take a group of prominent persons, the family origin of from two-thirds to three-fourths of them will be the upper third of the American status structure. It is not these essential facts but the interpretation placed upon them which raises questions for us. The only point of fact I would question is whether the recruitment of the very rich has shown a sharper increase through the process of inheritance than through self-earning. It is possible that this is so, but I am inclined to doubt it, and in any case their position does not depend only on the process which Mills calls "cumulative advantage."

Mills radically denies that the group he calls the "very rich" and the "corporate rich" are distinct "classes," in his sense. He explicitly lumps them together and on the whole gives the very rich a greater position of influence than they are usually accorded or than, I think, they actually enjoy. This is in line with his thesis that there is a single, unified power elite. Clearly, it is his contention that the base of the (business) group as a whole lies in command of the very large business enterprises—somewhat erroneously, or at least ambiguously, he puts the primary emphasis on control of property in accounting for this power.

Of the three main subgroups, Mills treats the "political directorate" as by far the weakest. It has, according to him, been greatly infiltrated by the business element, so that it can scarcely be treated as independent. Hence virtually the only element independent of what might be called the business oligarchy is the military—and this, he holds, is coming increasingly to fuse with the business group, or at least to form a close community of interest with it.

The pluralistic components of our older political traditions, Mills feels, are rooted primarily in local groupings—partly, of course, through the constitutional provisions which establish federalism and make Congressional representation dependent on local constituencies. But the operations of the big organizations have become national in scope, and often international. Hence structures rooted in localism have simply been pushed into a secondary position.

But at the same time Mills contends that the structural base of au-

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thentic localism has been progressively atrophied through the development of what he calls the "mass society." The most conspicuous phenomena of the mass society are the prevalence and characteristics of the media of mass communication, which tend to serve as instruments of the power elite out of the reach of locally based "publics" and influential elements in them. The theory of the mass society is only very sketchily presented in one chapter near the end of the book, but is clearly meant to provide one of the main components of the total picture of American society which Mills is presenting.

In terms of recent history, one of Mills' main contentions is that the New Deal period did not represent a turning point in social development, but rather a superficial flurry which only momentarily disturbed the process of emergence of the power elite and the dominance of the business contingent within it. Thus Mills speaks of the economic elite as in due course coming "to control and to use for their own purposes the New Deal institutions whose creation they had so bitterly denounced" (pp. 272-73).

Mills repeatedly disavows any intention of presenting a "conspiratorial" interpretation of American social and political development. He stresses the institutional positions occupied by his elite rather than their personalities and conspiratorial activities. Nevertheless he often comes very close to this implication because of his special theory that a peculiar irresponsibility attaches to the elite and their actions. By this he seems to mean the absence or relative ineffectiveness of formal legal restraints or of a system of "checks and balances" of the sort which has traditionally been associated with our political system. His contention thus is that the power elite has been freed from the historic restraints of our society and uses its power in terms of what he calls a "higher immorality"—a conception which is not very clearly explained.

Finally, it should be mentioned that in this, as in some of his previous writings, Mills' general tone toward both men and institutions is sharply caustic. *The Power Elite* certainly purports to be an exposition and an explanation of what has been happening in American society, but it is equally an indictment. There is no pretense of even trying to maintain a scientific neutrality; the book is a fiery and sarcastic attack on the pretensions of the "higher circles" in America either to competence in exercise of their responsibilities or to moral legitimation of their position. In such a case, the critic must ascertain the moral position from which the indictment is formulated; I shall have something to say about this later. In his combination of often insightful exposition and analysis,

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empirical one-sidedness and distortion, and moral indictment and sarcasm, Mills reminds one more of Veblen than of any other figure; that he has attained the stature of Veblen I question, but the role he is cutting out for himself is similar.

II

As I have said, the Mills analysis presents what, to me, is a subtle and complex combination of acceptable and unacceptable elements. Let me now attempt, at some of the most important points, to unravel these elements from each other. I want to try this first on the level of empirical generalization and then to raise one or two more strictly theoretical problems. I shall do so more in my own terms than in those employed by Mills.

In my opinion, two salient sets of processes have been going on in American society during the past half-century, the combination of which encompasses the main facts which are essential to our problem. The first of these is the dynamic of a maturing industrial society, including not only the highly industrialized economy itself but its setting in the society as a whole—notably, its political system and class structure (in a wider sense of the term "class" than Mills')—and the repercussions of the industrial development on the rest of the society. The second concerns the altered position of the United States in world society, which is a consequence in part of our own economic growth, in part of a variety of exogenous changes, including the relative decline of the Western European powers, the rise of Soviet Russia, and the break-up of the "colonial" organization of much of the non-white world. The enormous enhancement of American power and responsibility in the world has taken place in a relatively short time and was bound to have profound repercussions on the characteristics of our own society. Our old political isolation has disappeared and given way to the deepest of involvements.

My first thesis is that these two processes *both* work in the direction of increasing the relative importance of government in our society and, with it, of political power. But their impact has been all the greater because of the extent to which the United States has been an almost specifically non-political society. This has been evidenced above all in the institutions and tradition of political decentralization already mentioned, one aspect of which is the localism which Mills discusses. A second, however, has been a cultural tradition which has emphasized economic values—an emphasis on enterprise and production in an activist sense, not a merely passive hedonistic valuation of the enjoy-

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ment of material well-being. Moreover, the virtually unimpeded process of settlement of a continent in political isolation from the main system of world powers has favored maintenance of this emphasis to a greater extent than would otherwise have readily been possible.

At some points in his discussion, Mills seems to look back to the Jeffersonian picture of a system of economic production consisting mainly of small farmers and artisans, with presumably a small mercantile class mediating between them and consumers. Clearly this is not a situation compatible with high industrial development, in either of two respects. First, the order of decentralization of production where the standard unit is a family-size one is incompatible with either the organization or the technology necessary for high industrialism. Second, the "Jeffersonian" economy is not one in which economic production is differentiated from other social functions in specialized organizations; instead, the typical productive unit is at the same time a kinship unit and a unit of citizenship in the community.[3]

In all salient respects, the modern economy has moved very far from the Jeffersonian ideal. The pace-setting units have become both large and specialized. Their development has been part of a general process of structural differentiation in the society which has led to greater specialization in many fields. An essential aspect of the process of development of the economy as a system in *both* these senses is greater specialization on at least three levels: first, the specialization of organizations in the functions of economic production as distinguished from other functions; second, the specialization of functions within the economy; and third, the specialization of the roles of classes of individuals within the organization.

Leadership is an essential function in all social systems, which with their increase of scale and their functional differentiation tend to become more specialized. I think we can, within considerable limits, regard the emergence of the large firm with operations on a nation-wide basis as a "normal" outcome of the process of growth and differentiation of the economy. Similarly, the rise to prominence within the firm of specialized executive functions is also a normal outcome of a process of growth in size and in structural differentiation. The question then arises whether the process of concentration of firms, and of executive power within firms, has "gone too far" because it has been greatly

[3] How far this "Jeffersonianism" thus represents the moral position from which Mills launches his indictment is a question I will discuss at the end of the article. It provides a convenient reference point in terms of contrast both for Mills' characterization of the current society and for my own very different one.

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influenced by factors extraneous to the process of economic development itself.

Mills makes the assertion that the size of the large firm has exceeded the limits of economic efficiency. He presents no evidence, and I think most competent persons would regard this as an exceedingly difficult question. There is, however, one line of evidence not cited by Mills which has a bearing on it. It is true that the absolute size of firms has steadily increased—General Motors today is larger than any firm of the 1920's. But the *relative* share of the largest firms in the production of the economy has remained essentially stable for more than a generation, a fact which points to some kind of equilibrium condition with respect to the degree of concentration in the system as a whole.

A cognate question is whether the power of the executive or managerial class within industry, and particularly within the large firms, has increased inordinately, which if true would indicate that factors other than the functional needs of the productive process were operating to skew the internal power structure of firms in favor of the executive groups.

Generally speaking, Mills' argument is that the power of the very rich and the corporate rich *within* the economy is inordinately great and, by virtue of the factor of cumulative advantage, is becoming continually greater. At the very least, I think it can be said that his case is not proved and that there is equally good, if not better, evidence for an alternative view, particularly with reference to the trend.

First, I am not able to accept Mills' close identification of the very rich (i.e., the holders of "great fortunes") with the "corporate rich" (the primary holders of executive power in business organizations) as a single class in any very useful sense. Certainly, in the "heroic age" of American capitalism, from the Civil War to just after the turn of the century, the dominant figures were the entrepreneurs who, mainly as the founders of great enterprises and as the bankers and promoters concerned with mergers and reorganizations and the like, came to control these great organizations. But the dominant sociological fact of the outcome of that era was that these owning groups did not, as a group, succeed in consolidating their position precisely *within* their own enterprises and in the economy. It is a notorious fact that the *very* large enterprise still largely under family control through property holdings is much more the exception than the rule. Instead, the control has passed—by no means fully, but for the most part—to professional career executives, who have not reached their positions through the exercise

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of *property* rights but through some sort of process of appointment and promotion.

Mills concedes the main facts of this situation but fails, in my opinion, to evaluate them properly. It seems to be clear that the original "captains of industry," the makers of the great fortunes, *failed* to achieve or to exercise sufficient cumulative advantages to consolidate control of the enterprises in their families and their class ("class" in a sociological, not an economic, sense). This came about essentially because there were factors operating contrary to that of cumulative advantage, which Mills stresses so heavily. The main factor was the pressure to link executive responsibility with competence in such a way that the ascriptive rights of property ownership have tended to give way to the occupational functions of "professionals."

There are, above all, two ways in which Mills' treatment obscures the importance and nature of this shift. First, he continues to speak of power *within* the economy as based on property. To a considerable degree, of course, this is legally true, since the legal control of enterprise rests with stockholders. But, as Berle and Means first made abundantly clear, very generally it is not substantively true. In the old-style family enterprise, still predominant in the small-business sector of the economy, the functions of management and ownership are fused in the same people. In the larger enterprise they have by and large become differentiated. The fact that executives receive large salaries and bonuses is not to be twisted into an assumption that they control, so far as they do, through their property rights. Paradoxical as it may seem, a relatively backward industrial economy like that of France is far more *property*-based than is the case with the United States. In general, property holdings have not, of course, been expropriated, except for their diminution through inheritance and income taxes, which are not as negligible as Mills maintains. What has happened is that their relation to the *power* structure of the economy has been greatly altered. Mills almost entirely passes over this change.

The second problem concerns the process of recruitment in the higher occupational reaches of the economy. It is entirely clear that the process operates in the higher reaches overwhelmingly by appointment, i.e., the decisions of superiors as individuals or in small groups as to who should occupy certain positions. It is also true that the process is relatively unformalized—e.g., there are no competitive examinations and few, if any, formal qualifications of training. But from these facts Mills concludes, and again and again reiterates, that executive competence

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has very little, if anything, to do with the selection, that it is an overwhelmingly arbitrary process of choosing those who are congenial to the selectors, presumably because they can be counted upon to be "yes men." At the very least this contention is unproved, and I seriously doubt its correctness. There are certainly many difficulties and imperfections in the selection process. But I think it almost certain that higher levels of competence are selected than would on the average be the case through kinship ascription, and that, as such processes go, the levels selected are relatively high.

One final point in this field. It does seem probable that the factor of cumulative advantage has a good deal to do with the high levels of financial remuneration of the higher executive groups and with the discrepancies between their incomes and those of governmental and professional people on comparable levels of competence and responsibility. But this is very far from the great fortune level of the founding entrepreneur type, and the evidence seems to be that the discrepancy has not been cumulatively increasing to an appreciable degree, particularly relative to wages at the labor levels; cases like that of the academic profession are somewhat special.

So far I have been speaking about the nature and power position of the elite *within* the economy. The general tenor of my argument has been that, given the nature of an industrial society, a relatively well-defined elite or leadership group *should be expected to develop* in the business world; it is out of the question that power should be diffused equally among an indefinite number of very small units, as the ideal of pure competition and a good deal of the ideology of business itself would have it. But first I question whether the position of power of the business leadership groups is such that a heavy operation of the factor of cumulative advantage must be invoked to account for it. Secondly, I must stress that the business elite is no longer primarily an elite of *property*-owners, but that its center of gravity has shifted to occupationally professional executives or managers. Differential advantages of family origin, etc., are about the same for admission to this group as to other groups requiring educational and other qualifications. Again the evidence is that the proportion of its members recruited from the upper economic and social groups is and remains relatively high, but it has not, in recent times, been increasing, as the theory of cumulative advantage would lead us to expect.

The problem of an elite within the economy must, however, be clearly distinguished from that of an elite in the society as a whole and the

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power position occupied by such an elite. There are two main orders of questions bearing on the transition from one to the other. Though a thorough consideration of this transition would lead into very far-reaching questions, for present purposes one can be treated rather briefly. Mills gives us the impression that "eliteness" in any society, including our own, is overwhelmingly a question of the power that an individual or a group can command. By this, he means (I shall further discuss his concept of power presently) influence on the "big" decisions directly affecting what happens in the society in the short run. But there are many elements in the society which are relatively powerless in this sense, but nevertheless of the greatest functional importance. Our society has almost divested kinship units as such of important power in this sense. But this does not mean at all that the family has ceased to be important. Closely linked with this is the question of the feminine role. Women qua women by and large do not have a position of power comparable to that of men; but this is not to say that they are unimportant—otherwise how can we account for the extent of our national preoccupations with questions of sexuality? Finally, there is a *distinct* difference between the rank-order of occupations—which, relative to other role-types, are closely involved with decision-making in a society like ours—by power and by prestige. The most striking case is the relatively high position of the professions relative to executive roles in business, as revealed by the famous North-Hatt data. Physicians as a group do not exercise great power, but there is no reason to question their very high prestige, which has been demonstrated in study after study.

The second main context, however, directly concerns the question of power. In a complex society the primary locus of power lies in the political system. There are many subtle analytical problems involved in the delineation of this system and its functions in the society which cannot be gone into here; this formula will have to suffice. Two questions are, however, primary for our purposes: the degree of differentiation of the political system from other systems; and its own internal structure. These two problems, it will be noted, parallel those raised with reference to the economy.

For historical reasons it seems clear that the development of the American political system, since the breakdown of the first synthesis associated with the "founders of the Republic," has lagged behind that of the economy. This is a function primarily of the two factors already noted—the economic emphasis inherent in our system of values, and

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the relative lack of urgency of certain political problems because of our especially protected and favored national position. Relative to the economic structure, which had by that time grown enormously, the political was at its weakest in the period from the Civil War to the end of the century; this situation is sketched by Mills in broadly correct terms. Since then, both internal exigencies and the exigencies of our international position have been stimuli for major changes.

Internally, beyond the more elementary provisions for law and order and essential minimum services—much of this, of course, on a local basis—the main focus of the development of our political system has been *control* of economic organization and processes, and coping with some of the social consequences of economic growth and industrialization. The process started well before the turn of the century with the Interstate Commerce legislation and the Anti-Trust Act and continued through the New Deal era, not steadily but with waves of new measures and levels of political control.

A major problem in relation to Mills' analysis is whether this is "genuine" control. His view seems to be that at times it has been, but that on balance it is the business power-holders who control government, not vice versa; the above quotation about the outcome of the New Deal puts it succinctly. In my opinion this is a misinterpretation. If genuine and in some sense effective controls had not been imposed, I find it impossible to understand the bitter and continuing opposition on the part of business to the measures which have been taken.[4] Even some of those most completely taken for granted now, like the Federal Reserve system, were bitterly fought at the time. It therefore seems to me to be the sounder interpretation that there has been a genuine growth of autonomous governmental power—apart from the military aspect, which will be discussed presently—and that one major aspect of this has been relatively effective control of the business system. This control and the growth of "big government" have been generally accepted in the society as a whole. The participation of big-business men in governmental processes is by no means to be interpreted as a simple index of their power to dominate government in their own interests, as Mills often seems to maintain.

To me, another indication of Mills' biased view of the governmental situation is his almost complete failure even to mention the political

[4] Cf. F. X. Sutton, *et al., The American Business Creed* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), for an excellent analysis of the point of view of business toward its relations to government. The authors make it clear that the present state of affairs is far from being fully accepted in business circles even now.

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parties, or to analyze their differences. It seems to me broadly true that the Republican party, though a coalition, is more than any other single thing the party of the bigger sector of business. Four years of a Republican administration—two of them without control of Congress—is certainly not enough to indicate that big business through its favorite party organ controls the government on a long-run basis. So Mills is practically forced to the view that the alleged control operates above and beyond the party system. This seems to be connected with his relegation of the legislative branch to the "middle level" of power. I have strong reservations about this, but also it must not be forgotten that the presidency is the biggest prize of all in party politics, and it is its importance which forms the primary integrating focus of our particular type of party system. Surely the presidency is not simply the football of an inner clique which manipulates the executive branch independently of the party.[5]

Mills, of course, recognizes that the aftermath of two world wars, the rise of Communist power, and the relative decline of the older Western Great Powers provide the occasion for the increasing prominence of the military group in our governmental system. Before these changes—and, indeed, to a remarkable extent, as late as the 1930's—the military played a far smaller role in this country than in any other society of comparable scale and organizational and technological development. Part of the change may be interpreted as simply the redressing of a balance. But it seems to me correct to say that for the last ten years there has been a special situation attributable to the extremely unsettled condition of the world at large and to the difficulties entailed for the American system, given its background, in meeting the problem on its own terms. There is thus a sense in which it is true that the higher military officers have tended to fill a vacuum in the field of national decision-making. There are two main points to be made about Mills' treatment of the matter. First, more in this field than perhaps any other, Mills' discussion is marred by a hasty tendency to generalize from very recent short-run developments to the long-run prospects of the structure of the society. Even here he fails to mention that in certain crucial questions the recommendations of the military have been overruled by civilian authority, although the President is a former military man.

[5] Somewhat curiously, though tending to suggest that President Eisenhower's elevation to the presidency is symptomatic of the alliance between the "warlords" and the upper business group, Mills does not even mention Adlai Stevenson as a significant figure in the American political scene. To be sure, his book appeared before Stevenson's second nomination. But where does Stevenson fit?

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Secondly, the tone of indictment, particularly evidenced by the quite unnecessary and, I think, inappropriate parading of the term "warlord," is stronger in his discussion of this area than in any other, except perhaps the "mass society."

Related to the position of the higher military officers is what Mills calls the "military metaphysic," meaning the definition of international problems in terms of the primacy of military force. That there has been such a tendency, and that it has gone beyond the objective requirements of the situation, seem to be unquestionable. But I very much doubt whether it is as absolute as many of Mills' statements make it appear, and a swing in another direction is discernible already.[6] This seems to be another case of Mills' tendency to make large generalizations about major trends from short-run experience.

Finally, let us say a word about what Mills calls the "political directorate"—that is, the non-military component in the groups most influential in the affairs of government and politics. Again I think there is a certain correctness in his contention that a definite weakness exists here, and that the high participation both of business and of military elements in the exercise of power is related to this. But a difficulty arises in terms of the perspective on American society which I have been emphasizing throughout. Both the non-political stress in American social structure and values generally, and the recency and intensity of the pressures to build up this aspect of our structure, would lead one to predict that it would be a major focus of strain. American society has not developed a well-integrated political-government elite, in the sense that it has developed a relatively well-integrated business-executive group. For this reason responsibility has been carried—imperfectly, of course—by a very miscellaneous group which includes members of the business and military groups, as would be expected, but also "politicians," in the usual sense of people making an at least partial career out of elective office and the influencing of elections; professional people, particularly lawyers but also economists, political scientists, and even natural scientists (e.g., John von Neumann as Atomic Energy Commissioner); journalists; and, a very important element, upper-class people in more than the purely economic sense that Mills employs, of whom Franklin Roosevelt was one and Adlai Stevenson, though also a

[6] Whatever may be thought of it in other respects, Mr. Dulles' reluctance to join Britain and France in military measures against Egypt was hardly an expression of the "military metaphysic" now allegedly dominating the government.

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lawyer, is another. In my opinion, the structure of the American political leadership group is far from a settled thing. It certainly is not settled in terms of the long-run dominance of a business-military coalition.

Mills holds that the United States has no higher civil service at all, in the European sense, and seems to imply that we should have. There is relative truth in his empirical contention, though I think he tends to underestimate the real influence of "non-political" government officials on longer-run policy.[7] At least it seems highly probable that in the nature of the case the tendency will be toward a strengthening of the element of professional governmental officials who are essentially independent both of short-run "politics" and of elements extraneous to the structure of government and its responsibilities. In fact, the military officer is a special case of this type, and though his role is not stabilized, it presumably must come to be more important than it traditionally has been. However, it is questionable how far the specific models of civil service organization either of Britain or of Continental Europe—particularly, certain of their special connections with the class structure and the educational system—are appropriate to American conditions. Such connections in the American case would accentuate rather than mitigate the prominence of the Ivy League element to which Mills so seriously objects.[8]

Above all, I do not think that Mills has made a convincing case for his contention that the power structure impinging directly on American government is in process of crystallizing into a top business-military coalition with a much weaker political "junior partner" whose main function presumably is, by manipulation of the mass media and the political process in the narrower sense, to keep the great majority of Americans from protesting too loudly or even from awakening to what allegedly is "really" going on. On a number of counts which have been reviewed, there is a case on a short-run basis for part of his interpretation. But I think that the kinds of factors brought out in the previous discussion make it extremely dubious that even the partial correctness

[7] Good examples are the Department of Agriculture and the Reclamation Service of the Department of the Interior—and now, increasingly, the Public Health Service. I think that this is even true of the Foreign Service, and that Mills here, as in so many other connections, seriously exaggerates the probable long-run consequences of the McCarthyites' intervention in the affairs of the State Department.

[8] I think it correct to say that five years of Labour government in Britain, far from lessening the prominence of Oxford and Cambridge educations as qualifications for the civil service, in fact increased their relative importance, by increasing the national importance of the civil service itself.

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of his interpretation of a current situation will prove to be a sound indicator of what is to be expected over such longer periods as a generation or more.

My conviction on this point is strengthened by a variety of other considerations which, for reasons of space, cannot be discussed here, but may be mentioned. First, I am extremely skeptical of Mills' interpretation of what he calls the "mass society," which includes the structural position of the great majority of the American population. In this he ignores both kinship and friendship, and the whole mass of associational activities and relationships. One example is the spread of church membership—which I suppose Mills would dismiss as simply an escape from the boredom of white-collar life, but in my opinion is of considerable positive significance.

Another very important complex which Mills either treats cavalierly or ignores completely involves education at the various levels, and with it the enormous development, over a century, of science and learning and the professions resting upon them. It is true that the people rooted in these areas of the social structure are not prominent in the power elite, and are even subject to some conflicts with it; but they would not be expected to be prominent in this way—their functions in the society are different. Nonetheless, they must be taken very seriously into account in a diagnosis of what has been happening to the society as a whole. One of the most important sets of facts concerns the ways in which the services of technical professional groups have come to penetrate the structures both of business and of government, a circumstance which over a period of time has greatly enhanced the role of the universities as custodians of learning and sources of trained personnel.

Finally, there is one special case of a professional group whose role Mills treats with serious inadequacy—namely, lawyers. First, he dismisses the judicial branch of government as just "trailing along," with the implication that with a slight lag it simply does the bidding of the "real" holders of power. This seems to be a most biased appraisal of the role of the courts. Not to speak of the longer-run record, the initiative taken by the courts in the matter of racial segregation and in the reassertion of civil liberties after the miasma of McCarthyism does not appear to me to be compatible with Mills' views. Similar considerations seem to apply to various aspects of the role of the private legal profession, notably with respect to the *control* of processes in the business world. Mills tends to assume that the relation between law and business is an overwhelmingly one-way relation; lawyers are there to serve the

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interests of businessmen and essentially have no independent influence. This, I think, is an illusion stemming largely from Mills' preoccupation with a certain kind of power. His implicit reasoning seems to be that since lawyers have less power than businessmen, they do not really "count."

III

The last problem I wish to raise, therefore, concerns Mills' conception of power and its use as a category of social analysis. Unfortunately, the concept of power is not a settled one in the social sciences, either in political science or in sociology. Mills, however, adopts one main version of the concept without attempting to justify it. This is what may be called the "zero-sum" concept; power, that is to say, is power *over* others. The power A has in a system is necessarily and by definition at the expense of B. This conception of power then is generalized to the whole conception of the political process when Mills says that "Politics is a struggle for power."

Within limits, every student of social affairs is free to define important concepts the way he prefers; there is no canonically "correct" definition. But choosing one alternative will have consequences which differ from those implied in another, and this is the case with Mills' conception of power. The essential point at present is that, to Mills, power is not a facility for the performance of function in and on behalf of the society as a system, but is interpreted exclusively as a facility for getting what one group, the holders of power, wants by preventing another group, the "outs," from getting what it wants.

What this conception does is to elevate a secondary and derived aspect of a total phenomenon into the central place. A comparison may help to make this clear. There is obviously a distributive aspect of wealth and it is in a sense true that the wealth of one person or group by definition cannot also be possessed by another group. Thus the *distribution* of wealth is, in the nature of the case, a focus of conflicts of interest in a society. But what of the positive functions of wealth and of the conditions of its production? It has become fully established that the wealth available for distribution can only come about through the processes of production, and that these processes require the "co-operation" or integration of a variety of different agencies—what economists call the "factors of production." Wealth in turn is a generalized class of facilities available to units of the society—individuals and various types and levels of collectivities—for whatever uses may be important to them.

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But even apart from the question of what share each gets, the fact that there should be wealth to divide, and how much, cannot be taken for granted as given except within a very limited context.

Very similar things can be said about power in a political sense. Power is a generalized facility or resource in the society. It has to be divided or allocated, but it also has to be produced and it has collective as well as distributive functions. It is the capacity to mobilize the resources of the society for the attainment of goals for which a general "public" commitment has been made, or may be made. It is mobilization, above all, of the action of persons and groups, which is *binding* on them by virtue of their position in the society. Thus within a much larger complex Mills concentrates almost exclusively on the distributive aspect of power. He is interested only in *who* has power and what *sectoral* interests he is serving with his power, not in how power comes to be generated or in what communal rather than sectoral interests are served.

The result is a highly selective treatment of the whole complex of the power problem. There is, in the first place, a tendency to exaggerate the empirical importance of power by alleging that it is only power which "really" determines what happens in a society. Against this, I would place the view that power is only one of several cognate factors in the determination of social events. This bias of Mills is particularly evident in his tendency to foreshorten social processes and emphasize overwhelmingly short-run factors. There is, secondly, the tendency to think of power as presumptively illegitimate; if people exercise considerable power, it must be because they have somehow usurped it where they had no right and they intend to use it to the detriment of others. This comes out most conspicuously in Mills' imputation of irresponsibility to his "power elite" and the allegation, vaguely conceived and presented with very little evidence, that they are characterized by a "higher immorality." It is notable that as he approaches the climax indicated by the title of his final chapter the tone of indictment becomes shriller and shriller and the atmosphere of objective analysis recedes.

Back of all this lies, I am sure, an only partly manifest "metaphysical" position which Mills shares with Veblen and a long line of indicters of modern industrial society. I would call it a utopian conception of an ideal society in which power does not play a part at all.

This is a philosophical and ethical background which is common both to utopian liberalism and socialism in our society and to a good deal of "capitalist" ideology. They have in common an underlying "individualism" of a certain type. This is not primarily individualism in the

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sense that the welfare and rights of the individual constitute fundamental moral values, but rather that *both* individual and collective rights are alleged to be promoted only by *minimizing* the positive organization of social groups. Social organization as such is presumptively bad because, on a limited, short-run basis, it always and necessarily limits the freedom of the individual to do exactly what he may happen to want. The question of the deeper and longer-run dependence of the goals and capacities of individuals themselves on social organization is simply shoved into the background. From this point of view, both power in the individual enterprise and power in the larger society are presumptively evil in themselves, because they represent the primary visible focus of the capacity of somebody to see to it that somebody else acts or does not act in certain ways, whether at the moment he wants to or not.

There are, in contemporary society, three main versions of this individualistic utopianism, which may be called "liberal" and "capitalist" and "socialist"—I place all three terms in quotation marks deliberately. The liberal version is mainly "humanistically" oriented to the *total* welfare of the individual as a person, and in American terms it is very likely to assume a Jeffersonian cast, to hold up the vision of a simpler and hence almost by definition "better" society against the inhumanities and impersonalities of large-scale modern industrialism and all its concomitants.

The capitalist version is, with all the qualifications which such an assertion must occasion, *primarily* production-oriented. Essentially it says that, whatever the cost to individuals—including even businessmen themselves, or especially so—production must be achieved, carried on, and so far as possible increased. This is the focus of what has been called the "business creed."[9] Understandably it has been highly sensitive to "interferences" on both fronts, from liberal sources which would sacrifice productivity to humanistic values, and from governmentalist sources which would "interfere" with the businessman's primary responsibility for production. Social organization beyond the level of the firm is thus presumptively a limitation of its freedom.

The socialist version has been a secondary theme in American ideology largely because of the apolitical character of American society, which, as I have noted, has been prominent historically. The opposition to capitalism has centered on two fronts, the control of the economy in the interests of preventing abuses of power and the steering of the benefits of productivity in the humanistic direction of "welfare." But the socialist

[9] Cf. Sutton, *et al., op.cit.*

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questions whether *control* of the abuses of private enterprise is possible at all; to him, for the state to take over production directly is the only way. From this perspective, furthermore, the "Jeffersonian" version of romantic utopianism seems particularly unrealistic and unacceptable.

From one point of view, the socialist romanticizes the state and the political process. Whereas he distrusts private interests almost totally and feels that they cannot be entrusted with any responsibility, he romantically believes that if public authority alone is entrusted with all responsibilities, all will be well—because some mystical "popular will" or "public interest" controls it—forgetting that public authority, like other forms of social organization, is administered by human beings. And that he does not fundamentally trust even public authority is evidenced by his ultimate ideal that the state should "wither away" and the spontaneous co-operation of institutionally unorganized human beings should take over. The socialist has been put in a particularly difficult position in the contemporary world by the development of communism which, while still paying lip service to the eventual withering-away of the state, carries the enforcement of its predominance over all private interests, including the liberties of its citizens, to the totalitarian extreme.

Mills does not make his own position explicit in this book. As noted, at times he speaks like a nostalgic Jeffersonian liberal. I understand, however, that he professes to be a socialist—non-Communist, of course. But a basic strain of his thinking is consistent with both wings of the liberal-socialist dilemma on the basically *individualistic* premises that I have outlined: either that social organization beyond the level of the family and the local community is a bad thing *in toto*, or that it is instrumentally justified only to get society over a particular hump, the threat of the capitalist evil.

Mills seems to be suggesting that the development of the power elite is bringing that capitalist evil to a climax, to a situation which is intolerable to liberals and socialists alike. I suggest an alternative view: that, though of course accompanied by a whole range of "abuses," the main lines of social development in America are essentially acceptable to a humanistic ethic which in my case is closer to the liberal than to either of the other two outlined here. But it differs in not being in the older sense an individualistic liberalism. If the individualistic assumptions are modified in favor of a set which not only admit the necessity but assert the desirability of positive social organization, much of the ideological conflict between the three positions as total "systems"

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evaporates. Above all, it can be positively asserted that power, while of course subject to abuses and in need of many controls, is an essential and desirable component of a highly organized society. This position, in asserting and justifying the increased importance of government, thus grants that there is a grain of truth in the "socialist" theme. There is, however, also some justification for the existence of "capitalism," if by that is meant the institutionalization of responsibility for the larger part of economic production in the hands of a variety of private, non-governmental agencies. To my mind, there is no more reason why all important economic production should be controlled by government than why all scientific research should be.

Hence, in my opinion, many of the difficulties of Mills' analysis of a crucial problem in American society arise from his failure to transcend the dilemmas inherent in much of the individualistic tradition in American and, more broadly, in Western thought. It seems to me that he is clearly and, in the degree to which he pushes this position, unjustifiably anti-capitalist. He is partly pro-liberal and probably even more pro-socialist. But in the American scene a choice between these old alternatives of ideological orientation is no longer enough. It is necessary not only to criticize existing conditions from the older philosophical or ideological points of view, but to take serious stock of the ideological assumptions underlying the bulk of American political discussion of such problems as power.

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AN EXPLORATION INTO OPINIONS AND PERSONALITY*

By HERBERT H. HYMAN

M. Brewster Smith, Jerome S. Bruner, and Robert W. White, *Opinions and Personality*, New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1956, 294 pp. $6.00.

PSYCHOLOGIZING about politics has a long history. Doctrines of human nature figure in classics on political theory; the eloquent appeal in 1908 by Graham Wallas for a revival of such interest was ultimately followed by the works of Merriam and Lasswell; the recent period is highlighted by Riesman's writings and the publication of *The Authoritarian Personality*—these latter works so prestigious that they alone have created an extensive literature of commentary. The present emphasis on the political behavior approach and the universal use of public opinion data and method today give psychological analysis a central place in current work. What does the publication of *Opinions and Personality* add to the picture?

The authors state in their prefatory remarks that their work is in the service of *discovery*, rather than proof. They sought to develop a coherent framework for conceptualizing the relations between opinions and personality which then guided their methodology and empirical investigation and in turn led to improvements in conceptualization. It was hoped that such a framework or conceptual apparatus and the methods employed could guide others in discovering and proving by systematic inquiry the manifold relations between opinions and personality. That they have rendered such a service well seems abundantly clear to this reader.

Smith and Bruner are social psychologists with much training and practical experience in field research and public opinion surveys. Bruner has also been distinguished for experimental work in cognition, perception, and higher mental processes. Both have had long association with Harvard and the Psychological Clinic, at which a group of investigators under the inspiration of Henry Murray have been engaged in clinical studies of normal personality.[1] Smith and Bruner and Robert

* This article may be identified as Publication #A-238 of the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University.

[1] One of the early studies to come out of the clinic was an intensive investigation of eleven undergraduates conducted in 1941, dealing with the relation between ideology

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White, a clinical psychologist also long connected with the Psychological Clinic, thus comprised a formidable team, possessing the theoretical equipment of experimental, social, and dynamic psychology and the know-how of field, laboratory, and clinical investigation. The nuclear group was supplemented by three other psychologists and one social anthropologist; as a Diagnostic Council, they began their voyage of discovery seated around a table in September 1948. The log of their travels in search of an adequate theory and the maps drawn of their explorations into the opinions and personalities of ten subjects form the book under review, published some eight years after the original voyage.

Stated modestly and tentatively, the theory presented is rich in its concepts and structure, and once and for all puts an end to simplistic views about opinions or personality, or about relations between the two. Perhaps this is the prime service rendered—to enrich our ways of thinking about these problems and to deter oversimplification. First, a set of concepts is developed for describing opinions or attitudes (the terms are used interchangeably, along with such other terms as "sentiment") in a multidimensional way. Since an opinion involves an orientation to some class of objects in the environment, the writers distinguish the *object* from what they label the *topic* of an opinion. Here they are, of course, building on the tradition of cognitive psychology and following in the footsteps of all thoughtful writers on public opinion. The simple but important fact stressed is that attitudes about something must be understood in terms of the properties of the object as perceived by the individual rather than in terms of properties that may actually inhere in the object. One recalls Lippmann's dramatic introduction to his classic, *Public Opinion*, or Krech and Crutchfield's treatment of beliefs and opinions.[2] Perhaps less explicit in the current formulation, but of special interest to the political analyst, is the ironical fact which Lippmann stressed: that while opinions emerge in relation to the object as perceived in, as he puts it, the pseudo-environment, they must be *acted* out in the *real* environment. This, of course, sets a limit on irrationality in our perception of the world and provides an ultimate corrective mechanism, but the blunders involved and the price paid until our perception is straightened out may be great.

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and personality. See H. Murray and C. Morgan, "A Clinical Study of Sentiments," *Genetic Psychology Monographs*, XXXII (1945), pp. 3-149, 153-311.

[2] Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion*, New York, 1922; D. Krech and R. Crutchfield, *Theory and Problems of Social Psychology*, New York, 1949, Part II.

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The specific concepts employed to describe the object of an opinion involve first the content of our thinking about the nature of the object and the degree of differentiation in our thinking—whether the object is perceived globally or as containing many parts. Lippmann's usage of "stereotype"—the oversimplified picture—would signify the opposite of a highly differentiated object of opinion. Differentiation implies a concept of organization, in that the components may be regarded as differing in importance, some as central, others as minor. Then follow concepts of the saliency of the object—its immediacy in the everyday concerns of a person, and time perspective. The latter certainly has been a neglected area of inquiry but one of utmost importance, for, as Smith points out elsewhere, our orientations are based not merely on the world here and now but on our premises as to the future, and individuals vary greatly in the length and manner of operation of their time perspective.[3] Two additional concepts are employed to characterize the object of opinion—the informational support or degree of correct knowledge about it, and the object value or affective tone attached to it.

These concepts essentially describe the cognitive aspect of opinion, and additional concepts must be employed to characterize the orientation toward the object. Here the concepts are not quite in balance and are nowhere near as rich. First, the orientation is described in terms of the action tendency aroused—e.g., hostility toward the object—and then in terms of policy stand. The latter concept is a particularly strategic one, for the writers remind us that, at the level of politics or collective action or public opinion, the endless individual variations in action tendencies must be channeled into the limited range of alternative policy stands available. This is why the attempt to relate personality to opinion has often been barren. Personality may translate into action tendency, but diverse personalities and corresponding diverse action tendencies may have to stand under the banner of the same policy simply because there is no other option.

By these concepts, a comprehensive "anatomy" of opinion is sought as the prerequisite for studying their "physiology," their functions and relations to other aspects of personality. But before the writers enter upon this task, they note that a fundamental analytical distinction must be made between two levels of description of opinions: the level of *held* opinions, and that of *expressed* opinions. These levels may differ in

[3] See an earlier publication based on the same inquiry: M. B. Smith, "The Personal Setting of Public Opinions," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XI (Winter 1947-48), pp. 507-23.

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character, and may serve different functions and have different relations to deeper levels of personality.[4]

The description of opinions provided by these concepts must then be tied to personality. In treating the latter realm, no parallel anatomy of personality is attempted, for it is clear that personality is regarded as the most comprehensive organization of all psychological systems and is in no way restricted to the motivational or emotional equipment of the individual. Rather it subsumes opinions, dynamic processes, capacities, traits, temperamental equipment, etc. How then do opinions emerge from this larger and more basic system, where do they fit and to what are they related, and what function do they serve in adjustment? A set of concepts is developed to treat of these problems. Quite novel in the recent period and yet reminiscent of an old idea in psychology is the concept of the *expressive* nature of opinion. Each person has a style, a flavor, which is the quintessence of his personality and which permeates his activities. Opinions reflect personality not merely because they are dynamic outlets for needs, as in Lasswell's early formula about private motives being transformed into political opinions through displacement and rationalization, but simply because they express or are congruent with the basic style of the person. The style is compounded of such fundamentals as temperament or general mood, feeling tone, and action level, and of capacities of an intellectual nature—the ability to think abstractly, level of intelligence, etc. The empirical studies reported in the book provide many demonstrations of the validity of this idea and of its utility. To cite but one example with political implications, the insensitivity of the subjects to those aspects of Russian policy which may stem from Marxism or Communism or broadly ideological factors was expressive simply of a more general feature of their intellectual functioning, an inability to deal with abstractions.

This basic idea is, as noted, reminiscent of an old idea which in its original formulation sounds quaint to us today. One goes back to papers like Moore's on the "innate basis of radicalism," in which radicals were shown to differ from conservatives in reaction time and mirror drawing, to studies of the correlation between intelligence and ideology, to Howell's finding on the differences between radicals and conservatives in muscle co-ordination and tolerance to electric shock.

[4] An earlier paper growing out of the larger project discusses some of these matters. See R. Bauer and H. Riecken, "Opinion in Relation to Personality and Social Organization," *International Journal of Opinion Attitude Research*, III (1949-1950), pp. 513-29.

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How bizarre and primitive these early studies now appear to us, with their references to innate factors and their reduction of ideology to such simple functions as speed of reaction, and how much contradiction occurs in their findings![5] Yet the fundamental idea is meaningful, if it is recast in terms of the more sophisticated concept of an expressive aspect of opinion, in which there is no simple correspondence between isolated traits, but rather a *congruence* between ideological functioning and aspects of personality functioning. Smith, Bruner, and White not only reinstate an important approach to the relation of personality and opinions, but in their emphasis on the expression of *intellectual* capacities redress the balance. In much current study, opinions are seen as an outgrowth merely of motivational or dynamic processes. It is as if reason had no role in the opinions man forms. In the authors' view, reason and emotion, both fundamental in personality, find their expression in opinion formation.

A second set of concepts is used to tie opinions to personality. Opinions are in part expressive, but they are also dynamic or adjustive. They serve certain functions in the individual's dealing with reality. This reality is compounded of the novel features of the external environment, the issues of political and social life, and of the groups within which the individual must live and to which he must relate. The internal needs of the individual must find their resolution in the interplay with the outer environment. Correspondingly, opinions, both held and expressed, serve three functions: object appraisal, or the ordering of the complexities of the external environment; social adjustment, in which opinions are vehicles for relating the individual to his reference groups and membership groups; and externalization, in which through a variety of dynamisms inner difficulties and problems and needs are transformed into ideological tendencies. Each of these functions is worked out with considerable specificity. Thus externalization is elaborated in the form of three special propositions; treatment is given of the specific connections between held opinions and reference groups vs. expressed opinions and membership groups; and the three functions of opinion in mediating the individual's relation to reality are elaborated in terms of a more detailed set of values and goals of on-going activity (pp. 261-78). The fundamental point made is that while individuals may differ with respect to the weight that any *one* of these functions

[5] For a definitive treatment and critique of the literature of this period, see G. Murphy, L. Murphy, and T. Newcomb, *Experimental Social Psychology*, rev. ed., New York, 1937, ch. 13.

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has in the formation of their opinions, all three functions are at work to some degree.[6]

These specific concepts, if only in fragmentary form, are found in many other current studies of the dynamics of opinion formation. But a new and auxiliary idea is incorporated into the present work. In many other studies, while the theory holds that opinions are formed in the service of inner need or admission to a group or in relation to problematical features of the environment, the picture presented is like a frozen section. Opinion formation is one problem, but there is still opinion maintenance, furtherance, modification, transformation, growth—for life goes on and the individual comes into contact with new facts, new groups, new inner crises. Many of the current studies are dynamic up to a point, beyond which there appears to be no conception of process. Smith, Bruner, and White distinguish the *functioning* of opinion from the earlier functions that opinion served. There is implicit some assumption that individuals will generally try to maintain their existing opinions, for they serve a function. But this may be a hard battle, for the environment encroaches, presenting new information which may demand a reassessment of the old opinion. Consequently, in the day-to-day functioning of opinion a series of adjustive strategies and defenses must be employed in order to maintain or further the old opinions. These are described in some detail and illustrated by case material (pp. 251ff.). The adjustive strategies are not regarded as merely defensive. They provide play—at least in some of the subjects studied—for modification of opinions, even for openness in the face of new information.

Most interesting in this connection is a concept advanced almost casually. There is endless discussion in current communications research of self-selection of media—selective exposure, selective perception, selective memory—in terms of content congenial to pre-existing attitudes.[7] This discussion is often so unqualified that one receives an image of the individual as insulated from all new information via all media. The attractive suggestion dropped by Smith, Bruner, and White

[6] A striking parallel is found in a program of research under Daniel Katz at the University of Michigan, in which the same three functions of attitude are elaborated independently and empirical evidence is provided that changing an individual's opinions requires the choice of a method appropriate to the particular function of opinion that predominates. See, e.g., I. Sarnoff, D. Katz, and C. McClintock, "Attitude-Change Procedures and Motivating Patterns," in D. Katz, *et al., Public Opinion and Propaganda*, New York, 1954, pp. 305-12.

[7] For a summary of such studies, see J. Klapper, "The Effects of Mass Media," New York, Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, 1949, mimeo.

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is that there are two kinds of media, "line" media and "filler" media. The former are the real source of a person's opinions, of his line, whereas the latter simply fill in the chinks (pp. 248f.). In the light of this suggestion, the bluntness of some of the discussion of self-selection might be sharpened, for it may well be that self-selection operates on one class of media and not on the other.

These are the main concepts to bridge the connections between opinion processes and personality, but there is one final analytic discussion. Opinions may issue into action ranging from mere verbal expression, through support of given policies, to the most intense forms of personal action. Here the treatment is sketchy, but the tentative propositions advanced are that outcomes in action are determined by the function that opinion serves (opinions serving one function may call for less action than opinions serving other functions) and by the features of the situation in which the actor is involved.

Such is the major outline of the theoretical framework. However, this does not exhaust the formulation, for many useful ideas are advanced subtly and almost casually in the individual case studies presented. To some readers the book may appear excessively complex and analytical, and certainly one will chase oneself around in a circle if one tries fastidiously to put all these concepts and levels into an orderly and comprehensive theoretical *structure*. In part, this is due to the inherent mystery of the problem itself. In part, the lack of structure, of precise hypotheses about the relations among the concepts, reflects the nature of the inquiry. It was exploratory, a voyage of discovery, rather than a testing or proving by empirical means of the exact connections among the given variables that represented these concepts. It remains for others to draw from the array of concepts and the general theory some specific hypotheses for verification. The writers themselves are tentative in their approach, and indicate that there was much revision of their formulations over the years as they restudied their data and reviewed their thinking. In this reader's view, theirs is a most attractive system of ideas, full of wisdom, comprehensive and complex enough to deal with the richness of the problem of opinions and personality. On occasion, additional analytic distinctions or dimensions might have been incorporated. Thus the treatment of the orientation aspect of opinion, in contrast to the cognitive aspect, is rudimentary. The writers imply dimensions of intensity and strength or stability of the orientation, and generality or organization of attitude, in passing, but the concepts are

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not explicit.[8] The exact place of values or sentiments as highly general orientations out of which particular opinions individuate is not made explicit either, although there is much attention to such constellations in the empirical studies and clear indication that these are more predictive of particular opinions than are general, basic needs.[9]

The main theoretical formulation is presented in the initial chapters of the book, and again in the concluding pages, and could well stand alone. However, the bulk of the book is devoted to a report of the case studies of the opinions about Russia held by, and their relation to the personalities of, ten married men living in the Boston area. These subjects were studied over a period of fifteen weeks by the Diagnostic Council and its aides, and underwent an incredible battery of twenty-eight procedures, some standard and others invented to deal with special concepts. The purpose of the case studies was to test the utility of the theory and to provide a means for its revision and expansion. In no way are they regarded as a basis for generalizations or estimates.[10] The subjects were quite varied in background, but they all were of superior intelligence. While the age spread was quite wide, perhaps the incorporation of at least one youth and one old person would have helped to shed additional light. As one reads the cases, one finds the discussion of the genesis of attitudes somewhat sketchy. This does not seem to represent the emphases of the investigators, since a whole series of their procedures was relevant to this problem. It may reflect the difficulty of recollection despite vigorous techniques for unearthing developmental data. So, too, it would have been right to the point of the problem of opinion maintenance to have examined the course of the opinions of someone very old, and this would have been a contribution in its own right, for really nothing is known about the politics and ideology of the aged. But perhaps these criticisms merely reflect the tastes and hindsight of this reader.

The case studies are reported in narrative and clinical form, with no

[8] Such concepts would perhaps help to predict when opinions might issue into action. See Krech and Crutchfield, *op.cit.*, for a more elaborate set of concepts to describe the orientation aspect of opinions.

[9] In an earlier paper growing out of the present inquiry, Smith deals extensively with values, elaborating propositions and evidence as to the conditions under which values become engaged by particular objects of opinion. See M. B. Smith, "Personal Values as Determinants of a Political Attitude," *Journal of Psychology*, XXVIII (1949), pp. 477-86.

[10] It should be noted, however, that as a result of this inquiry, and using a more limited battery of procedures, Smith sought to test the generality of the theory by a two-wave panel study conducted on a sample of 250 males representing a New England community (*ibid.*). One regrets the lack of an incorporation into the present book of at least a brief report on these more extensive empirical findings.

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real evidence or data presented. Perhaps this is the condition of clinical psychology—that there is no codification of principles for the presentation of qualitative data, and each clinician is his own stylist. It might have been well had some indication been given of how much agreement or disagreement there was among the members of the Diagnostic Council on the interpretation of the material. To compensate for some of the imprecision of the qualitative accounts, tables summarizing case material relevant to each of the major variables are presented in a final chapter; this is a novel and valuable innovation in qualitative research. One other issue of strategy in research arises in connection with the empirical inquiry. In Murray's early study at the Harvard Psychological Clinic, four realms of opinion were explored and related to personality. Obviously, the utility of the present model could not be examined for the gamut of opinions. The writers chose *one* vehicle instead—opinions about Russia—and they explain their choice on explicit and good grounds. But certainly some compromise between breadth and depth was possible. Even two opinion vehicles would have permitted a test of the utility of the model, which could not be questioned on the grounds of the particularity of the problem of Russia. And the sacrifice of depth of exploration might have been a small price to pay for the increase in generality.

The impression left by the ten cases is, as the writers remark, "one of almost boundless individual variation." The utility of the model or theory is abundantly demonstrated for all the cases, but the processes operate in varying ways and the concepts are differentially appropriate. This is the real empirical generalization. There is a pluralism of determinants of opinion; the origin is complex; the functions are manifold; and the way in which personality issues into opinion is never simple. But the apparatus to deal with this complexity is available—not merely the concepts, but also the instruments. It is worth dwelling on some of these instruments, for a new investigator may well exploit some of the methodological ingenuity of the writers and also profit from their admonitions. Noteworthy for an inquiry into personality and opinion is the unusually large proportion of procedures devoted to testing intellectual functioning. Ingenious inventions for exploring the functioning of attitudes, the adjustive strategies, are tests labeled "argument completion," "conformity interview," "information apperception tests," and "stress interview." Among the lessons to be learned is the striking fact that the "deeper" and more projective methods, such as pictorial tests, Rorschach, TAT, and word association, were gen-

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erally unrevealing. The writers suggest that the translation of this level of personality diagnosis into overt ideological material and conscious thought and process does not come readily, and that the picture of personality provided in this way does not do justice to constructive ego functioning and its operation at the level of opinion. They stress the value of straightforward but intensive interviewing on matters of values and sentiments. Certainly, these admonitions should be taken seriously, for they come from men highly familiar with the repertory of clinical methods and from one of the pioneering sources of projective methods.

For psychologists and opinion researchers, the value of the work is indubitable. Some political scientists may find it rather remote from their interests, for the relation of opinions to action or policy, and of individual processes to collective processes, is only incidental to the inquiry. However, anyone attempting to describe opinion, in the individual or the mass, and those political scientists who are concerned with problems of personality should ponder this work carefully. Their vision may at first be blurred, for no simple formula is presented, but they will finally see more clearly into the obscurities of opinions and personality, for that is where Smith, Bruner, and White have struck a light.

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PARTY GOVERNMENT IN BRITAIN TODAY

By SAMUEL H. BEER

R. T. McKenzie, *British Political Parties: The Distribution of Power Within the Conservative and Labour Parties*, New York, St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1955, 623 pp. $7.50.

A FAMILIAR and lively controversy among political scientists is whether party government—or, to use a longer phrase, responsible party government—can and ought to be brought into existence in the United States. In this discussion it is normally assumed that party government actually exists in Great Britain. Is this so?

By party government we mean that competing for power are two major parties, each of which is strongly united in support of a distinctive and coherent program. Two-party competition; unity among partisans in the legislature and executive; a program based on a distinctive social philosophy: these are the main ingredients.

From such a system flow—according to the advocates of party government—certain desirable results. First, democracy is enhanced because the voter is given a "meaningful choice" in terms of program and in terms of control. He has a choice between lines of public policy that are intelligible and different. He knows that because of party unity, he can hold responsible the candidates of the majority party for what government does while that party is in power. Secondly, because programs are coherent, policies in legislation and administration are coherent and the far-flung, interdependent activities of the modern state are directed toward compatible and mutually supporting goals. In contrast, a loose party system produces a series of "casual majorities"—to use A. N. Holcombe's phrase—whose objectives may be inconsistent and shaped by no deliberately thought-out view of policy as a whole.

In reply, the opponents of party government argue that such a two-way division of the popular will falsifies the complexity of interests and purposes in modern society. It is therefore impracticable in the United States, although perhaps not in "homogeneous" Britain. Moreover, even if such a division of opinion were natural, we ought to hesitate to promote arrangements that would bring it more sharply into focus, intensifying conflict and perhaps setting class against class.

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Do we actually find such a system of party government in Britain today? If so, what are the results?

While R. T. McKenzie's superb book is not directly addressed to these questions, it throws a great deal of light upon them. As a study of British parties, it will take its place alongside Ostrogorski's classic account and no doubt for many years will be the basic work on the subject for the first half of the twentieth century. McKenzie's theme is the distribution of power within the Conservative and Labour parties. "What," he asks in essence, "is the role of the parliamentary leaders, especially the two Leaders, in relation to their followers in Parliament and in the mass organizations outside?" Are the Labourites as democratic and the Conservatives as authoritarian as the formal organization of the parties suggests? His answer, of course, is "No": both parties, shaped by the necessities of the British constitution, have very similar structures of effective power.

McKenzie undoubtedly succeeds in destroying certain stereotypes. But what is his positive finding? What is the actual pattern of power in the two major parties? While he starts from Michels' "iron law of oligarchy," he does not by any means conclude that the subtle and complex interaction of leader and follower can be caught in some such simple formula. The Prussian discipline with which freedom-loving Britons in the House of Commons troop into the division lobbies at the command of their chiefs will never cease to amaze the American observer. But the inner history of parties, as McKenzie's account shows in rich detail, demonstrates that party chiefs cannot win such conformity without great labor. Leaders cannot "ignore with impunity the moods and aspirations of their followers; they must carry their followers (and above all their followers in the parliamentary party) with them. And to do so, they have to take into account at every stage the clearly defined currents of opinion within their party" (p. 587).

To "take into account" very often means to compromise. And one of the most valuable aspects of McKenzie's book to the student of party government is the light it sheds on the art of management by which British leaders maintain their position and the unity of their parties by accepting as their own—in whole or in part—the demands of groups of their followers. He traces Balfour's tortuous maneuvers from 1902 to 1906 while he attempted to hold the Conservatives together in spite of the bitter struggle between Free Traders and Fair Traders. He recalls Baldwin's reluctant withdrawal in the face of anti-union sentiment in the party, culminating in the Trades Disputes Act of 1927. He stresses

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continually the lesson of the Carlton Club revolt of 1922: that the Conservative leader who fails to yield to pressure from below may be swept out of power altogether.

How far can we go beyond rough statements about the need for management and the mention of particular cases? Can we frame propositions about the structure of power in British parties that are at once precise and general—as befits political science?

One difficulty is that these power structures are not constant. They seem to change according to personality and circumstance, rendering precise generalization most difficult. Perhaps we could make some further progress by identifying recurrent patterns of change. For example, electoral victory and defeat—as one would expect—usually mark off periods of greater or lesser strength on the part of the leaders. Defeat regularly stimulates criticism of party organization and very often of the Leader, and the first phase of opposition may well be stormy—as it was for the Conservatives after 1929 or Labour after 1951. "Running hungry" and release from the responsibilities of office, however, tend to reunify the party out of power and so to forecast that time of all-round bliss that succeeds the triumph that sooner or later is won at the polls. But some of the pledges made, and many of the personal hopes born, during opposition cannot be fulfilled. So, being in power also has its second phase in which the explosions following defeat are prepared. Thus the Conservatives have recently begun to show deep cracks, as did Attlee's party in the latter part of his administration.

Some such scheme might enable us to explain some of the fluctuations in the power of leaders and to work toward a more precise and general statement of their relation to their followers. But there are fluctuations that are clearly not to be so explained and classified. Apart from the impact of unique personalities and conjunctions of events, there are certain lines of historical development. British politics is not now what it was in Salisbury's day, nor is the position of the Conservative leader in his party what it was then. Party cohesion in parliament has mounted steadily and steeply. Julius Turner has shown that in the middle third of the nineteenth century, party unity was no greater in the House of Commons than in the House of Representatives.[1] Party government, we need to remember, is a relatively late arrival on the British scene.

But as parties and parliament have grown outwardly more monolithic, and the outward show of their leaders' power correspondingly greater, an inner transformation has taken place. In the Conservative party, for

[1] Julius Turner, *Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress*, Baltimore, Md., 1951.

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instance, beginning after World War I and continuing into the present, there has gone on an elaboration of organs and offices through which back-benchers may affect party decisions. To mention only one or two of the main developments: The 1922 Committee—the main back-benchers' committee formed after the election of that year—gave to Conservative private members for the first time an opportunity for regular consultation together. At first exclusively a back-benchers' organ, communicating with the leadership through the traditional whips, the committee has drawn the leaders, whether in or out of power, into a quite close relationship, the Leader himself now often appearing before it, even when he is Prime Minister. Moreover, an elaborate system of functional committees—some eighteen main committees with various sub-committees—has grown up, especially since World War II; they are related to the 1922 Committee and before them also leaders frequently appear. In and around this developing framework, groups of M.P.'s can and do assert themselves. It is as if the M.P., deprived more and more of his independence in voting, has sought to right the balance by demanding a greater voice in the decisions to which he will be bound. And indeed, the 1922 Committee in the minds of some of its founders was—in the words of one of them—intended to be "a rein upon the leaders," who, it was felt, had led the party astray in the period of coalition.

To measure more accurately what has happened to the power relations of Leader and follower would require more information—and perhaps more delicate instruments than political scientists now possess. But we need to recognize that a growth of party discipline does not necessarily imply a proportionate decline in the power of the individual M.P. Even those who complain of their thralldom may demonstrate this possibility. One member, author of a book bitterly denouncing present rigidities,[2] proved himself a most effective lobbyist within the party on behalf of his Roman Catholic co-religionists during the passage of the 1944 Education Act.

Things do change, even among British Tories, and McKenzie may be fairly criticized for failing—in his anxiety to bring out what is constant—to dig into this important drift in the structure of Conservative power. In his account of the parliamentary Labour party, his stress initially—and rightly—is on "the evolution of the concept of the Leader." In the beginning the parliamentary group had only a chairman, who was elected annually and was often a different person from session

[2] Christopher Hollis, *Can Parliament Survive?*, London, 1949.

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to session. By 1922 MacDonald had emerged as Leader in name and in fact, enjoying a position in his party no less influential than that of the Conservative Leader in his. In view of MacDonald's highhandedness, even disdain, toward his followers and colleagues, his long and secure tenure invites comparison with the plight of Baldwin, who in roughly the same period had on several occasions to face menacing revolts. But perhaps McKenzie's inference from that comparison is a little too favorable to the power of the Labour Leader. Lansbury, after all, was forced out by a hostile conference and it only begs the question to try to explain this away by saying that he had never claimed the role of Leader "as it is normally conceived" (p. 325). Even more important is 1931. Although MacDonald was joined in the National government by the two other members of Labour's Big Three—Thomas and Snowden —only a tiny handful of back-benchers and no significant section of the mass organization followed him. And in recent years, Attlee's careful balancing of forces in the party has illustrated the continual need for management and judiciously gauged concession. The formal powers of discipline in the Labour party, it is true, look formidable on paper and, when directed against single individuals or small groups, can in fact be devastating. But as Leon Epstein has recently pointed out,[3] they are useless when a substantial minority is up in arms. On such occasions in British parties, as in democratic parties elsewhere, the only way to unity is compromise.

To examine the relation of leaders and followers only in the parliamentary parties and apart from the mass organizations outside is artificial. As McKenzie shows, the same interests and currents of opinion are present in both—although not necessarily in the same proportions—and support or dissidence in one will have its echo in the other. McKenzie spends a good deal of time examining the role of the party conferences and shows, what is indisputably correct, that rarely in the conference of either party is the leadership openly beaten by an adverse vote. This is not the same, of course, as saying that the leadership normally has its way. For as McKenzie points out in general—although he sometimes forgets it in particular cases—leaders may win "victories" by adopting betimes the views they know the majority will prefer. The rule on which they act, familiar to anyone in authority—father, teacher, employer, or officeholder—immensely complicates the measurement of power.

[3] "Cohesion of British Parliamentary Parties," *American Political Science Review*, L, No. 2 (June 1956), pp. 360-77.

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"Leaders," writes McKenzie, "are bound to be concerned mainly with their own conceptions of the national interest and with the competing demands of various interest groups which may or may not be adequately reflected within their party organization" (p. 589). At a conference, spokesmen for various interests—trade unions, farmers, landlords, war veterans, old-age pensioners, and so on—will make themselves heard. In each party, certain interests will be overrepresented as compared with the electors whose votes must be won if the party is to gain a majority, and so, of course, will the party militants. But whatever the balance of power at conferences, both parties' leaders have a further opportunity to redesign the profile that they will present to the electorate. This is provided by the manifesto issued at the time of a General Election.

It is interesting to follow through the intra-party decisions on policy, beginning with the resolutions submitted to party conferences and ending with the opposing manifestoes. When, for instance, we read through the resolutions submitted to the conferences of 1953, we get the impression of fundamental divergencies in social philosophy and sharp clashes of interest. The outcome in terms of resolutions actually adopted considerably modifies that impression. For instance, the proposals for wholesale nationalization that had been offered in large numbers to the Labour conference did not find a place in the final draft of the program, *Challenge to Britain*. Similarly, at the Tory conference, certain motions sharply hostile to trade unions were successfully prevented from even being debated. To examine the manifestoes of the next General Election in 1955, however, is to see an even more striking convergence of policy. Points of significant difference stand out—for instance, Labour's proposal to municipalize rented housing—but the general effect is that of two sets of party leaders making similar appeals to much the same groups of voters. Labour's plank on housing—to continue with this item of its program—included a promise to help people purchase their own homes—a typically Tory proposal which had barely been mentioned in the dozens of resolutions on the subject submitted to the conference of 1953. The Conservatives in turn stressed slum clearance, although this was advocated in only one or two of thirty-two resolutions on housing submitted to the conference a year and a half before. At the same time, the protests against housing subsidies and rent control, which had been the principal themes of those resolutions, found no echo whatsoever in the manifesto.

Judging by recent British experience, fierce two-party competition

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does not necessarily mean that party programs will sharply differ. On the contrary, such competition may well draw party policies together. In the process, almost inevitably programs lose coherence and become "bundles of compromises." At the same time they become more representative, if by that we mean that they attempt to please a wide selection of interest groups among the voters. The interplay between power and purpose is complex. British leaders are indeed "quite powerful" in relation to their followers—although certainly not "all-powerful." And it is precisely this power that enables them in proportion to resist demands from within the party in order to yield to electoral pressures. It follows that, as McKenzie notes, "the 'agreement on fundamentals' is very nearly as great as it has ever been in the modern history of British parties. . . . Two monolithic structures now face each other and conduct furious arguments about the comparatively minor issues that separate them" (pp. 581 and 586).

In a class-ridden country like Britain, class differences are bound to make their way into politics. The parties—at any rate, in their present phase—can hardly be accused of sharpening these differences. Britain, like the United States, is a complex modern society, divided into many diverse interest groups whose aims cannot be neatly and coherently classified under two and only two headings. The notion that British parties accomplish this in their social philosophies and programs needs deflation as much as do the stereotypes of party organization that McKenzie demolishes.

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THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH

By ROBERT S. MERRILL

Simon Kuznets, Wilbert E. Moore, and Joseph J. Spengler, eds., *Economic Growth: Brazil, India, Japan*, Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1955, 613 pp. $12.50.

I

WIDESPREAD concern with poverty in the so-called underdeveloped countries has become a major feature of the post-World War II scene. There have been numerous discussions of causes and possible remedies, many plans for practical action, and implementation of a considerable variety of programs under various auspices. This activity has been accompanied by a rapidly growing literature dealing with the technical problems which arise in planning and carrying out practical measures. In addition, there has been a great expansion of scientific interest in the conditions and consequences of differential economic growth during the past two centuries. Though few, if any, have thought that a definitive "general theory" of economic growth capable of immediate practical application would be quickly forthcoming, many have thought that a concentrated effort to improve our general understanding of economic growth might provide some useful supplements and corrections to the largely untested principles now available to practitioners. Moreover, the subject has great intrinsic interest and provides an opportunity to examine the problems and possibilities of interdisciplinary research.

As scholars explore the field of economic growth, the difficulties of doing fruitful research seem to be as great as the importance and interest of the subject. The subject is vast—more omnidisciplinary than multidisciplinary. A knowledge of historical developments during at least the past two hundred years in all parts of the world is relevant. No well-developed tradition of cross-cultural research in the field is available. Since the day of the classical economists long-run economic change has generally been neglected, largely because of the many difficulties which beset such study. It is not at all clear that more recent theoretical and methodological advances in the social sciences have obviated these. Therefore, much recent work on economic growth has been exploratory:

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an effort to find usable approaches to a vast, complex, and relatively amorphous body of data and problems.

The present book is the outcome of such an effort by the recently formed Committee on Economic Growth of the Social Science Research Council. The Committee wanted to explore the possibilities and problems of making systematic comparative studies of economic growth. Given their resources, they decided to concentrate on three main aspects: economic trends, demographic trends, and "Social Structure, the State, and Economic Growth." They picked three contrasting non-European countries (Brazil, India, Japan) which they felt had been sufficiently well-studied that scholars could be found to summarize and analyze data on each topic for each country in a relatively short period of time. The resulting papers, together with comments by discussants, were then circulated beforehand to participants in a research conference held in the spring of 1952. At the conference, each of the three topics was discussed on the basis of the information provided about the three countries.

The main body of the book consists of fifteen of the summary papers by almost that number of authors, revised in the light of the conference discussions and grouped under the three topical headings. The discussions were not included, apparently because they were too diffuse. Instead, each of the editors prepared a general essay on the topic he was most familiar with to provide a broad introductory framework to the papers concerned.

As represented by this book, the outcome of this effort is definitely disappointing; indeed, Kuznets recognizes it as such in his foreword. Though many of the individual studies provide interesting data and ideas, the papers on a given topic are not sufficiently parallel to provide a basis for reasonably systematic comparison nor is it easy to obtain from them a coherent picture of any one country. The introductory essays, while they outline general problems and discuss various methodological issues, deal relatively briefly with the materials on the three countries and even then seldom attempt systematic comparisons.

Thus, the studies in *Economic Growth* do not form a coherent whole. Since some of them have already been published elsewhere, and others may be, it might be questioned whether publication in the present form was justified. But I think that such a reaction ignores the main significance of the book. Here under one cover is a varied and fairly representative sample of the kinds of materials relevant to economic growth available on three non-European countries, interpreted according to a number of different approaches. And, in Kuznets' foreword and the

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three introductory essays, one has statements of some of the major problems in the general study of economic growth that one would like to tackle, using such data. The juxtaposition of case studies and general problems challenges the reader to think about ways of bringing the two into a more fruitful relationship. In publishing a book which places the reader in much the same situation as confronted the conference participants, the Committee, at least by implication, invites both area specialists and theorists to take up the problems of comparative study where the conference left off. While this was not the initial aim of the Committee, I doubt if they could have found a better way of presenting the invitation.

I would like to take up this challenge in a small way and make a few remarks on some of the difficulties that arise in using case materials for comparative purposes. The kind of comparative study that can be most usefully explored on the basis of the present symposium is that which focuses on establishing time series of major variables for a broad sampling of diverse cases over as long a time period as possible. Such systematic data, Kuznets feels, would provide empirical evidence of the similarities and differences in the economic growth of nations which it is the task of general theory to explain; provide a basis for testing available impressionistic hypotheses and generalizations; suggest new hypotheses; and provide the beginnings of tests of such new ideas.[1] He proposes such an approach explicitly with reference to economic and demographic trends, but I want to examine its possibilities in the study of determinants of economic growth as well.

II

For the study of economic and demographic trends, Kuznets suggests comparing the quantitative course of economic growth as manifested in "changes in aggregate output, in industrial structure, in accumulation of capital" and trends in population size and its significant components (p. v). Since these seem to be definite questions about quantitative variables for which there are developed techniques of estimation, one might expect that systematic data and comparisons could be easily produced.

This expectation, however, is not borne out even by the papers on demographic trends, which are more comparable than the others. From these papers, it is evident that even when data on the same variables are available, this does not necessarily mean that bases for systematic com-

[1] See, for example, the first reference in note 2 below.

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parison are provided. For example, though each of the three papers deals with changes in total population, birth rates, death rates, and migration, the organization and manner of presentation are such that the reader has to ferret out, rework, and then compare the data himself, in some cases locating them only in the non-demographic papers. In the case of age structure, literacy and educational status, rural-urban distribution, regional distribution, and internal migration, it is often impossible to find comparable figures on all three countries. This is not to say that these papers do not contain valuable data and analyses, but rather that differences in approach and emphasis among them result in only a relatively small core of comparable material.

Thus, even in fields where quantitative and systematic methods of analysis are relatively well advanced, it is by no means easy to develop systematic comparisons. In such fields it *is* possible to ask a limited number of specific questions of experts on each case, but the complexity of the phenomena investigated, the variations in the form in which data are readily available, and the possibility of different selective treatments if the number of questions considered is large can easily render the results of different specialists relatively uncomparable. Kuznets attributes part of such diversity to different disciplinary and personal interests, but it seems to me that it is the responsibility of those interested in comparisons to formulate their questions in such a way that comparability can be achieved, since the specialist is seldom in a position to know just what data in what form are required. This requires an amount of organization and standardization much greater than might be anticipated. Moreover, the effort required to rework available data into appropriate form is often so great that few results can be expected on relatively short notice.

The papers on economic trends exhibit similar problems, but the difficulty that stands out is that of deficiencies in basic data, particularly for relatively extended time periods. Gaps make it impossible in many cases to construct directly aggregate economic indices of major importance. Such series as can be constructed often differ from case to case and, even where similar ones are available, their significance varies because of differences between countries and time periods. To provide even rough estimates of important economic magnitudes by indirect inference from such partial series would require the development of standards of comparison and interpretation using information from countries and time periods for which relatively complete data exist—a task calling for a great deal of reworking of such data.

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It may be doubted whether such large-scale efforts are feasible or, if possible at great cost, desirable. Kuznets is optimistic despite his awareness of the difficulties involved and stresses the fact that no really concerted effort has been made to explore the diversity of cases of economic growth. The reader of this book is provided with little evidence on which to judge the usefulness of systematic data on economic and demographic trends. For such evidence he can turn to Kuznets' recent work containing comparisons of countries on which relatively adequate data can be put together.[2] These suggest, I think, that a major effort would be worthwhile. But it should be realized at the outset that the task is difficult, both conceptually and practically, and may easily require new forms of research organization and methods of work if it is to be carried out as successfully as the data permit.

III

The papers on economic and demographic trends clearly indicate that delimited and definite questions must be asked of each case and answers stated in comparable form if systematic comparisons are to be achieved. When we turn to the study of "qualitative" determinants of economic growth, where methods are far less developed, this problem looms even larger and raises basic issues as to the kinds of questions useful in comparative work. The essays in Part III on "Social Structure, the State, and Economic Growth" provide some hints of sources of difficulty and possible directions for further work.

I think that one can infer from these papers that certain kinds of questions are *not* appropriate bases for comparative study because their answers ramify far too broadly. Questions about the "influences," "effects," or "role" of a particular factor are of this kind. For example, the papers on the role of the state attempt to trace the effects of governmental policy on economic change. To do this, they must not only summarize the many changing aspects of such policies but also deal with at least two other different and difficult subjects. On the one hand, the effects of many policies depend on how they influence the economic milieu—prices, costs, markets, price levels, capital availability, labor

[2] See Simon Kuznets, "Towards a Theory of Economic Growth," in Robert Lakachman, ed., *National Policy for Economic Welfare at Home and Abroad*, Garden City, N.Y., 1955, ch. 3, pp. 12-103; *idem*, "International Differences in Capital Formation and Financing," in National Bureau of Economic Research, *Capital Formation and Economic Growth*, Princeton, N.J., 1955, pp. 19-106; and *idem*, "Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of Nations, I: Levels and Variability of Rates of Growth," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, v, No. 1 (October 1956), pp. 5-94.

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supply, etc.—within which economic organizations operate. These effects, however, depend not only on the content of the policies, but also on the internal and international economic situation of the country. Therefore, to isolate and trace the effects of governmental policy on the economic situation and opportunities of various segments of an economy require the analyst to explore the changing economic situation of his case in considerable detail. On the other hand, the effects of policy also depend on how organizations and individuals respond to changing economic pressures and opportunities. For example, both Lockwood and Reubens stress the significance of a kind of Japanese analogue to the "Protestant ethic" in explaining the direction and intensity of Japanese responses to changing economic conditions brought about, in part, by governmental action. Thus, studying the effects of state policy in a given case also requires that one deal with the very difficult problem of trying to ascertain and characterize the principles which account for the manner in which members of a society respond to changing economic conditions.

A similar problem of scope is evident in the discussions of social structure. Most features of social structure, such as family and community organization, systems of social stratification, patterns of social relations, value systems, etc., do not themselves constitute aspects of economic action. Rather, they are held to influence patterns of economic choice. For this reason, such studies have to characterize both social structure and patterns of economic action, and then relate the one to the other, each a complex task.

It is therefore not surprising that these articles do not provide enough comparable and similarly analyzed materials to form a basis for systematic comparative study, even though they often shed much light on the particular countries discussed.

Another kind of question which does not seem useful in this context is that which asks about the determinants of some feature or change. As indicated by discussions of the determinants of government policy, of changes in social structure, or of the course of change in an industry or economic sector, etc., that are scattered throughout the book, such questions lead so readily to many diverse factors that the possibility of focusing on delimited questions is almost inevitably lost.

It would seem to follow from these considerations that a first step in developing methods for the broad comparative study of the determinants of economic growth would be to isolate a limited number of sharply delimited features of a society which appear to be important

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in economic change. Case studies of the determinants or effects of given features would be valuable in suggesting which features are likely to be important, but, given our present knowledge and techniques, they cannot themselves be directly incorporated as parts of a comparative study. Instead, the next step would be to work out ways of succinctly characterizing the major variations found in each feature so that diverse countries and time periods could be systematically described within a consistent framework. It would then be the task of area specialists to use such concepts to characterize conditions in their respective countries over time. The result aimed at would be time series for each feature of each country, which could then be compared with one another and with comparable economic and demographic series in a fashion analogous to that followed by Kuznets in the studies mentioned above.

It goes without saying that it is far easier to sketch such a program than to execute it. The difficulties are enormous.

IV

I would like to conclude with a few remarks on one particular type of question which seems important in following out a program of this type. In executing some such investigation, it seems reasonable to give priority to the two major features most directly related to economic action: (1) the milieu which determines the economic pressures and alternatives confronting organizations and individuals, and (2) the patterns or strategies followed in responding to this changing milieu. Other features, such as governmental policy and social structure, are largely significant as influences on economic milieu and/or response patterns. Thus, study of the former would be greatly aided by the development of methods of analyzing and characterizing the latter.

It seems clear from the papers in the present book and from other work on economic growth that special problems arise in the analysis of the relations among situation, response patterns, and economic performance. In the first place, both situation and response patterns have so many different aspects that it is difficult to discover ways of characterizing them, even approximately, in sufficiently simple terms that comparisons are manageable. Second, they are interdependent in that the important aspects of an economic situation are those which, according to a given strategy of economic choice, make a difference in the action taken. This means that determining patterns of response is of key importance. But it is precisely in inferring such patterns that conflicting interpretations frequently arise.

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The reason for this difficulty is fairly clear. What is actually observable is a series of economically relevant actions, together with the situations in which these take place. Since actions change with situation, one seeks to discover regularities underlying such changes and to formulate approximate rules of behavior such that, if people behaved "as if" they followed these rules, they would take the actions observed. However, since both actions and situations have many aspects, it is not surprising that different interpretations of a given body of evidence are possible. Whyte's comments on the kind of interpretation of the behavior of large-scale Brazilian agriculturalists given by James and Siegel are a case in point. A fuller and more striking example may be found in an essay by Aubrey published in another symposium.[3] There he tries to show that a great deal of investment behavior usually interpreted as a manifestation of cultural preferences can be interpreted as economically rational action in the usual sense if certain aspects of the situation confronting investors are taken into account. I do not think Aubrey proves his interpretation to be correct and previous ones wrong. Rather, he shows to my satisfaction that two interpretations having very different implications for economic growth appear to be consistent with the kind of data usually available.

This clearly suggests that improved methods are required if reliable analyses and comparisons of patterns of economic choice are to be made. Some general directions in which improvement would be useful may be mentioned. No interpretation should be accepted unless the author clearly states the alternative interpretations he has tried and explains the basis of his choice between them. This in turn means that an effort must be made to move from relatively vague impressionistic characterizations of patterns of economic response toward rigorous models from which a variety of precise deductions can be made. Moreover, a variety of different models of this sort need to be constructed. For it is only when one can compare a variety of deductions from a variety of alternative models that one can decide what empirical data are crucial in determining which model applies, and then can actually provide evidential grounds for preferring one interpretation to others. All of this requires a style of analysis and presentation rather different from that usually found in descriptions and narrative interpretations of economic change.

It is important to add that improved techniques of constructing and testing inferred regularities underlying changing actions in changing

[3] Henry G. Aubrey, "Investment Decisions in Underdeveloped Countries," in *Capital Formation and Economic Growth, op.cit.*, pp. 397-440.

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situations have applications beyond the study of strategies of economic choice. One major possibility of improving our understanding of governmental economic policies and of reducing their complexity to a form more amenable to comparative analysis is to seek regularities connecting various policies at a given time and changes in policy over time. Kuznets seems to use this idea in his concept of "secular decisions," and a more elaborate framework along similar lines has been developed by Hoselitz.[4] Similarly, situational variations in reproductive behavior, in business organization and operation, in economically relevant social relations, etc., would seem to require the same kind of approach. I think it is only as we obtain a far firmer grasp than we now have on the relations between action and situation that we will be able to locate reliably the crucial boundaries which differentiate changes brought about by situational alterations from those which stem from modifications of the deeper levels of culture, social norms, and personality.

[4] See Bert F. Hoselitz, "Patterns of Economic Growth," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, XXI, No. 4 (November 1955), pp. 416-31.

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